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I. !NTRODUCTION 
In recent years, commentators with a broad range of political per-
spectives have called for renewed attention to "morality" in family law. 
This call has been made in a variety of contexts by legal scholars, I politi-
1. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 865, 879 (1989) 
(finding that U[s]tate intervention into family life. _ . is less likely now than previously to be based 
on moral judgments"); Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals & the Law: No-Fault Divorce and 
Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503 [hereinafter Schneider, Marriage, Morals] (evaluating di-
minished moral discourse in family law and noting both advantages and disadvantages of the trend); 
Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L 
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cians,2 and policy makers.3 Two concerns about themes of family law 
commentary emerge from these diverse sources. The fIrst theme argues 
for a new direction in family policy. Those advocating a change in direc-
tion argue that traditional families-two parent, heterosexual married 
couples with children-are essential to a healthy society and must be en-
couraged.4 They argue that contemporary family laws, most notably no-
fault divorce and related laws, have contributed to and fostered the de-
cline of the traditional family.5 According to these commentators, the 
REv. 1803, 1807-20 (1985) [hereinafter Schneider, Moral Discourse] (noting the "tendency toward 
diminished moral discourse" in family law cases and statutes and the debate surrounding them); Jana 
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443, 1527 (1992) (arguing that the 
"increased dissociation of law and morality . . . is directly linked to the privatization of family 
law"); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Last Decade(s) of American Family Law, 46 1. LEGAL EDUC. 546, 547 
(1996) (noting a decline in moral discourse in some areas of family law); Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce 
Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 741, 741 (1994) (critiquing the "no-
fault divorce culture" and suggesting connections between no-fault divorce and violence). But see, 
e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Femi-
nist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DrvORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 198 (critiquing the 
traditional moral judgments in family law as too narrowly conceived); Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral 
Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 225, 270 (1997) (arguing that moral discourse in fam-
ily law has evolved rather than diminished in recent decades); Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided 
Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers Should Look Instead to the American Law 
Institute, 11 INT'L 1.L. POL'y & FAM. 216, 230-36 (1997) (summarizing proposals adopted by the 
American Law Institute that remove concepts of fault and marital misconduct from marital property 
and alimony law). 
2. As early as 1980, President Jimmy Carter, speaking from the White House, called for a 
"reaffIrmation of families as a fundamental building block of our society." President Jimmy Carter, 
Opening Session of the White House Conference on Families, Baltimore, Maryland (June 5, 1980). 
More recently, both Republicans and Democrats have called for restoration of family values. See, 
e.g., The Contract with America (July 11, 1998), <http://web.mit.edulrepublicansfwww/con-
tracthtml>; see also Robert Wright, The False Politics of Values, TIME, Sept 9, 1996, at 42 (evaluat-
ing the bipartisan interest in values and morality). 
3. Policy makers calling for a more explicit integration of traditional values in family policy 
also cover the full range of the political spectrum. Compare CONTRACf WITH THE AMERICAN FAMILY 
(Ralph Reed ed., 1995) with WIlLIAM A. GALSTON. LIBERAL PuRPoSES: GoOD. VIRTUES. AND DIVER. 
SITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 213-37, 257-89 (1991). 
4. Of course, defining "family" is both a critical issue within this debate and one that divides 
many scholars. Compare Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional 
Rights of Children, 27 Loy. U. CHI. Ll. 321, 327-28 (1996) (arguing that the institution of marriage 
is integral to familial love and security) with Martha Minow, All in the Family and In All Families: 
Membership, Loving, and Owing, in SEX. PREFERENCE. AND FAMILY: EsSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 
249,260 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) (arguing for an "expansive" defini-
tion of family on the ground that "values signaled by 'family' are worthwhile and ••• should be 
promoted wherever possible"). 
5. Another recurring target of this group is welfare and its claimed connection to family disin-
tegration. In recent years, key leaders and policymakers have blamed welfare for social problems like 
poverty and family violence that contribute to family breakup. See Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Ending 
Welfare Reform as We Know It, AM. PROSPECf, Fall 1993, at 84 (finding that a political consensus 
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principles of privacy, individual rights and autonomy that underlie the 
"no-fault revolution"6 should be deemphasized in family law policy. In-
stead, family law policy should promote a return to traditional principles 
of right and wrong and marital commitment.7 
The second theme is voiced primarily by some family law scholars 
who have identified a change in the language of family law. The decreas-
ing reliance on "fault" in family law over the last few decades, accord-
ing to these scholars, has resulted in "a diminution of the law's discourse 
in moral terms about the relations between family members" and the 
"transfer of moral decisions from the law to the people the law once reg-
ulated."8 These scholars do not claim that contemporary family law lacks 
a moral justification, nor are they strongly advocating corrective mea-
sures.9 Rather, they note that the way current family law "expresses 
among some liberals and most conservatives has emerged that blames single mothers receiving wel-
fare for "weakened commitment to competence, work, and responsible living" which leads to pov-
erty); Karen Hosler, Dole Draws Fire with Comments on Crime; Candidate Criticized for Appearing 
to Link Spousal Abuse, Welfare, BALT. SUN, May 31, 1996, at 8A (quoting 1996 presidential candi-
date Bob Dole who blamed welfare programs for increases in domestic violence); Robert Scheer, 
Gingrich, Savaging Welfare, Is on a Fool's Errand, L.A TIMES, Nov. 28, 1995, at B9 (describing 
Gingrich's false "depiction of [a slain pregnant woman] as the product of an immoral welfare cul-
ture"). Of course, families are affected by policies outside the traditional law of domestic relations 
such as welfare and employment policies. However, a thorough discussion of trends in those laws 
and their affect on the stability of American families is outside the scope of this Article. 
6. The term "no-fault revolution" was originally used by Lenore J. Weitzman in THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CIDLDREN IN 
AMERICA (1985). That term and other references to the no-fault era throughout this Article refer to 
the shift from exclusive reliance on fault grounds for divorce to the inclusion of no-fault grounds in 
all states. This era began in the late 1960s and was completed in the early 1980s. The term also ref-
ers to changes in alimony and marital property laws that occurred during the same period throughout 
the United States, which deemphasized the role of fault. The term "fault era" as used throughout 
this Article refers to the period before the no-fault era when fault was a key factor in divorce, ali-
mony, and custody decisions. 
7. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN. FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING oUR MOST URGENT 
SOCIAL PROBLEM 20-21 (1995); GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB. THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIE1Y FROM 
VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES (1995); William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, Pus. 
INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12 (suggesting that no-fault divorce and related developments in the law 
have led to increases in divorce and the weakening of the American family). Of course, concern 
about the stability of the American family has emerged throughout American history since the Puri-
tans voiced concerns about "fragility of marriage, the growing selfishness and irresponsibility of par-
ents and the increasing rebelliousness of children." ARLENE SKOLNICK. EMBATILED PARADISE: THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 8 (1991) (quoting SARA M. EVANS. BORN FOR LIB. 
ERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 63 (1989». 
8. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note I, at 1807; see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Dis-
course and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 430, 431 (1985) (clarifying the meaning of moral dis-
course as "the frank invocation by courts of value-laden language to justify both doctrine and partic-
ular resUlts"). 
9. Carl Schneider and Jana Singer, for example, see this trend of diminished moral discourse 
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ideas"lo-through the language of statutes and judicial decisions-in-
creasingly relies less on moral language, ideas and prohibitions, and 
more on principles of private ordering and individual freedom. They cau-
tion that this may have a negative impact on preserving traditional 
families. 
This Article challenges the assumption that no-fault divorce and re-
lated family law developments over the last three decades have signalled 
a retreat from either a moral vision or moral discourse in family law. 
Without question, the shift to no-fault divorce has resulted in sweeping 
changes in both the moral justification underlying family law and the 
language of the statutes and cases reflecting these developments. The Ar-
ticle maintains, however, that contemporary family law has not retreated 
from morality; rather, the values that are embodied in both the language 
of statutes and in judicial opinions have evolved over time and reflect 
both a broader understanding of morality and a reconceived notion of 
rights within the family. 
Contemporary family law has replaced the emphasis on limiting sex-
ual relations to marriage that characterized the fault era with an emphasis 
on other values-equality, fairness, responsibility for dependent spouses 
and, most especially, emotional and fmancial commitment to children. 
The language of the laws embodying these new values contains fewer 
explicit references to morality. But, this new discourse-with its empha-
sis on obligations, protection, duty, and equality-is the language of an 
expanded meaning of morality informed by the concept of practicing vir-
tues. Individuals lead moral lives by meeting their duties, treating others 
fairly and protecting the vulnerable. I I 
The new developments in family law that reflect this changed mo-
rality include increased regulation in child custody and visitation, child 
support, and family violence. Other areas-access to marriage and the 
rights of cohabitants-have not been dramatically changed in the no-fault 
era but are being debated in ways that make the moral assumptions un-
derlying the laws more explicit.12 The debate about same sex marriage, 
for example, has forced federal and state legislators, family law scholars, 
and policymakers to rethink the religious, cultural and, most prominently, 
as having boIh positive and negative consequences for family law. See Schneider, Marriage, Morals, 
supra nole I, at 503; Singer, supra nole 1, at 1527. 
10. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra nOIe I, at 1827. 
11. For a fuller discussion of !he meaning of practicing virtues, see infra noles 29-72 and ac-
companying Iext. 
12. See infra noles 241-312, 364-78 and accompanying IeXt. 
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the moral values underlying the institution of marriage.13 
Finally, this shift in values may also account for an increasing reli-
ance on laws drafted as rules rather than the broad discretionary stan-
dards that have traditionally characterized family law.14 Movements such 
as the change from discretionary standards to required formulas for set-
ting child support have conferred new rights on family members, particu-
larly custodial parents and children.ls "Rights talk"16 is often associated 
with diminished emphasis on morality because focusing on individual 
rights over family concerns is thought to undermine marriage by encour-
aging pursuit of self-fulfillment over duties to other family members.17 
Rights among family members, however, can serve to reinforce the val-
ues of equality and commitment. The increased use of rules to create 
rights and regulate obligations among family members reflects the law's 
increased concern for enforcing family members' obligations to each 
family's most vulnerable members, particularly children.ls 
Both the language and the purposes underpinning current standards, 
however, draw on moral principles. Pursuit of these new values involves 
greater emphasis on issues that, at first glance, appear more concerned 
with economic or psychological principles. For example, courts assessing 
"fault" in a divorce context focus on issues like sexual misconduct. In 
the no-fault era, courts spend more time on issues like determining in-
come for child support and evaluating parenting skills. To the extent this 
discourse translates to fmancial and emotional support for children, it re-
lates to moral issues. This Article concludes that such a shift is desirable 
because it has the potential to strengthen families-in all their current 
forms-and their ties to the broader community. Most importantly, this 
shift is one that furthers what has become the central moral goal of fam-
ily law: protection of children. 
Part One of this Article explores the meaning of morality by briefly 
reviewing a variety of attempts to explore the meaning of moral conduct. 
This Section draws on a variety of contemporary moral philosophers who 
13. See infra notes 247-80 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 519·65 and accompanying texL 
15. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The 
Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 226-31 (1991). 
16. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POUTICAL DIS. 
COURSE (1991) (critiquing what she sees as the American preoccupation with rights, which validates 
individual, arbitrary preferences rather than teaching collective responsibility and duty); infra notes 
89-103 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 472·86 and accompanying text. 
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have built on the classical tradition to develop a broader defmition of 
moral behavior. This discussion provides a context for the current debate 
about the meaning of morality in family law and moral discourse in the 
no-fault era. 
Part One also reviews the historical debate about how law should 
strike a balance between promoting communitarian values and respecting 
autonomy and individual rights. The Article argues that the conflict un-
derlying this debate may be overstated. All laws have moral implications, 
and decisions about law, made by citizens, legislators and policymakers, 
necessarily involve choices that privilege some values over others. Regu-
lating family members is a particularly value-laden task. A tension will 
always exist between protecting individual freedom and privacy of family 
members and state intervention to further the common good. However, 
this tension does not require a retreat from the concept of rights within 
the family; rather, rights can be conceived in a way that furthers the 
moral vision of family law by using rights as a tool to ensure the protec-
tion of vulnerable members of the family. 
Part One concludes by noting that the hierarchy of values embodied 
in the moral vision of family law has changed over time. Sexual morality 
has become less important over time while protecting children has be-
come central to the moral framework of family law. 
Part Two of the Article examines the traditional, fault-based moral 
discourse in the law governing grounds for divorce, alimony and child 
custody that prevailed in this country until the 1970's. It concludes that 
this approach has several significant drawbacks. First, the fault-era's em-
phasis on sexual practices and traditional gendered family roles rein-
forced patriarchy and tended to hurt custodial parents-primarily wo-
men-and children. Additionally, the fault-era's reliance on broad 
discretionary standards resulted in inadequate fmancial awards and dual 
standards for men and women. Further, because moral discourse in fam-
ily law has been primarily focused on issues of sexual conduct in mar-
riage, the fault-era moral vision excluded families created outside of mar-
riage. Litigating issues of fault also exacted significant financial and 
emotional costs on families. Finally, the emphasis on regulating sexual 
conduct in the fault-era did little to promote the evolving moral goal of 
family law-protecting children. 
Part Three of the Article explores the ways in which some laws that 
developed in the no-fault era express morality in family law. Examining 
current laws governing divorce, marital property, child support and cus-
tody, the Article identifies ways in which both the language surrounding 
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the debates about such laws and the laws themselves express values of 
equality, commitment and responsibility for family members, particularly 
dependent members. The Article notes that for the ftrst time, the lan-
guage of morality has expanded into two areas that were largely unregu-
lated in the "fault" era-access to marriage and family violence. 
The Article concludes that these developments over the last thirty 
years represent a healthy trend toward an overall family policy that 
strengthens families and protects each family's weakest members. Never-
theless, more needs to be done to achieve a family policy that protects 
children. Finally, the Article identiftes additional measures, both in tradi-
tional domestic law and in the broader policy arena, that must be accom-
plished to truly strengthen families, and most importantly, to protect 
children. 
II. MORALITY AND ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 
A. Defining Morality 
Before evaluating the changes in the role of morality and moral dis-
course in family law over the last thirty years, it is necessary to clarify 
what is meant by morality in this context and how it relates to the law. 
Until recently, popular debate about morality in this country often fo-
cused on sexual practices.19 A brief review of moral theory and philoso-
phy reveals a much broader meaning of morality, which is beginning to 
be reflected in law and social policy. 
Defming morality is a challenging task. Efforts to formulate princi-
ples of moral behavior have occupied cultures throughout the history of 
19. Carl Schneider sees this limited view of morality as part of a recent trend that signals a 
change in "the social position of moral discourse ...• [T]he very term 'moral' has in some milieux 
taken on a narrow-and derogatory-meaning. Specifically, it is at best confined to questions of sex-
ual morality. 'Morality' means 'traditional morality' which means sexual morality." Schneider, Mar-
riage, Morals, supra note 1, at 537. Although Schneider suggests that the association of morals with 
sexual practices helps to account for the recent decline in moral discourse in family law, he notes 
that similar observations were made by commentators almost seventy years ago. See id. at 537 n.77 
(citing WALTER LIPPMAN, A PREFACE TO MORALS 285 (1929) ("[I]n the popular mind it is immedi-
ately assumed that when morals are discussed it is sexual morals that are meant.")); see also 
Michael J. Meyer, Family Virtues and the Common Good, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 409, 413 (1996) 
(" [T)he entire realm of virtues is often reduced .•. into one subset, such as sexual virtues, teenage 
chastity or marital fidelity."); Kenneth L. Woodward, What Is Virtue?, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1994, at 
38 (comparing the modem American association of virtue with "sexual purity" to the ancient 
Greeks, medieval theologians and some contemporary moral philosopher's association of virtue with 
the "good person"). 
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humankind.20 Even a modest attempt to draw from the major Western 
schools of moral philosophy, which have influenced the contemporary 
debate about morality and families, would require a review of the ethical 
traditions of classical Greece, medieval Christendom, the natural law 
moral philosophers of seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain~ the 
utilitarian school, and the rational or Kantian school of thought.21 A de-
tailed and thorough review of the ethical traditions represented by these 
cultures and schools of thought, much less including the many modem 
strains of non-Western thought that have influenced these debates, is be-
yond the scope of this Article.22 There are, however, central themes or is-
sues that emerge from these traditions that provide insight into both the 
general debate about morality and the debate within family law. 
One dimension of morality relates to its meaning as a code or set of 
rules that determines "right" and "wrong" behavior.23 Under this mean-
ing of morality, which most closely resembles the approach during the 
fault era in family law, the primary value of a moral code is to identify 
conduct that should be punished or, to a lesser extent, rewarded.24 
A broader meaning of morality, one that offers much greater poten-
tial for family law, relates to the concept of practicing virtue.25 One must 
20. See generally ALAsDAIR MAclNrYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF Enncs: A HISTORY OF MORAL 
P!in.osOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TwENI1ETII CENTURY (2d ed. 1998). 
21. See generally JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF Ennes (1983). 
22. For a summary of these ethical traditions, see generally FINNIS, supra note 21; 
MAcINTYRE, supra note 20. 
23. The term "moral" can be defmed as "of or relating to principles of right and wrong be-
havior •.. expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior." WEBSTER'S NEW COllEGIATE Dlc. 
TIONARY 748 (5th ed. 1977). Alan Wolfe defines a moral code as "a set of rules that define people's 
obligations to one another." ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBUGATION 
2 (1989); see also Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1827 ("A decision made on moral 
grounds turns on whether particular conduct is 'right' or 'wrong,' whether it accords with the obliga-
tions owed other people or oneself. "). 
24. See, e.g., LoN L FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 30 (1969) (describing this approach to 
morality as the "morality of duty"). 
25. Terms like values, virtue, and morality are used somewhat interchangeably in much of the 
literature on this topic and in this Article. While the word "values" may simply connote one's pref-
erences, its recent use in phrases like "family values" has given it a meaning that approximates 
"virtue." See, e.g., Hugh Leavell, Forget Family Values, Marital Values Hold Key, SAN DIEGO 
UNiON-TRlB., Mar. 9, 1996, at E3 ("The cry for 'family values' is heard across the land."). To the 
extent one understands morality as the practice of virtue, virtues and values are also linked to the 
term morality. 
The subject of morality and its relationship to virtues and values have enjoyed a resurgence of 
interest among politicians and scholars in recent years. For a discussion of politicians' current "re-
lentless" interest and discussion of morality, values and virtue, see Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, The Lazy 
Politician's Way to Win: Embrace Virtue, LA TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at M6; Susan Reimer, Virtue 
Has Become a Growth Industry, BALT. SUN, Nov. 21, 1995, at IE; Woodward, supra note 19, at 38; 
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begin with the ancient Greeks' and the medieval theologians' understand-
ing of the pursuit of virtue as essential to attaining the "Good Life" in 
order to understand how little the ideal of sexual purity, which was the 
focus of moral inquiry in the fault era, expresses about this broader con-
cept of morality.26 Under this classical view, moral individuals are those 
who strive for excellence and the full realization of human potentiaJ.27 
Many contemporary moral philosophers28 have embraced this tradition 
that views practicing virtues as the path to personal happiness and makes 
people, among other things, responsible citizens and parents.29 
Which virtues to practice constitutes much of the debate among 
those philosophers and cultures that ascribe to the concept of the good 
life.30 No tradition places primary emphasis on sexual purity; the con-
cepts covered by the term virtue cover a much broader range of behav-
ior.31 Alasdair MacIntyre has attempted to delineate the differences and 
Wright, supra note 2, at 42. Both scholarly and popular press books on virtue and morality have also 
flooded the market. See generally WILLIAM J. BENNETr. THE BOOK OF VIRTUES: A TREASURY OF 
GREAT MORAL STORIES (1993); A CALL To CHARACI'ER (Colin Green & Herbert Kohl eds., 1995); 
ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE. AfTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE. 
CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 
1995); JAMES Q. Wn.sON. THE MORAL SENSE (1993); VIRTUE (John W. Chapman & William A. GaI-
ston eds., 1992). 
26. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. THE 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA' OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (Bums, 
Oates & Waskbum, 1915); ARiSTOlLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARiSTOTI.E (W.D. Ross trans., 1941). 
27. Immanuel Kant, although often associated with an emphasis on moral law or codes, ech-
oes this view that conforming to rules about right and wrong is not itself central to the moral or 
good life. See IMMANUAL KANT. GESAMMELTE SCHRIFrEN (Prussian Academy 1923), cited in GEORGE 
ARMSTRONG KELLy, IDEAUSM. POLITIes AND HISTORY: SOURCES OF HEGELIAN THOUGHT (1969). In-
stead, obeying the rules is only important insofar as it prepares man to aspire to a life of virtue and 
goodness. See id. 
28. See, e.g., MAcINTYRE, supra note 20; Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democ-
racy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203 (R.B. Douglass et aI. eds., 1990); James Q. Wilson, The 
Family-Values Debate, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1993, at 24. 
29. Lon Fuller's description of the two dimensions of morality-the "morality of duty" and 
the "morality of aspiration"-helps to clarify this dual meaning of morality; 
The morality of aspiration is most plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy. It is the morality 
of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers .••. Where the 
morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at 
the bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible .••• 
FULLER, supra note 24, at 5; see also RICHARD B. BRANDT, EnncAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NOR. 
MATIVE AND CRITICAL Ennes 356-68 (1959) (comparing the dimension of morality that imposes du-
ties or rules with the morality that encourages excellence and aspiring to one's fullest potential); J.M 
FINDLAY, VALUES AND INTENTIONS (1961); W.D. LAMONT, THE PRiNCIPLES OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
(1946); A.D. LINDSAY. THE Two MORALITIES: OUR DUTIES TO GOD AND SOCIETY (1940); A. 
MACBEATH. EXPERIMENTS IN LIVING 55-56 (1952); JEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 40-42 (1990). 
30. See MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 181-203. 
31. See id. at 121-80; see also VIRTUE, supra note 25. 
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similarities in the conceptions of virtue from a variety of Western think-
ers, ranging from Aristotle to Benjamin Franklin.32 Identifying individual 
virtues within the cultures represented by these thinkers, MacIntyre notes 
some of the differences in each culture's "lists of ... virtues. "33 As an 
example, he notes that the New Testament praises humility as a vLrtue, 
while Aristotle would include it as one of the vices related to magnanim-
ity.34 Benjamin Franklin's list of thirteen virtues for private moral ac-
counting includes some virtues not mentioned in Aristotelian or biblical 
lists (cleanliness, silence, industry) and others (the drive to acquire) that 
the ancient Greeks had considered vices.35 MacIntyre summarizes the dif-
ferent approaches to virtue represented by this "relatively coherent tradi-
tion" of Western thought: 
We thus have at least three very different conceptions of virtue to confront a vir-
tue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Ho-
mer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the 
achievement of the specifically human telos whether natural or supernatural (Aris-
totle, the New Testament and Aquinas); a virtue is a quality which has utility in 
achieving earthly and heavenly success (Franklin).36 
MacIntyre concludes that despite the differences in individual virtues 
represented by these three conceptions, they share a core concept of vir-
tue-that the value of practicing an individual virtue must be measured 
by how such practice contributes to the good of one's whole life.37 Under 
this conception, while practicing the individual virtues is worthwhile for 
its own sake, what is most important is how the virtues contribute to the 
ultimate goal of living a unified, good life.38 
This concept of practicing virtues can only work in a society that 
shares the "[same] overriding conception of the telos of a whole human 
life"39 or "shared moral rrrst principles."40 The belief that certain choices 
are morally superior to others was rrrst challenged by the moral and po-
32. See MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 181, 185. 
33. [d. at 181. 
34. See id. at 182. 
35. See id. at 182-183. 
36. [d. at 185. 
37. See id. at 185-203. 
38. Macintyre ultimately concludes that, because modem American society lacks a shared con-
cept of the Good Life, this tradition of practicing the virtues to achieve a shared societal vision of 
the ideal life has no place in contemporary American culture. See id. at 252-55. 
39. [d. at 202. 
40. [d. at 253. 
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litical philosophers during the Enlightenment-Locke41 and his intellec-
tual descendants, Mi1l42 and Dworkin43-who believed in tolerance for 
each individual's creeds and belief systems.44 This belief in moral relativ-
ism makes it difficult, if not impossible, to defme a society's core val-
ues.4S Further, even if a society can be said to share a moral code at a 
given time, many moral philosophers believe new experiences and 
knowledge may change both the hierarchy of values and the values 
themselves.46 
Much of the rhetoric about virtue or values in the United States to-
day is really an attempt to reinstitute the classical and medieval Christian 
tradition of transforming certain political issues, for example same-sex 
marriage and abortion, into issues that can be resolved by the invocation 
of moral principles.47 More specifically, the debates within family law 
concern the evolution of values that have shaped the law's vision of the 
ideal family.48 The vision has moved from one that is fixed, relying upon 
natural law principles to determine the roles and obligations of family 
members,49 to a recognition that both the composition and the functions 
of families in contemporary American society have changed in recent de-
41. See RICHARD AsCHCRAFT. LocKE'S Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 97-121 (1987). 
42. See C.L. TEN. MIu. ON LIBERTY 14-18 (1980). 
43. See generally RONALD DWORKIN. A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
44. See, e.g., ERNST CASSlRER, THE PHILoSOPHY OF THE ENUGlITENMENT 160-81 (1951). 
45. See, e.g., MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 252-53. 
46. The transcendentalist view that certain supreme values exist in nature to be discovered and 
conformed to is represented by both religious and secular philosophers. See AQUINAS, supra note 26; 
KANT, supra note 27, at 112-13. This view is to be contrasted with the empiricist view that an indi-
vidual's or a culture's moral code can change over time as a result of new experience and knowl-
edge. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739). For an interesting contempo-
rary discussion of the transcendentalist vs. empiricist view of moral codes, see Edward O. Wilson, 
The Biological Basis of Morality, ATLANTIC MONTIlLY, Apr. 1998, at 53 (focusing primarily on a re-
lated debate concerning the process by which individuals or societies acquire their moral codes). 
47. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 28, at 24. 
48. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note I, at 270. 
49. See Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 432-34 (summarizing the line of 19th century United 
States Supreme Court cases that reflect a "teleological" view of the family drawn on natural law 
and Christian principles of what constitutes the "good family.") This view is perhaps most clearly 
reflected in the late nineteenth century Supreme Court case Bradwell v. Illinois: 
[T)he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the re-
spective spheres and destinies of man and woman .... The constitution of the family organi-
zation, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates 
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood. 
83 U.S, 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in majority opinion sustaining a state's right to 
deny women access to the practice of law). 
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cades.50 While many commentators attribute changes in family structure 
to economic and political conditions,51 such changes may also be attrib-
uted to changes in the hierarchy of values within many Western countries 
over the last few decades.52 For example, greater emphasis on equality 
and fairness and diminished concern for regulation of. sexual conduct are 
shifts in values that have been reflected in family life.53 
Much of contemporary moral philosophy represents an attempt to re-
invigorate the concept of morality as the practice of virtues.54 These phi-
losophers have attempted to catalogue the central virtues of contemporary 
American culture within the "vast reaches of the realm of morality. "55 
While sexual fidelity in marriage still occupies a place in the moral dia-
logue in this country, there is strong evidence suggesting it is not a core 
or central value among most Americans.56 Instead, over the last several 
50. See generally SPECIAL REPORT, Single Parents, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPmCS, Dec. 1993, 
at 36 (finding that "other families"-households of people not headed by married couples-should 
grow faster than the average household between 1990 and 2010, gaining share from 15 percent to 16 
percent of all households); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 
UTAH L. REv. 537, 539 (examining patterns of change in family structure and fmding that most dras-
tic changes have occurred in the "internal activities of families and the external conditions that ac-
count for their structure and composition"). But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on 
What You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 
UTAH L. REv. 569, 570 (arguing that "nontraditional" label for nonmarital family is a misnomer, be-
cause such households have existed "for all of human history"). 
51. See, e.g., Georgia Dullea, Wide Changes in Family Life Are Altering the Family Law, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1983, at AI. 
June Carbone has argued that a major factor in the current change in sexual mores-including 
the increased incidence of divorce-is the change in material conditions. These changes, including 
longer life spans, more effective contraception and delays in childbearing have increased the poten-
tial length of marriages and the opportunities for mUltiple relationships. See June Carbone, Morality, 
Public Policy and the Family, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 267, 278 (1996). 
52. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH. LAw AND MODERN SOCIETY 114-19 (1983) (describing changes in 
laws concerning marriage and divorce as changes resulting from shifts in a "community's value sys-
tem" and noting that such changes in the law are more "deep-seated" and irreversible than changes 
resulting from economic or social change). 
53. See id. 
54. See generally MAcINTYRE, supra note 25. 
55. Meyer, supra note 19, at 413. 
56. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 52, at 119 (identifying "changing values about sexual behav-
ior" as evidenced by the fact that "[a]dultery is no longer the heinous social and legal offense it 
was"); Nancy Gibbs, In a Breathtaking Reversal of Fortunes, Clinton's Popularity Soars While Starr 
Gets Stuck in the Mud, TIME, Feb. 9, 1998, at 28 (noting that a week after the Monica Lewinsky sex 
scandal broke, President Clinton achieved the highest approval ratings of his five-year presidency 
and that "Americans are less puritanical and more forgiving than the cartoon version suggests"); Cal 
Thomas, Let's All Get in Moral Shape, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 11, 1998, at C3 (discussing the impact 
of allegations of adultery on the part of President Clinton and Democratic National Committee 
Chairman and Colorado Governor Roy Romer and commenting that "[w]orse than adulterous behav-
ior is the growing acceptance of it by the public"). 
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decades, American society has placed increasing importance on the val-
ues of fairness, equality and compassion. Evidence of this general shift in 
values comes from both public opinion and scholarship. Measuring pub-
lic opinion on such complex issues as equality and fairness is difficult, 
but some evidence exists that equality in family relations is valued in 
theory, if not always in practice, by Americans.57 
Evidence of this trend among academics is easier to identify. Con-
temporary philosopher Michael Meyer includes among his representative 
set of "moral or ethical virtues" which may contribute to the good life-
benevolence, civility, compassion, fairness, and tolerance.58 In The Moral 
Sense, James Q. Wilson identifies what he considers four primary exam-
ples of our "moral sense": sympathy, fairness, self-control and duty.59 
Drawing on the classical tradition, Wilson explains that practicing these 
four virtues does not always result in laudable conduct; rather, these 
character traits predispose us to moral conduct.60 As Wilson puts it, 
"[t]emperate people are more likely to keep promises, resist temptations, 
and reciprocate our affections than are intemperate ones; sympathetic 
people are more disposed to help us when we are in need and to take our 
feelings into account than are hard-hearted ones. "61 
Feminist moral philosophers have also added to the vocabulary of 
moral discourse by adding the virtue of "care" to the list of core values, 
recasting traits like good parenting as "virtues": 
Traditional moral theorists, with a few exceptions, often see morality as composed 
of constraints that limit our pursuits of what we desire. Feminist moral theorists, in 
contrast, often stress the value of good relationships-whether personal or civil-
and of good parenting and emotions conducive to leading admirable lives. And we 
stress that these are moral values.62 
57. See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD. WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN BELIEFS ABour DISTRIBunVE Jus· 
TICE 107 (1981) (studying Americans' attitudes toward distributive justice and fmding that partici-
pants favored strict equality in the family); see also RANDOLPH TRUMBACH. TIlE RISE OF TIlE EGAU-
TARIAN FAMILY (1978) (noting that the parent-child relationship has become more egalitarian). But 
see ARLIE HOCHSCHILD. THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLurlON AT HOME 
(1989) (citing examples of families that do not favor equality). 
58. See Meyer, supra note 19, at 413-14. 
59. See WILSON, supra note 25, at xiii. Wilson defines "moral sense" as "an intuitive or di-
rectly felt belief about how one ought to act when one is free to act voluntarily." [d. at xii. 
60. See id. at 82. 
61. [d. 
62. VIRGINIA HELD. JUSTICE AND CARE 3 (1995); see also ROBERT E. GOODIN. PROTECTING TIlE 
VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILmES 28-41 (1985) (arguing that our primary 
moral obligation is to care for the vulnerable, particularly children). 
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Philosophers more closely associated with the liberal tradition have 
also contributed to the debate about core American values. In A Theory 
of Justice, John Rawls offers fairness as the intrinsic good, suggesting 
that it is the moral imperative all would follow if we had no information 
about our status Of place in society.63 
Ross Evans Paulson identifies "liberty, equality and justice" as the 
"core values" of modem American society.64 In his review of various so-
cial reform movements between 1865 to 1932, Paulson contends that the 
potential success of these movements depends upon shifts in both the 
meaning of these concepts and the ranking among them.65 He ends his 
analysis at mid-twentieth century, noting that the core values still stood, 
but a shift was beginning in both the meaning and priority many Ameri-
cans placed on these core values: 
Americans wrestled anew with the conflict between the priorities of liberty and 
equality and the practical meaning of justice. Only gradually would some begin to 
understand . . . that in liberty interdependence was more important than individual 
independence in maintaining cultural traditions and social institutions. Only pain-
fully would a few people face the issue that liberty as a social goal was something 
more than freedom from external governmental restraint. It could also include free-
dom from segregation, discriminatory employment, or negative stereotypes as 
well .... Only haltingly ... did the American political system and culture begin 
to recognize that justice was not simply adherence to a set of procedures (due pro-
cess) or a tenuous equity (reward proportionate to effort or "fairness"). Justice was 
&Iso a matter of the standards, of the expectations applied to all levels, of constitu-
tional phrases turned into daily practices, protected by courts and undergirded by a 
sense of community.66 
The core values in contemporary American society, then, have 
shifted over time. They now embody both communitarian values--com-
passion, duty, and care-and more liberal values-equality, fairness, and 
justice. 
63. See JOHN A RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-14 (1971); see also John Rawls, Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 520-22, Sept. 1980; John A. Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS, Summer 1985, at 223-51 (supporting the 
justice as fairness theory more on its utility in a pluralistic society such as modem America than on 
the fact that it reflects "commonly shared presumptions"). 
64. Ross EVANS PAULSON. LIBERTY. EQUAUTY. AND JUSTICE: CiVIL RiGIITS. WOMEN'S RIGIITS. 
AND THE REGULATION OF BUSINESS. 1865-1932, at 2 (1997). 
65. See id. at 2-3. 
66. [d. at 244-45 (emphasis omitted). 
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B. The Relationship Between Law and Morality 
Identifying a society's core values-an uncertain task in a pluralistic 
country like the United States-is only part of the analysis. The next and 
related question is what the role of law should be in defIning or promot-
ing the society's morality or core values. The relationship between law 
and morality has prompted considerable debate over several centuries.67 
For the early classical philosophers, the primary purpose of the State was 
to promote virtue.68 By punishing bad acts, the law "stimulate[d] men to 
virtue and urge[d] them forward by the motive of the noble."69 The be-
lief that a central connection exists between law and morality was chal-
lenged by the liberal tradition so strongly associated with nineteenth cen-
tury philosopher John Stuart Mill's "harm principle," which asserts that 
government should remain neutral on moral questions and interfere with 
a citizen's liberty only to prevent harm to others.70 A slightly different 
and more contemporary version of the "harm principle" is exemplilled 
by the mid-twentieth century views of H.L.A. Hart.7l Hart developed the 
view that legal enforcement of morality is not necessary to prevent a so-
ciety's disintegration and that a pluralistic society with competing moral 
visions can both survive and flourish.72 
67. See ROSCOE POUND. LAW AND MORALS 125-53 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1969) (1924). 
68. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at xxviii. 
69. ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1109 (quoting Nicomachean Ethics X. 9 1180a); see also 
ROBERT P. GEORGE. MAKING MEN MORAL 19-47 (1993) (analyzing the writings of Aristotle and 
Aquinas as providing Western thought's "central pre-liberal tradition"). This classical view of the 
absolute link between law and morality was carried forward in medieval England: 
On this medieval view, as on the ancient, there is no room for the modem liberal distinction 
between law and morality, and there is no room for this because of what the medieval king-
dom shares with the polis, as Aristotle conceived it. Both are conceived as communities in 
which men in company pursue the human good and not merely as-what the modem liberal 
state takes itself to be-providing the arena in which each individual seeks his or her own 
private good. 
MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 172. 
70. See JOHN STUART Mn.L, ON LIBERTY 13 (1955). 
71. See generally H.LA HART. LAW. LIBERTY. AND MoRALITY (1963) [hereinafter HART. LAW]; 
see also H.L.A. Hart, Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. Cm. L REv. 1,8-13 (1967). 
Hart's views were challenged by Patrick Devlin, a British High Court Judge, who believed that gov-
ernment should enforce a society's core moral values, not because of the intrinsic truth of the moral 
choices, but as a means of protecting the society's cohesion. See PATRICK DEVUN. THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF MORALS 9-11 (1965). The Hart-Devlin debate has been characterized as "one of the most remark-
able debates in the history of English speaking jurisprudence." GEORGE. supra note 69, at 49. For an 
interesting examination of the debate and its place in contemporary moral theory, see id. 
n. See generally HART. LAW, supra note 71. Still other moral and political philosophers argue 
that the question of whether the government, through its legal system, should promote morality is 
rendered moot by the lack of moral consensus in this country. Thus, the function of the state through 
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C. Morality and Family Law 
1. Protecting Children: A Central Moral Goal of Family Law 
The questions raised over the last several centuries about both the 
meaning of morality and the law's role in supporting a society's morals 
resonate in family law today. Are there central moral truths that justify 
the State's interference and regulation of family life or should the law re-
spect private choices and resist enforcing a moral code unless the breach 
of the code harms a fellow citizen? If State intervention is justified, can 
the State effectively intervene to promote moral behavior in families? Is 
"moral behavior" limited to punishing bad acts like sexual misconduct? 
Or can the virtues of commitment, responsibility and fairness translate 
into family law? 
Turning fIrst to the question whether there are central moral truths 
in this country with regard to families, there is substantial evidence of 
deep division on key issues like the importance of marriage and the defI-
nition of family.73 However, there is some evidence that concepts like re-
sponsibility, equality, and commitment, particularly to children, now have 
greater meaning in defIning morality in family law than condemnation of 
its courts is "to conceal the depths of our conflicts .•. and ••• play the role of a peace-making or 
truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of conflict, not by invoking our 
shared moral first principles. For our society as a whole has none." MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 
253. MacIntyre, like many other communitarians, laments the current dissociation of law and moral-
ity and would prefer to see the state take a more active role in promoting morality. See id.; see also 
GLENDON, supra note 16 (calling for the law to shoulder more of the burden shared with religion and 
custom in promoting community values). 
73. Martha Minow is one of the commentators who has identified this deep division. She sug-
gests that this lack of consensus on issues like the defmition of family suggest that no group or indi-
vidual advocating a particular deflnition of family can claim "their own preferences as natural, con-
sensual or obvious." Minow, supra note 4, at 305. For another view that finds less conflict among 
Americans on family and other issues, see generally ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION. AFTER ALL: WHAT 
MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLy THINK ABom: GOD. COUNTRY. FAMILY. RACISM. WELFARE, IMMI· 
GRATION. HOMOSEXUALITY. WORK. THE RIGHI'. THE LEFT. AND EACH OTHER 278 (1998) (finding after 
18 months of research examining 200 people clustered in communities around the country that 
Americans are "[r]eluctant to pass judgment, ••• are tolerant to a fault, not about everything ••• but 
about a surprising number of things, including rapid transformations in the family"). While this tol-
erance for other peoples' values and beliefs is viewed as a virtue by Alan Wolfe, others condemn 
such "moral relativism." See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 25, at 10. Several commentators assert that 
American society is too fragmented and too focused on the issue of cultural diversity, with no strong 
concept of community. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.. HABITS OF THE HEART: INDMDUAUSM 
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 155-62 (1985); AMITAI ETZIONI. THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: 
RIGHTS. REsPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 1-20 (1993); John Leo, Sneer Not at oz-
zie and Harriet, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept 14, 1992, at 24; George F. Will, Circus of the Cen-
tury, WASH. POST, Oct 4, 1995, at A25. 
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adultery and other sexual misconduct.74 There is also an emerging con-
sensus about the centrality of protecting children as, perhaps, the core 
value that should be promoted in family law.75 Again, public opinion 
polls provide some support for this assertion.76 Such polls indicate Amer-
icans believe that providing emotional and fmancial support for children 
are Americans' primary concerns.77 
This theme of increasing concern for children as the central goal of 
family law also runs through contemporary family law scholarship and 
many policy papers. Mary Ann Glendon was one of the fIrst family law 
scholars to suggest a "children fIrst" principle in the context of income 
allocation after divorce: 
All property, no matter when or how acquired, would be subject to the duty to pro-
vide for the children. Nor would there be any question of "spousal support" as 
distinct from what is allocated to the custodial spouse in his or her capacity as 
physical custodian. In cases where there is significant income and property left 
over after the children's needs have been met, the regular system of marital prop-
erty division and spousal support law could be applied as a residual system.78 
Challenging family law scholars to rethink the moral justifIcations 
for family law, June Carbone acknowledges conflict among scholars and 
policymakers on most family law issues.79 She suggests that the only area 
74. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
76. Marsha Garrison has gathered much of the existing data on public opinion on many family 
law issues. See Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. 
REv. 41, 116 & n.334 (1998) (citing HART & TEETER REsEARCH COMPANIES National Telephone Sur-
vey of 1502 Adults for NBC News and Wall Street Journal, Question 59 (June 17, 1994) (reporting 
that, in response to question on effectiveness of "several actions the government might take to try to 
strengthen families and family values," 49% of the respondents rated "tougher laws to help collect 
money from parents who do not make their child support payments" as "very effective," and an ad-
ditional 19% rated them as "fairly effective"»; see also Mellman & Lazarus, Mass Mutual Ameri-
can Family Values Study (1989) (describing results of survey commissioned by Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company in which most respondents ranked "[b]eing responsible for your 
actions," and u[b]eing able to provide emotional support to your family," as their most important 
personal values while u[b]eing free of obligations so I can do whatever I want to do" came in last). 
77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
78. MARy ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 95 (1987); see also Mary 
Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553, 1557-65 (1984); Mary Ann 
Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 19 (1990-91). 
79. See Carbone, supra note 51, at 281; JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE 
SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (forthcoming 2000) (maintaining that the moral center of fam-
ily law has shifted from adult partnerships to parental ties); see also June Carbone, Child Custody 
and the Best Interests of Children, 29 FAM. L.Q. 721, 737 (1995) (reviewing MARy ANN MASON, 
FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1994» [hereinafter Carbone, Child Custody] (arguing that custody law should speak in terms 
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of potential agreement is likely to be "an insistence on the importance of 
and obligation to children. "80 Examining family policy from a philosophy 
perspective, Michael Meyer is even more explicit when identifying the 
"optimal type of moral language to discuss the family and its future": 
I only wish to claim that the one virtue, the nurturing of children . . . ought to be 
included in our list of the central or the cardinal virtues. Indeed, even if one 
wishes to distinguish between public virtues and private virtues, the virtue of nur-
turing children belongs high on both lists.81 
More recently, Naomi Cahn has suggested that the debates that are 
often phrased as " 'self-centered individualism' " and " 'family values' " 
are really competing visions of the family that share the same central 
goal of protecting children.82 
This consensus about the centrality of protecting and nurturing chil-
dren goes beyond academics. William Galston, former Domestic Policy 
Advisor to President Clinton, identifies the central goal of family policy 
to be "rais[ing] children well. "83 He advocates policies that "join the 
languages of economics and morals" to achieve this central goal.84 The 
of children's needs rather than children's rights). 
80. Carbone, Child Custody, supra note 79, at 737; see also Rhode & Minow, supra note I, at 
198 (arguing that "the moral obligations [under current family law standards] should embody clearer 
commitments to equality between the sexes and the quality of life for children"); see generally 
James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' 
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371 (1994) (arguing that talk of parents' rights should be abandoned and 
replaced with language of parental privilege to care for children in ways that are consistent with 
their temporal interests); Harty Krause, "Family Values" and Family Law Reform, 9 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POl_ 109, 128 (1993) ("[T]he social contract must return to one basic value judgment: 
Each child must be guaranteed a decent opportunity in home and school, in life and the economy."); 
Barbara Bennen Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child· Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 
CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1748-49 (1993) (arguing that "it is parents' rights, as currently understood, 
that undermine those values of responsibility and mutuality necessary to children's welfare"). But see 
Scon Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 J. FAM. L. 325, 354 (1997) (arguing that, 
while the "yearning to promote only one value runs deep ••. [a]mong principles we might valorize 
as paramount, protecting children and other vulnerable people is surely worthy. But as with any 
value, the needs of children must sometimes compete for moral attention") (footnotes omitted). 
81. Meyer, supra note 19, at 413-14. See also WILSON, supra note 25, at 249 (defIning familes 
as "a human commitment designed to make possible the rearing of moral and healthy children" and 
stating that concern for children is "the primary-maybe only-reason for government to be con-
cerned with families"). 
82. See Cahn, supra note I, at 225; see also Garrison, supra note 76, at 102-05 (arguing that 
the emergence of a child-centered approach in family law scholarship generally supports a commu-
nity-based child support model). 
83. William A. Galston, Home Alone, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1991, at 43; see also DAVID 
BLANKENHORN ET AL., REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1990); 
Richard T. Gill, For the Sake of the Children, 108 PuBLIC INTEREST 81 (1992). 
84. Galston, supra note 83, at 43. 
1130 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: 1111 
moral importance of caring for children has also been noted by politi-
cians and the highest elected officials.85 
2. The Link Between Family Law and Morality: Beyond Individual 
Rights vs. Community Values 
Turning next to the question of whether the law can or should pro-
mote these values, some scholars and policymakers argue that the law's 
ability to promote moral, behavior is very limited.86 Mary Ann Glendon 
has highlighted the limited role family law has played in promoting mo-
rality: "Much of family law is no more-and no less-than the symbolic 
expression of certain cultural ideals . . . . Probably no other area of law 
is so replete with legal norms that communicate ideas about proper be-
havior but that have no direct sanctions. "87 These sentiments are echoed 
by others, including policymakers.88 
Some liberal philosophers have argued that even if the law can af-
fect moral choices, the state has little or no role in restricting individual 
choices about the right to marry or divorce or how to raise children.89 
Many family law scholars, reviewing law and policy trends over the last 
few decades, have concluded that this liberal tradition, to a large extent, 
has triumphed.90 They claim that devotion to individual rights is the pri-
85. For example, in a 1996 public appearance, President Clinton stated: "You cannot imagine 
how many women and children are thrown into poverty simply because the responsible parent, usu-
ally the father, walks away and leaves them without any money and won't help .... This is a 
moral outrage and a social disaster." President William Clinton, Remarks to the Community in Den-
ver (July 22, 1996), in 32 WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 1305. 
86. The related question of the relative place of religion and government in promoting "family 
values" is thoughtfully discussed in STEPHEN CARTER. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); see also STEPHEN CARTER. CIVILITY: 
MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY (1998). 
87. GLENDON, supra note 78, at 10. Lon Fuller suggests that the difficulty in developing laws 
that foster morality within families might explain the narrow focus on sexual conduct and adultery. 
See FUllER, supra note 24, at 40. 
88. See Galston, supra note 83, at 40. 
89. See Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, in LIBERAL RiGIITS: COLLECTED 
PAPERS 1981-1990, at 250, 268-269 (1993). 
90. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PuRsUIT OF INTIMACY 1-3 (1993) 
(arguing that the premise of modem family law, "like other liberal institutions, should remain neutral 
among visions of the good life, intervening only when necessary to prevent one individual from 
harming another," promotes a vision of the self that is "fundamentally asocial" and undermines the 
"communal preconditions" for intimacy in family life); Krause, supra note 80, at 125 (acknowledg-
ing the need to develop laws that respect the value this country places on parents' right to autonomy 
and privacy, but finding that "[r]ecent trends of non-intervention, of 'privacy' and 'value neutrality' 
favor parental autonomy in procreation and child-rearing too decisively"); William E. Nelson, Patri-
archy or Inequality: Family Values or Individuality, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 435, 438 (1996) (conclud-
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mary cause of the diminished force of morality as a guiding principle in 
family law.91 As Carl Schneider states: 
That tradition [of noninterference in the family] has been reinforced by an ideolog-
ical development-the increasing displacement of the old republican ideal and the 
elevation to legal orthodoxy of that dictum from Mill's On Liberty that asserts 
"that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."92 
This theme-that an emphasis on individualism and non-interference 
has reduced the role of morality in family policy-is also reflected in the 
writings of policymakers. William Galston believes that the decline of the 
two-parent family over the last three decades can be attributed, in part, to 
the value society places on "individualism, on self-expression, and self-
realization, and on personal choice. "93 
Amidst the voices emphasizing the conflict between individual rights 
and strong families are a few commentators suggesting more fruitful 
ways of analyzing the shifts in family law over the last three decades.94 
The paradigm of freedom, autonomy, and individualism versus the com-
mon good, shared values, and strong families may no longer advance the 
discussion. A broader view of morality and a reconception of rights as 
effective tools for protecting vulnerable family members suggests that a 
concern for individual rights is compatible with a concern for morality. 
In an article examining the role of rights in friendships and other close 
relationships, Michael Meyer suggests that recognizing rights and individ-
ual differences can actually strengthen relationships: "Individual moral 
ing society's "shared commitment to individualism" has impeded gender equality and oiher family 
law reforms); Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 439 (expressing dissatisfaction wiih ihe application of 
Mill's iheory to family law and arguing ihat "family relationships should be founded on rules and 
practices we can call good" raiher ihan simply ihe absence of harm); JOHN WITTE, JR.. FROM SACRE. 
MENT TO CONTRAcr: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN WESTERN TRADmON (1997) (identifying spe-
cific strands of hundreds of years of religious and philosophical pronouncements on marriage, which 
have produced ihe current model of marriage ihat is weakened by its focus on individual over 
community). 
91. See supra note 90. 
92. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1839. 
93. Galston, supra note 7 (identifying ihe shift in American values from sacrifice and self-
restraint to self-expression and personal choice as a trend ihat has contributed to ihe increase in di-
vorce); see also JAN DIZARD & HOWARD GADLIN. THE MINIMAL FAMILY (1990) (arguing ihat individ-
ual rights and family autonomy represents a moral change ihat has rendered ihe traditional family 
obsolete). 
94. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note I, at 270; Minow, supra note 4, at 260; Rhode & Minow, 
supra note I, at 198. 
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rights provide individuals with a certain secure moral standing. A proper 
sense of self-worth is not inconsistent with the virtues of friendship. 
Clearly, habits of self-respect inspired by rights can encourage such vir-
tues among one's friends."95 
Many feminists have rejected a rights-based approach to regulating 
family law because of its connection to concepts of individual privacy 
and non-interference, which tend to maintain and support the traditional 
patriarchal family structure.96 Moreover, cultural feminists fmd rights-talk 
hostile to the concepts of community and affiliation.97 
There are, however, a number of feminists and other scholars who 
believe "careful protection of rights protects friendships and affiliation of 
many kinds and constructs a morally valuable sort of community."98 Ex-
tending this reasoning from the tightly woven community of friends to 
the community of family members, one could argue that parents and chil-
dren who are secure in their rights and responsibilities to one another 
may have healthier, stronger relationships. A number of commentators 
have supported the idea that rights have a place in family relationships 
and that such rights and communitarian values are not mutually 
exclusive. 
In accounting for changes in family policy in recent decades, Martha 
Minow sees liberty and private ordering as just one of the choices availa-
ble to decision makers in a given conflict. In other conflicts, decision 
makers may choose state intervention: 
Committed to equality and liberty, driven by legacies of differences and discrimi-
nation, our legal system reflects simultaneous devotion to neutrality toward---or 
95. Michael J. Meyer, Rights Between Friends, PHIL. 467, 474-75 (1992); see also Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 687, 688-89 (arguing 
that communitarian values and liberalism are not mutually exclusive). 
96. For example, Carol Smart argues that: 
[T]he "family" constitutes one instance of the operation of patriarchal relations in the con-
crete. Indeed the "family" can be identified as a focal point at which a range of oppressive 
practices meet It is both an ideological and economic site of oppression which is protected 
from scrutiny by the very privacy that "family life" celebrates. 
CAROL SMART. THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRIARCHAL RELA· 
TIONS 10 (1984). 
97. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CIU. L. REv. 1, 28 (1998) (sum-
marizing cultural feminism as revolving "not around the axis of autonomy, individuality, justice and 
rights .•. but instead around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, community, responsibility and care"). 
98. Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning, 70 Tax. L. REV. 
1019, 1027 (1992). See also MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF 
MARRIAGE (1999) (arguing that altruism and sharing should coexist with rights and economic justice 
in marriage); Merle H. Weiner, "Civilizing" the Next Generation: A Response to Civility: Manners, 
Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy by Stephen L. Carter, 42 How. W. 241, 287-90 (1999). 
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better yet, tolerance of-private choices and devotion to officially articulated values 
... [B]oth religious and family freedoms protect the autonomy of the Amish who 
resist a compulsory school law as an incursion on their way of life, and yet neither 
religious nor family freedoms could shield a parent or guardian from a child labor 
law applied to forbid a child from distributing religious leaflets on the street or 
from conviction for child endangerment for withholding medical treatment due to 
religious belief.99 
Minow also suggests that the idea that laws are ever value-neutral is 
false. loo Each time the government, through its lawmakers, decides to 
regulate or refrains from regulating, a choice in values is made.lol As Mi-
now sees it, "neutrality," in some absolute sense, is not an option; in-
stead, there is the choice between deference to the value of private free-
dom and the alternative of publicly imposed values.I02 Minow goes on to 
challenge policymakers to "articulate a possibility of tolerance and com-
mitment to particular values."103 
Therefore, two overarching points should guide one's analysis of the 
impact of changes in family law over the last few decades on the moral 
vision of family law. First, despite the debates about whether law can or 
should promote morality, the fact is that regulating families is a value-
laden enterprise. Building on the classical tradition, contemporary moral 
philosophy has broadened the meaning of morality in ways that prompt 
reconsideration of the moral implications of no-fault developments in 
family law. Even laws that do not explicitly address right and wrong 
often have a moral dimension. As Martha Minow puts it, no-fault and re-
lated developments have "simply shifted the focus from the moral con-
duct of the parties prior to divorce (who did what to whom) to the moral 
obligations that should be recognized following divorce (who is responsi-
ble to whom, to what extent, and for what duration)."I04 Rethinking what 
it means to promote moral conduct in family law also means rethinking 
what constitutes the language of morals. Discourse in laws and decisions 
that imposes duties and responsibilities on one family member for an-
other is moral discourse. 
Second, while deep division exists among the general population,105 
99. Minow, supra note 4, at 258. 
100. See id. at 258-59. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. [d. at 261. 
104. Rhode & Minow, supra note I, at 198. 
105. See generally WOLFE, supra note 23 (identifying the deep divisions on issues of homo-
sexuality and same sex marriage among the American public). 
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judges,l06 and family law scholars,107 about the ideal family, there are 
shared moral principles that support the protection and support of chil-
dren.los In evaluating whether there has ,been a decline in moral discourse 
in family law one must ask whether the law's traditional focus on fault 
addressed the central moral truths in family law, particularly protection 
of children. If not, the focus should shift from evaluating the decreased 
emphasis on fault to exploring the extent to which developments in fam-
ily law over the last few decades address and promote these central val-
ues. The remaining sections of this Article seek to answer these 
questions. 
m. THE "OLD" MORAL DISCOURSE: REGULATING SEXUAL CONOuer 
Despite the broad defmition of morality and virtue described in the 
preceding Section, the code of behavior and the notion of right and 
wrong in the "fault" era of family law were primarily concerned with 
prohibiting certain sexual practices.109 Constitutional protection for the 
private sphere of the family developed in cases beginning in the 1920s,110 
106. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.3 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality 
opinion) (deflning !he family unit accorded traditional respect in our society as !he "unitary family," 
typifled by !he marital family), with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) 
(holding !hat "[olurs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for !he bonds uniting !he members 
of !he nuclear family"). 
107. This division is, perhaps, most striking when comparing !hose scholars urging policies 
and laws !hat reinforce !he traditional two parent family wi!h !hose scholars who defend !he single 
parent family model. Compare Lynn D. Wardle, No·Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 
1991 BYU L. REv. 79, 135 (1991) (arguing !hat "we have made a major mistake by not paying 
greater attention to how our new divorce-on-demand system is affecting an entire generation of chil-
dren brought up in !he poverty of single parent homes"), with NANCY E. DoWD. IN DEFENSE OF SIN-
GLE-PARENT FAMIUES (1997) (arguing !hat marriage does not support women and may not protect 
children). 
108. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text 
109. June Carbone traces !he emphasis on regulating sexual conduct as an element of family 
policy in !his country to "a set of moral codes criminalizing fornication, adultery, and sodomy many 
of which have been repealed or remain unenforced." Carbone, Child Custody, supra note 79, at 270 
(citing MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN. THE NEUTERED MOTHER. THE SEXUAL FAMILY. AND OTHER 
TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145-76 (1995». 
llO. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. llli-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Related cases arising under !he First Amendment 
and !he Equal Protection Clause include Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also Anne C. Daily, 
Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv. 955 (1993) (reviewing Supreme Court 
decisions !hat have developed a right of family privacy while recognizing tradition of state regUlation 
of !he family). 
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but the notion that the state could regulate family life to promote moral 
behavior among its members was always fIrmly embedded.11I However, 
the behavior scrutinized for its morality was primarily focused on sexual 
conduct.112 A dissent by Justice Harlan in a 1961 case upholding a state 
ban on contraceptive use for married couples reflects the narrow scope of 
issues viewed as "moral": 
[The] inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that so-
ciety is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community, 
but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as 
well. . . . The laws regarding marriage which provide both when . . . children are 
born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosex-
ual practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to 
lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social 
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.1I3 
This Section will provide examples from divorce, custody, and sup-
port law of this narrow defmition of morality in the fault era, and will 
evaluate the shortcomings of this approach in promoting moral conduct, 
particularly with respect to the care and nurturing of children.1I4 Even if 
this system worked once, it began to break down decades ago.1I5 By the 
time the sole reliance on fault was discarded in the 1970s, it did not 
111. See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 8 (reviewing Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse 
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L REv. 1803 (1985) and discussing the 
role courts have played in regulating moral behavior within the family). 
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
113. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). June Carbone has 
traced the history of the link between morality and sexual conduct. Marriage, with its common law 
ideal of the "transcendental" unity of spouses, was an exception to the general hostility towards sex-
ual relationships that existed in this country since its founding. This ideal separated conjugal inter-
course from other forms and linked it to a unity that depended on the different, but complementary 
natures of men and women, and the nature of marriage as a lifelong and monogamous institution. 
This ideal was important to maintaining the link between sex, procreation and childrearing and was 
critical to the creation of marriage as a permanent institution necessary to protect vulnerable women, 
and connect children to family lineages that were an important sense of wealth and identity. The ma-
jor purpose of family law, then, was to reinforce a set of norms that discouraged divorce and extra-
marital (both pre-marital and adulterous) conception. It was never intended to manage a system of 
widespread divorce or to regulate conduct within marriage. The fault law's emphasis on regulation of 
sexual conduct should therefore, she argues, not be evaluated in the context of current conditions. 
See Carbone, supra note 51, at 272-75. 
114. States adopted no-fault laws at different times beginning about 1967 and continuing 
throughout the 1980s. Therefore, the cases describing the concepts of fault embodied in divorce, ali-
mony and custody laws are drawn from cases that may have been decided as late as the 1980s. Ad-
ditionally, because some states still retain concepts of fault in their divorce laws, particularly with re-
spect to divorce grounds, a few cases used to illuminate concepts of fault are even more 
contemporary. 
115. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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work at all. 116 
A. The Meaning of Fault as Grounds for Divorce 
The fault-based system of divorce, established in this country in the 
mid-nineteenth century, has its roots in religious law because the ecclesi-
astical courts governed divorce in England. l17 Under this system a di-
vorce was only granted at the request of an innocent spouse upon proof 
of a "fault" or offense against the marriage by the other spouse. I IS This 
reflected the Anglican religious view that marriage was a "permanent 
moral bond between husband and wife."119 Carl Schneider describes the 
ideal of marriage embodied in fault-based divorce as a "life-long mutual 
responsibility and fidelity from which a spouse could be relieved, 
roughly speaking, only upon the serious breach of a moral duty by the 
other spouse." 120 
Other commentators have described fault-based divorce as reflecting 
America's view of marriage as a "contract with God and spouse" 121 
which conveys a "powerful message about the permanence of marriage 
and family commitments." 122 This view of the moral underpinning of 
fault-based divorce law is echoed in nineteenth century Supreme Court 
case law: 
116. See id. 
117. See HOMER H. CLARK. JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 6-7 (4th ed. 1990) 
("The American colonies, upon their establisIunent, received many of the English rules concerning 
marriage, divorce and the status of married women. Of course the colonies never had ecclesiastical 
courts but these doctrines appeared in legislative enactments and judicial decisions and became part 
of our civil law."). 
Though the Ecclesiastical Law of England is no part of our Common Law • . • that part of 
the jurisdication of the Ecclesiastical Courts relating to annulment of marriage and divorce 
was given by law to our Courts, it is reasonable to believe that we should follow the princi-
ples and precedents of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the administration of our law .... 
S. v. S., 29 A.2d 325, 326 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942). 
118. See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibil-
ity in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 605, 607 (1996). 
119. Christopher Price, Comment, Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L 
& COMPo LJ. 669, 683 (1997) (analyzing the American experiences with both fault and no-fault sys-
tems of divorce and recommending the Irish adopt the fault-based system in implementing Ireland's 
1995 referendum on divorce). 
120. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1809. 
121. Morse, supra note 118, at 606. 
122. Wardle, supra note 1, at 750. Wardle goes on to emphasize that the fault-based system 
underscored permanence in marriage because" '[c]ommitment is the moral virtue.' " Id. at 751 
(quoting ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF TIiE AMERICAN MIND 201 (1987». 
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[W]hile marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions of courts a civil 
contract . . . it is something more than a mere contract The consent of the parties 
is of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is executed 
by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot 
change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely re-
leased upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once 
farmed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. 
It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply 
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress.l23 
While many commentators acknowledge weaknesses in the applica-
tion of the fault system in practice,124 reliance on fault grounds for di-
vorce is almost uniformly described as expressing society's moral belief 
that marriage is a lifetime commitment to one's spouse with all the emo-
tional and economic obligations associated with that commitment.l25 
Both the articulation in the law and application in practice of fault-
based divorce did little to promote this idealized view of marriage. First, 
the concept of "fault" has always been a very narrow one. Monogamy is 
the principle form of commitment envisioned under the traditional fault 
grounds. Other important commitments such as providing fInancially for 
wives during marriage or after divorce or treating wives and children re-
spectfully and without violence were not addressed or emphasized in the 
fault system. A brief review of the evolution and history of the fault-
based grounds for divorce reveals how narrow the concept of marital 
misconduct was in that system. 
Because the English ecclesiastical courts, under the doctrines of the 
Roman Catholic Church and, later, under the Church of England, viewed 
marriage as a permanent bond, there was no absolute divorce under the 
common law. l26 The :fIrst inroad into state-sanctioned divorce was a late 
123. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-211 (1888). This view has continued well into the 
twentieth century. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
124. Even those who condemn or criticize the "no-fault" access to divorce acknowledge the 
failure of fault grounds to promote commitment to marriage. It is generally accepted that by the time 
no-fault grounds were being adopted in some states 'in the 196Os, the fault system had resulted in the 
widespread use of perjured testimony and had encouraged acrimony between divorcing couples by 
requiring fault or blame to lie with one party. See, e.g., GLENDON. supra note 78, at 79 ("The [fault] 
system had degenerated into a formal recitation of perjured testimony, leaving acrimony in its wake 
.... "); Wardle, supra note 107, at 79, 135 (critiquing no-fault divorce, but acknowledging the nega-
tive impact of "hostile litigation [and] deceit in legal processes" in fault-era divorces). But see, e.g., 
MAx RHEINSTEJN. MARRIAGE STABILITY. DIVORCE. AND 1liB LAW 258 (1972) (arguing that the dual 
system of fault-based divorce on the books and divorce by collusion and mutual consent in practice 
was a "compromise" that satisfied both conservatives and liberals). 
125. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
126. Of course, the Roman Catholic Church could grant annulments, and did so freely during 
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seventeenth-century Parliamentary Act permitting divorce a vinculo l27 on 
grounds of adultery.l28 Homer Clark and Carol Glowinsky describe this 
"avenue of escape from marriage" for "the richest and most powerful 
people in Britain": 
This was the divorce by special Parliamentary Act, given only for adultery. . . . 
Not only was this kind of divorce confmed to the rich, it was also largely the pre-
rogative of men, only four being granted to wives during one hundred and fifty 
years. There are some indications that the virtual absence of practicable legal meth-
ods for terminating marriages led large segments of society to adopt non-legal 
methods for this purpose, that is, to separate and contract subsequent marriages 
without benefit of divorce.J29 
Adultery remained the only ground for divorce in England even af-
ter divorce jurisdiction was transferred from the ecclesiastical courts to 
the civil court system in 1857.130 It was not until 1937 that English law 
added other fault-based grounds for divorce, the most commonly invoked 
being cruelty and desertion.131 Although American law has always al-
lowed divorce more freely than English law, the development of divorce 
law in this country reflects its British and ecclesiastical roots, particularly 
in its emphasis on adultery as the most serious offense against the mar-
riage. June Carbone has traced the historical development of American 
family law, noting the existence of eighteenth century legislation pre-
scribing the death penalty for "adulterie" and "sodomie":132 "Early 
American family law was marked by a clear identification of sexual mo-
this time. See HOMER H. CLARK. JR.. THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN TIlE UNITED STATES 125-
26 (2d ed. 1988). 
127. "a vinculo matrimonii: Lat From the bond of matrimony. A term descriptive of a kind 
of divorce, which effects a complete dissolution of the marriage contract" BLACK'S LAW DIcnON-
ARY 136 (6th ed. 1990). Prior to the Church's exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce in 
England, Anglo-Saxon law allowed divorce by consent of the spouses or for the wife's adultery or 
desertion. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 406. English common law also permitted a divorce a 
mensa et thoro, or divorce from bed and board. This was a legal separation on certain enumerated 
fault grounds, but neither party could remarry. See PETER N. SWISHER ET AL.. FAMILY LAW: CASES. 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 715 (1990). 
128. See CLARK & GLOWINSKY, supra note 117, at 6. 
129. Id. 
130. See The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 20 Victoria, 1857v. 
97. Divorce and Matrimony causes 20 and 21 Viet c85, described in Margaret K. Woodhouse, The 
Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 AM. 1. LEGAl RlST_ 260, 273 (1959). 
131. Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 ch. 57. English divorce law now in-
cludes no-fault grounds and is set forth in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. 18 (Eng.). 
132. Carbone, supra note 51, at 273 (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG. GOVERNING TIlE HEARTH: 
LAW AND TIlE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 19 (1985) and THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 5 (Max Farrand ed., 1929». 
1999] NEW LANGUAGE OF MORALITY IN FAMILY LAW 1139 
rality as fundamental to the importance of marriage, and was religious, if 
not necessarily sectarian, in origin."133 While there were variations in the 
speed with which divorce became available by statute in different geo-
graphic regions,I34 adultery was consistently included as one or, some-
times the only, fault ground.135 
Indeed, until 1966, the only ground for divorce in New York was 
adultery.136 Even when many states added the additional grounds of cru-
elty and desertion, adultery was the most commonly used ground.137 It 
was a popular and reliable ground for a couple of reasons. First, in some 
states, adultery was the only ground that did not require the parties to 
separate for a year or more before filing for divorce.13s Additionally, 
while corroboration of adultery may have presented some proof 
problems, the relatively clear and straightforward deflnition of adultery'39 
133. Id. 
134. Those areas settled by Protestants-primarily New England-had general divorce statules 
from the time of settlement. In the middle Atlantic and Southern states, the areas most influenced by 
Catholicism and the Church of England, the colonies did not permit divorce except by legislative act 
throughout most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See CLARK & GLOWINSKY, supra note 
117, at 7. 
135. Discussing the state of marriage in the nineteenth century, David Hoffman noted that 
"the policy of most countries ..• has been to allow no other ground for the actual dissolution of the 
[marriage] contract, than adultery." DAVID HOFFMAN. LEGAL Ol1lUNES 150 (1836). 
136. See N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988) (adding cruelty, abandonment, and ex-
cessive prison confinement, which became effective Sept. 1, 1967). 
137. See Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform 
No·Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REv. 607, 610 (1997). By the time no-fault grounds for divorce 
were widely adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, cruelty had become the most popular ground for di-
vorce. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 506. 
138. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 7-103(a) (1991). 
139. "'Adultery' is generally defined as sexual intercourse by either spouse with someone 
other than their spouse." JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL.. UNDERSTANDING FAMtLY LAW 209 (1993). 
However, there is some variation in the way courts have defined the term. See, e.g., Menge v. 
Menge, 491 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that wife's admission of having had oral 
sex but not coitus fell under definition of adultery); Bales v. Hack, 509 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1986) (stating that although homosexuality is not a specifically enumerated ground for divorce, 
it could constitute adultery or extreme cruelty). The potential variation on the definition of adultery 
has been the subject of renewed interest as the media has examined the sexual conduct of various 
public officials. See, e.g., Walter Kim, When Sex Is Not Really Having Sex, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 
30; Nancy Kruh, No Foolin': That's What Adultery Is, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 1998, at lC; 
Tony Pugh, Definition of Adultery, Infidelity Debated, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 25, 1998, at A26; Jason 
Vest, Robb's Unadulterated Opinion: A Rousing Debate on the Infamous Fidelity Factor, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 1, 1994, at D1. 
Of course, corroboration of adultery did present proof problems. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 
345 So. 2d 586, 590 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("Courts are a bit more sophisticated today and infer that 
people do what comes naturally when they have the opportunity."); Westervelt v. Westervelt, 258 
N.E.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. 1970) (holding evidence of spouse's cohabitation with another insufficient to 
prove adultery); Seemann v. Seemann, 355 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 1987) (holding that evidence that defend-
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may have made it easier to prove than other fault grounds, most of 
which permitted trial judges wide discretion in defming them.l40 
The emphasis in statutes and other legal commentary devoted to 
adultery resulted in a preoccupation with sexual misconduct as the pri-
mary measure of morality in marriage. Other immoral behavior, such as 
physical and verbal abuse or failure to provide adequate economic sup-
port to a dependent spouse or children, were sanctioned in a system in 
which sexual misconduct was the only indication of fault within a mar-
riage. The value of this focus on sexual conduct as a way to evaluate or 
promote moral behavior was further undercut by the double standard 
some commentators have observed in the application of adultery 
statutes.141 
The other two grounds for divorce that were most widely used in 
the fault era were cruelty142 and desertion.143 While both of these grounds 
permitted courts the opportunity to sanction conduct in marriage that 
went beyond sexual morality, they were of limited value in promoting 
moral conduct. The historical context in which these grounds were devel-
oped and the broad discretion permitted judges in applying these grounds 
permitted the development of dual standards for husbands and wives. l44 
For example, while cruelty was initially developed as a ground for di-
vorce to assist women with abusive husbands,145 it was applied in an era 
ant wife had spent ten nights in room with adult male was insufficient to prove adultery when wife 
testified that she had not slept with the man due to her strong religious beliefs). 
140. Terms like cruelty and constructive desertion are subject to wide interpretation by trial 
judges applying them in divorce cases. See infra note 465. 
141. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 
96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1533 n.139 (1983) ("[S]trict divorce laws have historically operated more 
harshly upon women than upon men. For example, in many states a woman's single act of adultery 
constituted grounds for divorce but a man's adultery would not unless it were repeated or flagrant."). 
142. One defmition of cruelty is that it "occurs only when there is bodily harm or a reasona-
ble apprehension of bodily harm." CLARK, supra note 126, at 507. In the states where cruelty is not 
available (MD, NC, VA) or is strictly construed (DE, PA), the concept of constructive desertion 
evolved to fill the gap in situations where the spouse's cruelty forces the other spouse to leave the 
mariial home. See, e.g., Sackman v. Sackman, 203 A.2d 903 (Md. 1964). 
143. Willfulness is a requirement in desertion statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050 
(Michie 1998); IDAHO CODE § 32-603 (1996); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 (1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 3301(a)(I) (West 1991). Most statutes require that the desertion continue over a period of 
time, one year being the most common. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 501. 
144. See Nelson, supra note 90, at 517 (fmding a double standard in New York courts' defmi-
tion of cruelty). 
145. See Nan Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife Abuse, 3 LAW & POL. Q. 382, 
388-89, 393-94 (1981); Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-
Century Massachusettes, 33 WM. & MARy Q. 586, 588-89 (1976) (arguing that the courts interpreted 
fault requirements early in the 18th century in ways that prevented women from obtaining divorces 
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when a husband was entitled to use some force to discipline his wife.l46 
Courts often required a pattern of substantial physical abuse where cru-
elty grounds were invoked against a husband. In one case, evidence that 
a husband had hit his wife with his fist within the first two months of 
their marriage was not sufficient to establish cruelty.147 In another case, 
the wife alleged that her husband had "committed physical cruelty on 
her person" and that she was "afraid to live with [him] for fear that he 
[would] commit further and additional harm and injury [to her]."I48 The 
complaint was dismissed because only actual violence of a degree at-
tended with "danger to life or health" constituted cruelty.149 The courts 
were so tolerant of violence by a husband that they found one man justi-
fied in striking his wife after he had found her sitting on the lap of an-
other man and kissing him.150 Some courts also held that if the wife had 
reason to know that her future husband was abusive before the marriage, 
her prior knowledge barred her later use of cruelty as grounds for 
divorce.151 
On the other hand, relatively minor transgressions by a wife have 
been interpreted as cruelty justifying a husband's action for divorce. For 
example, divorces have been granted on cruelty grounds based on the 
wife's persistent nagging,152 her "denial" of the husband's "marital 
rights"153 or a demand that he use contraceptives.154 In contrast, a hus-
band's lack of sexual interest in his wifel55 or other failure to have sexual 
except for the most reprehensible male conduct). 
146. See SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIlE LAWS OF ENGLAND 445 (Thomas 
M. Cooley ed., 3d ed. 1884) (stating that a husband may, by force, keep his wife within the bounds 
of duty). See also JAMES SCHOUI.ER. MARRIAGE, DIVORCE. SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 
§ 1574 (6th ed 1921). For a discussion of the recent controversy over whether the law ever explicitly 
adopted a "rule of thumb" permitting a man to beat his wife so long as the rod was no thicker than 
his thumb, see infra note 328. 
147. See Glantz v. Glantz, 310 P.2d 23 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
148. McDowell v. McDowell, 223 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. 1969). 
149. [d.; see also Capps v. Capps, 219 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1975) (holding that a single act of 
physical violence was not enough to entitle wife to divorce on ground of cruelty). 
150. See Nilsen v. Nilsen, 183 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
151. See Williamson v. Williamson, 204 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Ark. 1947). 
152. See McGann v. McGann, 186 P.2d 424, 426 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (granting divorce 
where plaintiff's wife "was cold toward him, nagged him, wrote him whining letters while overseas, 
turned her back on him while in bed, attempted to regulate his life and refused to permit him to go 
bowling with his father . . . . "). 
153. Di Croce v. Di Croce, 209 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
154. See Barretta v. Barretta, 46 N.Y.S.2d 261, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1944). But see Dahnken v. 
Dahnken, 161 N.y'S.2d 539, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (holding that wife's belief that she had valid reason 
to leave home for husband's use of contraception did not constitute abandonment). 
155. See McClinton v. McClinton, 200 N.y'S.2d 987, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
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relations did not constitute cruelty. 156 
The husband's right at common law to determine where both his 
wife and children could live,151 codified in some states,158 also led to an 
early dual standard in desertion cases. Thus, a failure of a wife to follow 
her husband when he moved, except in the most egregious circum-
stances, would give rise to a cause of action against her for divorce on 
grounds of desertion.159 The husband had no corresponding duty to defer 
to a wife's decision to move; if a wife left the marital home, she would 
be guilty of desertion. 160 
The enactment of the Married Women's Property Actsl61 and the ex-
156. See Shepetin v. Shepetin, 229 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (App. Div. 1962). Of course, given the 
absence of no-fault grounds during this period, husbands and wives often colluded to create grounds 
for divorce. Thus, in some of these cases, the other party may not have opposed the charge of cru-
elty. Additionally, the need to circumvent the system may have contributed to the inconsistencies. 
See J. HERBIE DiFoNZO. BENEATII THE FAULT LINE: TIlE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN 
'TwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 55 (1997). See also discussion infra at Section ill CCl)(a). 
157. The husband's right to control both his domicile and that of his wife is based on the 
"unity of person" doctrine of marriage, which deprived married women of an independent legal ex-
istence. CLARK, supra note 126, at 286-88; see also Motykowski v. Motykowski, 282 N.E.2d 458, 
461 (lll. App. Ct. 1972); Lewis v. Lewis, 284 A.2d 21, 23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971); Cavallo v. 
Cavallo, 359 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Santarsiero v. Santarsiero, 331 A.2d 868, 
869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974). 
158. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 (repealed 1975); LA. avo CODE ANN. art. 120 (repealed 
1985); Dmo REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (repealed 1974). 
159. See, e.g., Roby v. Roby, 77 P. 213, 215 (Idaho 1904) (holding that husband was not 
guilty of desertion where the husband established a home in a desolate mining region and his wife 
refused to follow him on the ground that it was not a fit place to live because it was disagreeable 
five months of the year, when most of the travel was on snowshoes, and there were no schools, 
churches or theaters in the locality); Crosby v. Crosby, 434 So. 2d 162 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Bennett 
V. Bennett, 79 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1951) (emphasizing the well-established doctrine that the hus-
band, being the head of the family and legally responsible for its support, has the right to choose 
and establish the domicile for himself and his wife, and when he provides a new domicile, his wife's 
refusal to follow him constitutes desertion, unless the change is plainly unreasonable). This case was 
superceded by MD. CONST. art. 46, Maryland's version of the Equal Rights Amendment. See Blount 
V. Boston, 718 A.2d 1111 n.5 (Md. 1998». 
160. See, e.g., Towson V. Towson, 258 F. 517, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (holding that a wife 
who left her husband because of cruelty, taking their minor child with her, was not entitled to sepa-
rate maintenance or custody of the child when she was unable to sustain her claim of cruelty and 
thus had deserted her husband without just cause), overruled in part by Barlett V. Barlett, 221 F.2d 
508 (D.C. Cir. 1954); McGrath v. Gimler, 60 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946) (holding that 
a father who left New York to take up residence in Wyoming had the right to custody of the child 
over the mother who deserted the father by refusing to follow and live with him in Wyoming). 
161. 
[U]nder the Married Women's Acts, in force in most if not all states, the unity of the 
spouses is severed, and each is a separate legal personality in so far as the disabilities of the 
wife are abolished; but such acts are to be construed as not otherwise impairing the unity of 
the spouses .••• The law continues to recognize that unity with respect to certain rights, du-
ties, and obligations arising from the marriage and constituting its object. These Married Wo-
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pansion of concepts of equal protection in gender discrimination cases162 
have resulted in more evenhanded applications of cruelty and desertion 
statutes.163 However, the statutory language adopted in most states is ex-
pansive enough to continue to allow trial judges broad discretion in their 
app1ication.l64 This discretion leads to both unpredictability and inconsis-
tency in application.165 It also permits judges to apply their own stan-
dards of behavior which, given the composition of the state judiciary, 
still means the male perspective will dominate.l66 
Finally, a review of reported decisions on cruelty and desertion 
grounds reveals the same preoccupation with sexual morality as the pri-
men's Enabling Acts do not purport to operate upon the family relations, or to take from the 
husband, his marital rights, except as they pertain to property. 
26 AM. JUR. Husband and Wife § 3 (1940) (footnotes omitted); see also Richard H. Chused, Married 
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. W. 1359 (1983). 
162. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
163. The dual standard in desertion cases resulted, in part, from the husband's right to deter-
mine the family's domicile. This common law inability of married women to establish a separate 
domicile was eroded in many states by the adoption of the Married Women's Property Act because 
these statutes severed the common law "unity of spouses." See supra note 161. In addition, the prin-
ciple of derivative domicile for married women was successfully litigated in the 1970s on equal pro-
tection grounds. See, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1974), 
rev'd in pan, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1968). 
164. For statutory language on cruelty, see, for example, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 
(West 1998) ("cruel and abusive treatment"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 (1994) ("habitual cruel and 
inhuman treatment"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (1992) ("extreme cruelty"); NJ. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:34-2 (West 1987) ("extreme cruelty"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (Michie 1994) ("cruel and 
inhuman treatment"); N.Y. DOM. REI... LAw § 170 (McKinney 1988) ("cruel and inhuman treatment 
... endanger[ing] the physical or mental well being of the plaintiff"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03 
(1997) ("[e]xtreme cruelty"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1994) ("extreme cru-
elty"); OK!.. STAT. ANN. tiL 43, § 101 (West 1990) ("[e]xtreme cruelty"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3301 (West 1991) ("cruel and barbarous treatment endanger[ing] ••• life or health"); Rl GEN. 
LAWS § 15-5-2 (1996) ("extreme cruelty"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1985) 
("[p]hysical cruelty"); SD. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-2 (Michie 1992) ("[e]xtreme cruelty"); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tiL 15, § 551 (1989) ("intolerable severity"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1995) ("cru-
elty"); W. VA. CODE, § 48-2-4 (1998) ("cruel or inhuman treatment"). 
For statutory language on desertion, see, for example, ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a) (1989); ALAsKA 
STAT. § 25.24.050 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-4O (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 
(1991); 750 Iu.. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/401(2)(1) (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN .• FAM. LAw § 7-102 
(1991); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West 1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West 1987); 
N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1994); 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tiL 15, § 291 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1995). 
165. Of course the indeterminancy of the cruelty ground also contributed to its popularity in 
the fault era when many divorces were obtained by collusion and perjury. See DIFoNZO, supra note 
156, at 51-56. 
166. See WOMEN IN THE LAw: A LoOK AT THE NUMBERS 31 (American Bar Association, Dec. 
1995) (finding that in 1991, 7% of federal court judges and 9% of state court judges were women). 
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mary way of evaluating conduct in marriage.167 Boasting of affairs with 
other women,168 a husband's insistence on excessive, unnatural, or other-
wise unreasonable sexual intercourse,169 transvestitism or transsexual-
ism,170 refusal to engage in sexual intercourse,17I homosexuality, 172 and a 
wife's desire to use contraception during sexual relations173 have all been 
considered cruelty under various state statutes. 
Further, because both cruelty and desertion require that the couple 
has ceased cohabitation,174 a significant number of litigated cases on de-
sertion have focused on whether sexual relations have occurred within a 
marriage.175 These cases focus on whether a spouse has refused sexual re-
lations,176 whether the refusal of sexual relations amounts to desertion, 177 
and whether the refusal to .have sexual relations is justified.178 
The inquiry into misconduct through the fault-based divorce grounds 
has provided only a very limited opportunity for legislators and judges to 
engage in moral discourse about the meaning of commitment in mar-
167. See Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Annotation, Fault As Consideration in Alimony, Spousal 
Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R. 3d 1116 (1978). 
168. See Smith v. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1963); see also Diehl v. Diehl, 149 A.2d 133 (pa. 
Super. Ct. 1959); RP. Davis, Annotation, Insistence on Sex Relations as Cruelty or Indignity Consti-
luting Ground/or Divorce, 88 AL.R. 2d 553 (1963). 
169. See Thomason v. Thomason, 332 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). 
170. See Steinke v. Steinke, 357 A.2d 674 (pa. Super. Ct. 1975). 
171. See Hinkle v. Hinkle, 74 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1953); Mante v. Mante, 309 N.Y.S.2d 944 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 
172. See H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 
173. See Forbes v. Forbes, 1 W.L.R. 531 (1955). 
174. See ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.050 (Michie 1998) (willful desertion for one year); ARK. CODl; 
ANN. § 9-12-301 (Michie 1998) (willful desertion of 18 months separation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46b-40 (West 1995) (willful desertion for one year); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (1991) (willful de-
sertion for one year); MD. CODE ANN .• FAM. LAW § 7-103 (1991) (desertion for 12 months without 
interruption); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1 (1998) (utter desertion for one year); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 458:7 (1992) (unexplained absence for two years; joining religious group believing the rela-
tion of husband wife unlawful and refusal to cohabit for six months); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 
(West 1987) (cruelty for three months; desertion for 12 months); N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (Mc-
Kinney 1988) (abandonment for one or more years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 101 (West 1990) 
(abandonment/desertion for one year); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 1991) (desertion for 
one or more years); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-2 (1996) (desertion for five years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
3-10 (Law Co-op. 1985) (desertion for five years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101 (1996) (desertion 
for one year or absent state for two years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (1998) (willful desertion for 
more than one year); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1989) (desertion for seven years); W. VA. CODE 
§ 48-2-4 (1998) (abandonment or desertion for six months). 
175. See Ct.ARK, supra note 126, at 504 (noting that the majority of litigated cases on deser-
tion focus on whether cessation of cohabitation has occurred). 
176. See id. at 504 n.47; Fortman v. Fortman, 243 A.2d 517, 520-21 (Md. 1968). 
177. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 504 n.48. 
178. See, e.g., Hodges v. Hodges, 131 A.2d 703, 704-05 (Md. 1957). 
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riage. This body of law tells married couples that sexual indiscretions can 
have serious consequences-Le., provide a legal ground for ending a 
marriage. However, the messages about conduct outside the area of sex-
ual relations are inconsistent and unpredictable and include the destruc-
tive message that treating one's spouse with respect and freedom from 
physical abuse may not be obligations the law envisions in marriage. 
Fault-based divorce decisions also endorse a double standard for 
. men and women when judges evaluate the behavior of husbands and 
wives differently as they apply divorce grounds. The expense and delay 
experienced by both parties to a divorce when fault has to be litigated 
hurts families trying to cope with the trauma of family breakup. These 
costs can rise to the level of a moral issue when the party seeking the di-
vorce does so to protect herself and her children from violence and pro-
tection is delayed by the expense and length of court proceedings.179 
B. Alimony Law in the Fault Era 
The "no-fault revolution"18o also resulted in a shift in the law's ap-
proach to alimony or spousal support. This change was marked primarily 
by a dimunition of the role of fault in alimony decisions and is viewed 
by many commentators as part of the "tendency toward diminished 
moral discourse"181 in alimony. 
Prior to the 1970s, alimony was awarded to wives only following a 
legal separation or divorce.182 Although there did not appear to be any 
single justification set forth in the early statutes authorizing alimony, 
both need and fault were the primary justifications for early awards of al-
imony.183 English alimony law placed greater emphasis on the need to 
179. Battered women are at greatest risk of abuse when attempting to separate from their abu-
sive partners. Among victims of violence committed by an intimate, women separated from their 
husbands were three times more likely to be victimized than divorced women and twenty-five times 
more likely to be victimized than married women. See Ronet Bachman & Linda E. Salzman, Vio-
lence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey, U.S. Dept of Justice (Aug. 1995). 
180. For a description of the term "no-fault revolution," see supra note 6. 
181. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note I, at 1809; see also Carl E. Schneider, Rethink· 
ing Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REv. 197,233-57 (1991). 
182. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSfONE. COMMENTARIES *189. In 1979, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), holding that the Alabama statute authorizing ali-
mony to be imposed only upon husbands and in favor of wives violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
Prior to 1979, only a few states permitted alimony to be granted to husbands. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 4330 (West 1994); MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (1998). 
183. Alimony, unknown at common law, is a creature of statute. See Chester G. Vernier & 
John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 201 (1939). 
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support the wife as a basis for alimony because the award was made in 
the context of a legal separation in which the parties would remain mar-
ried and the husband had a continuing obligation to support his wife.184 
However, in this country, where alimony was awarded upon absolute di-
vorce, the law placed greater emphasis on alimony's punishment and re-
ward functions.18s Characterizing the early justification for alimony under 
American law, one commentator notes that "[a]limony was based largely 
on fault and was only available to innocent wives whose husbands had 
caused the marriage to fail."186 Additionally, alimony tended to be 
awarded for life when it was ordered because it was not directly tied to 
the wife's economic need.187 
This view of alimony in the fault era has been interpreted as pro-
moting moral discourse because it required courts to focus on "inno-
cent"188 or "guilty" conduct.189 Wives were regularly denied alimony 
when courts interpreted their actions as conduct that "broke up the mar-
riage"l90 or made them "guilty" parties. 191 The presumption favoring a 
lifetime award of alimony has also been interpreted as promoting moral 
discourse because it recognized that "each spouse assumes lifelong re-
sponsibility for the other." 192 
An examination of the way alimony laws were crafted and applied 
reveals the limits of fault-based alimony laws' ability to promote moral-
184. Under English common law, wives surrendered their property rights at marriage and had 
no ability to support themselves while married. 2 BURNS, EcCLESIASTICAL LAW 450-51 (1781). 
185. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 139, at 243; CHESTER G. VERNIER, 2 AMERICAN FAMILY 
LAW 259 (1932). 
186. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 139, at 243. But see Dayton v. Dayton, 161 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 
1942); Rader v. Rader, 126 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1961); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio 
Com. PI. 1954); Bray v. Landergren, 172 S.E. 252 (Va. 1934). 
187. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 650. 
188. See Dayton v. Dayton, 161 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1942); Rader v. Rader, 126 So. 2d 189 (La. 
App. 1961); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio Com. PI. 1954); Bray v. Landergren, 172 
S.E.252 (Va. 1934). 
189. The gUilt of either spouse is relevant. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 151 S.W.2d 998 (Ark. 
1941); Gusman v. Gusman, 39 N.E. 918 (Ind. 1895); Poppe v. Poppe, 52 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. App. 
1944). But see Bonanno v. Bonanno, 72 A.2d 318 (NJ. 1950); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 11 A.2d 128 (NJ. 
Ch. 1939); Miles v. Miles, 202 P.2d 485 (Or. 1949); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 S.E.2d 64 (Va. 1942). 
190. See Stumpf v. Stumpf, 179 A.2d 893, 896 (Md. 1962) (holding that wife, who refused to 
reconcile with allegedly alcoholic husband until he agreed to let her resume control of their finances, 
had effectively deserted her husband). 
191. See Mathews v. Mathews, 459 So. 2d 546, 549-50 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (reiterating that a 
party need only establish by circumstantial evidence the reasonable conclusion that adultery has been 
committed and denying wife permanent alimony on the trial court's finding that she was "guilty of 
adultery"). 
192. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1810. 
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ity. First, the fact that alimony was unavailable to husbands in most juris-
dictions undermined its role in promoting mutual responsibility and com-
mitment in marriage. Indeed, the cases from this era reveal the hardship 
created under this rule.193 The fact that wives who were not found to be 
"innocent" were denied alimony also worked to exclude many deserving 
wives.194 
The nature of the task of evaluating marital misconduct also in-
creased the likelihood of harsh or unfair results. Findings of fact about 
guilt or innocence are subjective and imprecise; two judges hearing the 
same case could easily reach two different conclusions on whether a wife 
was innocent or a husband guilty.19S For example, in a case where a wife 
left her husband after he physically and mentally abused her, one judge 
might fmd that the husband constructively deserted the wife and there-
fore award her alimony.196 On similar facts, another judge might interpret 
the wife's actions in leaving an abusive husband as actual desertion on 
her part and therefore deny her alimony as the "guilty party."197 
Additionally, the tendency of the law is to place inappropriate 
weight on sexual misconduct, specifically adultery, but not enough 
weight on other kinds of misconduct such as physically or mentally abus-
ing one's spouse198 had implications for alimony as well. Thus, a wife 
who committed one act of adultery in a thirty year marriage during 
which she devoted herself to raising children and supporting the hus-
band's career would be left with no support after marriage. l99 In an era 
when most women were economically dependent, a wife who exper-
ienced abuse by her husband might have to stay in a violent marriage or 
risk loss of support because the abuse may not be included under a par-
193. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 158, 159-60 (Ala. 1966) (holding that the husband 
should not be awarded the parties' jointly owned home even though he received custody of their 
child). 
194. See GREGORY ET AL, supra note 139, at 243. But see, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & June 
Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL L REV. 855 (1988) (reviewing 
nineteenth and twentieth century cases on alimony and finding substantial variation on the issue of 
whether a "guilty" spouse could collect alimony). 
195. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2250 (1991) (discussing drawbacks of judicial discretion). 
196. See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 221 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
197. See, e.g., Towson v. Towson, 258 F. 517, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (holding that a wife 
who left her husband because of cruelty was not entitled to alimony where she was unable to sustain 
her claim of cruelty and thus had deserted her husband without just cause). 
198. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. 
199. In many states, if a divorce was granted to the husband based on the wife's adultery or 
some other conduct giving rise to fault-based grounds, the wife would be barred from receiving ali-
mony. See supra notes 186, 190-91 and accompanying text. 
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ticular judge's concept of cruelty or constructive desertion.2OO Thus, while 
the statutes and decisionmakers used language which purported to punish 
misconduct and reward virtue in marriage, often the application of these 
laws did not accomplish those goals. 
Finally, the message of marriage as a lifetime commitment was fur-
ther undercut by the infrequency and low levels of alimony awarded 
under this system. Fewer than 16% of divorces occurring between 1887 
and 1922 included provisions for permanent alimony.201 Statistics in the 
1960s and 1970s reveal a similar pattern in which alimony was awarded 
in less than 20% of divorce cases.202 Post 1980 award data show a simi-
lar pattern.203 
When alimony was awarded, the amounts were low.204 The Census 
200. See Bradford, supra note 137, at 631-632; Martha Heller, Note, Should Breaking-Up Be 
Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would Have upon Domestic Vio-
lence, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 263, 272 (1996) (arguing that requiring women to prove the miscon-
duct of violent husbands in support proceedings "would deter women from leaving dangerous rela-
tionships"). But see Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 869, 869 (1994) ("[I]ncreased abuse and other undesirable behavior is a natural conse-
quence of the fact that in some states the marriage contract cannot be enforced."); Wardle, supra 
note 1, at 741 (critiquing the "no-fault divorce culture" and suggesting a link between no-fault di-
vorce and violence). 
201. See PAUL H. JACOBSON. AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 127 (1959). A nationwide 
sample of divorce decrees revealed that 9.3% of divorces included provisions for permanent alimony 
from 1887-1906; in 1916, the percentage was 15.4 and in 1922, alimony was awarded in 14.7% of 
cases. See id. 
202. See WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 162-68 (indicating that between 1968 and 1972, the per-
centage of cases in which alimony was denied went from 20% to 15% in California cases; this per-
centage had increased to 17% by 1977); see also Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce 
Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 1. FAM. L. 443, 473 (1981-82) (indicating that alimony awards in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, declined from 20% of cases in 1965 to 16% in 1978). 
203. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS. 
SERIES P-23, No. 152, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1985 (1987). According to a 1986 United 
States Census Bureau survey, fewer than 15 percent of all women who had ever been divorced or 
were currently separated had obtained an agreement or court order to receive alimony. See id. For 
other studies of the percentage of women awarded alimony at divorce, see ALASKA WOMEN'S COM. 
MISSION. FAMILY EQUITY AT ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE EcONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON Woo 
MEN AND CHILDREN 17 (Oct 1987) (10% in Alaska); WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 167 (17% in Cali-
fornia); Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 267 (1988) (38% among contested adjudications and 11.5% among un-
contested cases in Montgomery County, Maryland); McGraw et aI., supra note 202, at 473 (16% in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Di-
vorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 362 (1987) (30% received more than $1 per year 
alimony in New Haven County, Connecticut); Barbara R. Rowe & Alice M. Morrow, The Economic 
Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten or More Years of Marriage, 24 WU.lAMETIE L. REv. 
463, 476 (1988) (28% in Oregon); Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory 
Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 85 (1986) (7% in Vermont). 
204. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS. 
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Bureau reported that the average amount of a1imony received by women 
in 1978 was $2,850205 The figure went to $3,733 in 1985, a decrease 
when adjustments for inflation were ca1culated.206 The use of broad dis-
cretionary standards for setting a1imony permitted judges a wide range in 
setting a1imony and resulted in low awards.207 Decisions and commentary 
from the era also reflect negative stereotypes about women that may 
have influenced both the scarcity and the meagerness of awards.20s 
All of these circumstances--exclusion of needy husbands, exclusion 
of fmancially needy women who were not deemed "innocent," the im-
precision of fmdings of guilt and innocence, and the reluctance to award 
any or adequate alimony in a vast majority of cases-undermined the 
moral power of alimony in fault-based divorce and hurt women, and, 
particularly, children.209 Despite the language in statutes, which suggested 
spouses would be accountable for misconduct in marriage and that virtu-
ous wives could count on a lifetime of support, the application of these 
laws did little to reinforce those messages. On the contrary, lawyers 
counseling husbands considering divorce in the fault era could assure cli-
ents that they could avoid responsibility for dependent spouses by urging 
SERIES P-23 No. 112, CHiLD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, at 9 (1981). This report was the first re-
port in which the Census Bureau reported data from a survey specifically designed to obtain data on 
child support and alimony. See id. at 1. 
205. See id. 
206. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 203, at 7. For other studies of amounts of ali-
mony awarded at divorce see ALAsKA WOMEN'S COMMISSION, supra note 203 (median $500/month); 
WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 171 (median $21O/month); Bell, supra note 203, at 286 (mean monthly 
award ranged from $366.67 for marriages of 6-10 years to $650.88 for marriages over 15 years). 
207. See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1106-09 
(1989). 
208. 
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of secured indolence. It should not be 
suffered to convert a host of physically and mentally competent young women into an army 
of alimony drones, who neither toil nor spin, and become a drain on society and a menace to 
themselves. 
Samuel H. Hofstadter & Shirley R. Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 J. FAM. L. 51, 55 (1967). 
We do not construe the marriage status, once achieved, as conferring on the former wife of a 
ship-wrecked marriage the right to live a life of veritable ease with no effort and little incen-
tive on her part to apply such talent as she may possess to making her own way. 
Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1955); see also Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282 (NJ. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978). 
209. Studies have documented the decline in standard of living of custodial parents-predomi-
nantly mothers-and children after divorce. See, e.g., DIANE DODSON & JOAN ENTMACHER, WOMEN'S 
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, REPORT CARD ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDBUNBS 32 tbI. 4-E (1994); ELEA· 
NOR E. MACCOBY BT AL, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 126-30, 
257-62 (1992) (identifying a decline in standard of living experienced by custodial parents and chil-
dren after divorce). 
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an interpretation of facts that shifted or shared blame for the disintegra-
tion of the marriage. 
The husband could be further reassured that, even if the judge found 
the husband "guilty" and the wife "innocent," the chances of being or-
dered to pay substantial alimony were small. For similar reasons, that 
same lawyer, counseling an "innocent" wife, could do little to assure 
that woman that her commitment to her marriage would result in fman-
cial support following divorce. Therefore, the moral force of alimony law 
in the fault era was very weak. 
C. Custody in the Fault Era 
According to some commentators, modem custody law is another 
area of family law in which the relevance of moral judgments has been 
deemphasized in the no-fault era.210 However, an examination of custody 
law in the fault era reveals a similar preoccupation with sexual conduct 
as the primary focus of moral inquiry. As a result of this preoccupation, 
discussions of right and wrong in custody cases were narrowly conceived 
in the fault-era and often did not focus on behavior that was most rele-
vant to parental fitness and protection of children. 
A particularly striking example of fault-era courts' tendency to view 
sexual conduct as the sole measure of morality is found in a 1962 New 
York custody decision.211 In that case, the court approved a trial court's 
judgment denying custody to a mother based on her extramarital affair 
and described the court's role in enforcing morality: 
It therefore has devolved upon the courts to establish the moral standards to be fol-
lowed by persons to whom is entrusted the care and custody of children. And 
never has there been a greater need for the courts to maintain a high level of moral 
conduct than exists today. This court intends to give more than lip service to the 
principle that the fabric of our society is composed of the family unit and when the 
family unit is damaged, the fabric of society suffers. Our courts will continue to in-
sist upon a high level of moral conduct . . . and will never succumb to the 
'Hollywood' type of morality so popular today .... 212 
The emphasis on sexual conduct in fault-era custody cases may be 
grounded in the historical tendency to stereotype and idealize women in 
custody law.213 Maternal fitness in custody cases was evaluated against 
210. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1528 (citing Carol S. Bruch, Forms of Exclusion in Child 
Custody Law, 7 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 339, 341-42 (1986)). 
211. See In re Anonymous, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1962). 
212. Id. 
213. This discussion is based, in part, on Jane C. Murphy, Legal/mages of Motherhood: Con-
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the stereotype of the ideal mother who was married, stayed at home, and 
was, most importantly, both heterosexual and monogamous.214 
Through the early nineteenth century in this country, fathers almost 
invariably were awarded custody of their children upon divorce or sepa-
ration.2lS Consistent with women's general loss of legal status and power 
upon marriage,216 mothers had neither rights nor access to their children 
if they did not live with the father.217 As Blackstone wrote, "[AJ mother, 
as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect. "218 A 
maternal, or "tender years," presumption had replaced the paternal pref-
erence by the middle of the twentieth century.219 The presumption pro-
vided that unless mothers were unfit, they should have custody of their 
children, particularly those under age five.220 This presumption was 
grounded in the view that women's natural disposition toward nurturing 
made them the preferred caretakers.221 
Even under a system in which the maternal presumption was the 
rule in all fIfty states, courts generally deprived the mother of custody if 
she was believed to be promiscuous.222 Reviewing the state of custody 
flicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 
693-696 (1998). 
214. Mothers had neither the legal nor the economic means to raise their children unless they 
were married to the fathers. The state regarded children as the father's property, subject to his con-
trol both during the marriage and after its dissolution. See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the 
Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 181-82 (1916). 
215. See GROSSBERG, supra note 132, at 235; sUZANNE RAMOS, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF CHILD 
CUSTODY 32 (1979). For an examination of custody law in an earlier period of history see MARY 
ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1-47 (1994) (examining the treatment of children during colonial times as eco-
nomic assets with "custody" granted through relationships established in indenture contracts or 
apprenticeships). 
216. See WOMEN AND THE LAW § 3A.02[l]-[2] (Carol H. Lefcourt & Jane Campbell Moriarty 
eds., 1996). 
217. Mothers had neither the legal nor the economic means to raise their children unless they 
were married to the fathers. The state regarded children as the father's property, subject to his con-
trol both during the marriage and after its dissolution. See Pound, supra note 214, at 181-82 (1916). 
218. BLACKSTONE, supra note 146, at 441. 
219. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Cus-
tody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1523, 1536 (1994). Others have de-
scribed the maternal preference as taking root much earlier, between the mid-19th century and the 
1920s. See MASON, supra note 215, at 118. 
220. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 799 (indicating that, while few courts define "tender 
years," the "presumption would clearly apply to a child under five years"). 
221. See Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revis-
ited, 1 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 107, 114 (1978). 
222. See Carl A. Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CON'TEMP. PROB. 720, 
731 (1944) (concluding that generally, custody will not be awarded to a parent who has been 
"guilty" of adultery because it is "immoral conduct"); see also Robert J. Bregman, Custody 
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law in 1967, Homer Clark noted that the most common cases involving 
the "morals of the parties" involved a wife who had committed adultery 
and that "other forms of immorality are rarely given much discus-
sion."223 Even twenty years later, he found "[p]arental conduct raising 
questions of sexual morality has produced more custody litigation than 
any other types of conduct. "224 Thus, discussions of morality in custody 
cases often arise in the context of one parent seeking to change or obtain 
custody based on the sexual practices of their divorced or separated 
spouse.225 These cases are characterized by the courts' assumption that 
cohabitation or adultery renders a parent morally unfit for custody.226 
Custody cases reviewing the sexual conduct of a parent are also 
marked by a tendency to apply a dual standard when evaluating the 
"moral fitness" of a mother as compared to a father.227 The most typical 
cases involve attempts to control the sexual behavior of a divorced or 
separated mother seeking to gain or maintain custody.228 Courts have held 
that the mother's cohabitation outside of marriage is itself harmful to the 
children and warrants state intervention either through a change in cus-
Awards": Standards" Used When the Mother Has Been Guilty of Adultery or Alcoholism, 2 FAM. L.Q. 
384, 387 (1968). 
223. CLARK, supra note 126, at 586. 
224. [d., at 803. Clark notes that this preoccupation with sexual morality in custody cases has 
continued in some states in the no-fault era. See id. ("Notwithstanding contemporary changes in sex-
ual mores [sic] sexual morality still generates strong emotions in the minds of judges which are re-
flected in their judgments either expressly or under the surface."). 
225. See, e.g., Beasley v. Beasley, 160 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1964) (finding that while 
nonmarital sexual conduct "does not, in and of itself, serve as an absolute bar" to giving custody to 
the offending parent, nevertheless, a finding of adultery on the part of one parent constitutes an "ad-
judication of [that parent's] relative unfitness to have custody"); Taylor v. Taylor, 309 P.2d 508, 509 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (finding "that a mother who has taken her children into an adulterous 
home ... has thereby shown her unfitness for custody"); Parker v. Parker, 158 A.2d 607, 610 (Md. 
1960) (depriving an adulterous mother of custody despite her "confession of error and avowal of re-
pentance"); Wilson v. Wilson, 590 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Mont. 1979) (finding, on balance, that the chil-
dren in question would be better off with their father, rather than their adulterous mother, even 
though he would have to employ child care); Morrissey v. Morrissey, 154 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Neb. 
1967) ("Where a wife is found ... guilty of adultery, she is an unfit person as a matter of law to 
have the care and custody of her minor child .... "). 
226. In one of the most frequently cited "morality" custody cases, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois held that custody could be changed on the father's showing that the mother and children were 
living with her boyfriend, though there was no showing that this arrangement was harmful to the 
children. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424-26 (Ill. 1979). While the court made reference to 
"the mental and emotional health of the children" it focused upon "the moral hazards" from cohab-
itation. See id. 
227. See WOMEN AND TIlE LAW, supra note 216, at § 6.05[2]. 
228. See Murphy, supra note 213, at 199. 
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tody229 or the imposition of restrictions on the mother's behavior as a 
condition to her maintaining custody.230 Evidence demonstrating similar 
paternal extramarital conduct often does not trigger the same punitive re-
sponse against fathers.231 
The second category of custody and visitation cases in which courts 
have traditionally engaged in explicit discussion of "morality" is cases 
involving gay and lesbian parents.232 Until the 1980s, few homosexual 
parents were successful in custody cases.233 Similar to cohabitation and 
adultery cases, the language in these decisions focused on general con-
cerns about "immoral" and "illicit" relationships rather than specific 
harm to the children involved.234 
Courts in the fault-era consistently labeled both mothers and fathers 
actively engaged in homosexual relationships as poor moral examples for 
229. See In re Marriage of Thompson & Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ill. 1983) (distin-
guishing Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (111. 1979), and granting custody to father who had com-
mitted adultery and cohabited with a girlfriend and his children); Melancon v. Bergeron, 598 So. 2d 
694, 697, 699 (La. Ct App. 1992) (fmding that granting mother physical custody of the children was 
an abuse of discretion because the mother had lived in "open concubinage" with her boyfriend for 
over three years, with no intention of getting married, while the father had remarried and could pro-
vide a stable environment); Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91-92 (Va. 1977) (affIrming the trial 
court's fmding that, solely by reason of her adulterous cohabitation, the mother was unfIt to be a 
custodial parent). 
230. See, e.g., ParriIlo v. ParriIlo, 554 A.2d 1043, 1045 (R.I. 1989) (fInding that the court 
could prohibit a wife from spending the night with cohabitant in her house while her children were 
present). 
231. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589, 591-93 (Kan. 1978) (awarding custody to 
the father because, among other reasons, the mother's fiancee had spent the night in her home, even 
though the father lived with his girlfriend in a hotel room and had allowed his lover to stay there 
while the children were present); Flournoy v. Flournoy, 392 So. 4d 1096, 1098-99 (La. Ct App. 
1980) (awarding custody to the father even though both the father and mother engaged in adulterous 
relations, reasoning that the father's affair was more "discreet" than the mother's); see also 
DEBORAH L. RHODE. SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY (1997) (fault system in 
custody hurts mothers because courts are generally harsher to women than men in cases of sexual 
misconduct). 
232. See, e.g.,1RA MARK ELLMAN ET AL.. FMoULY LAw: CASES. TEXT. PROBLEMS 636-38 (3d ed. 
1998) (summarizing and discussing cases and commentary involving custody and visitation disputes 
based upon sexual conduct of homosexual parents). 
233. Twenty years ago, New York courts expressed the view that homosexual relationships 
were considered "clandestine deviate conduct" In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854, 860 (Sup. Ct 
1976). 
234. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 45 (Ct App. 1975) (holding that residence 
in a homosexual household is detrimental to children and contrary to their best interests); Towend v. 
Towend, No. 639, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 6193, at *8-10 (Ohio Ct App. Sept 30, 1976) (conclud-
ing trial court's preoccupation with the sexual techniques of lesbians was relevant to the direct ad-
verse effect upon children of homosexual activity). But see Nadler v. Superior Ct, 255 Cal. App. 2d 
523, 525 (Ct App. 1967) (holding that it is the duty of the trial court to exercise its discretion as to 
how the welfare of the child will be affected by a parent's homosexuality). 
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their children.235 Until recently, judges deprived gay and lesbian parents 
of custody, and in some cases visitation, despite evidence that children 
might be hurt by being deprived of a parent's care236 and that gay parents 
are as capable of competent and loving care as heterosexual parents.237 
Thus, the discussion of morals in these cases did little to protect children. 
As one commentator explained, the arguments against granting custody to 
homosexual parents are limited to the ideas that "if gay parents have 
custody, they will perform sex acts in front of the children; if gay par-
ents have custody, the children will be harmed because of the immoral 
environment. "238 
The focus of moral discourse in the fault-era was on regulating sex-
ual conduct within marriage. Litigants' right to get a divorce, financial 
support, or access to their children was largely dependent on having en-
gaged in sexual conduct consistent with trial judges' codes of behavior. 
The courts gave less protection or attention to dependent members of 
families created outside of marriage, families experiencing domestic vio-
lence, or children in need of support. 
IV. THE NEW MORAL DISCOURSE IN FAMILY LAW 
Beginning in the 1970s, courts and legislatures began to implement 
a series of changes in family law that reduced the role of fault and, con-
sequently, the role of sexual misconduct in deciding who should be 
granted a divorce. While fault based grounds for divorce continued to ex-
ist in most states even in the no-fault era,239 the adoption of no-fault in 
all fIfty states by 1985 meant that the option of obtaining a divorce by 
consent without collusion and perjury was available throughout the 
country.24O 
235. See N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 
314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981); MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 963-69 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v. 
Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1,5 (pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692-94 (Va. 1985). Gay 
parents' visitation rights were limited in J.L.P. (H.) v. DJ.P', 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. App. Ct. 
1982) and in Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). Some more recent 
decisions have required a demonstrated nexus between harm to the child and the parent's sexual ori-
entation. See infra note 459 and accompanying text. 
236. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980). 
237. See id. at 1216. 
238. Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 11 U. DAY· 
TON L. REv. 275, 329 (1986) (summarizing case law and commentary from the 1970s and 1980s). 
239. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. LJ. 
773, 816 (1996). 
240. See JUDITH AltEEN. CASES AND MATERIAt.S ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 75 (Supp. 1995). 
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Following the spread of no-fault grounds for divorce, a number of 
other changes occurred in family law that shifted the emphasis in family 
law from punishing adults for sexual infidelity to protecting children's 
welfare. Although the no-fault revolution's first changes dealt with di-
vorce grounds, no-fault also diminished the role of sexual misconduct in 
deciding the terms of custody and visitation decisions. In its place, devel-
opments in custody law refmed the best interest standard to focus on fac-
tors that more directly bear on children's well-being. 
Simultaneously, other developments in family law during the last 
three decades have increased both the debate about who can marry and, 
to some extent, the procedural requirements that encourage couples to re-
flect on the meaning of commitment prior to marriage. The behavior of 
family members in ongoing families has also been subject to greater reg-
ulation when courts and legislatures reject principles of family autonomy 
in favor of protecting women and children from family violence. Devel-
opments in the law during the last three decades have also increased le-
gal protections for those largely left out of the moral vision of the fault 
era, financially dependent unmarried cohabitants and children born 
outside of marriage. Finally, the move in the late 1980s from a broad 
discretionary standard for setting child support to fixed formulae repre-
sents an important step in protecting the economic well-being of children. 
A. Access to Marriage 
Over the last century, the regulation of access to marriage has been 
marked by a steady decline in state interference.241 Reviewing the 
changes in regulation of marriage formation in this country and other 
Western countries from 1800 to the mid 1980s, Mary Ann Glendon char-
acterized the change as follows: 
The picture is one of many small changes, unremarkable in themselves, but to-
gether signaling a major transition in the way modern legal systems intersect with 
marriage behavior. 
Viewed in their historical context, the apparently trifling changes . . • are the 
culmination of a long series of events that, beginning around 1800, gradually freed 
individuals from most constraints on their ability to marry or on their choice of 
marriage partner.242 
241. See MARy ANN GLENDON. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW. AND FAM· 
ILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 35-36 (1989) [hereinafter GLENDON. TRANSFORMA· 
TlON]; GLENDON, supra note 78, at 63-64. 
242. GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 35. The history of regulation of marriage 
in this country for African-Americans is quite different. Until the 1860s, because Black men and wo-
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Noting both a declining public health necessity and a growing recogni-
tion of a constitutionally-based right to marry, Glendon found that the 
only remaining restrictions to marriage relate to age, polygamy, and in-
cest, and that even in these areas, many marriage impediments "lack 
teeth. "243 
It is only within the last decade that family law has begun to reex-
amine the meaning of marriage and the law's role in it. This renewed in-
terest in the meaning of marriage has resulted in legislative debate in 
both state legislatures244 and Congress245 about moral issues surrounding 
the decision to marry. Family law scholars have also devoted increased 
attention to the religious and moral underpinnings of marriage.246 
1. Who May Marry: Same Sex Marriage 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided Loving v. Vir-
ginia,247 holding that Virginia's ban on interracial marriages violated the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.248 Loving has been viewed as both an example of the law's attempt 
to further moral behavior and as the beginning of a retreat from regula-
tion of who may marry.249 The moral message of Loving-that all people 
should be treated as equals with dignity and respect-was a strong 
one.250 
men were considered slaves and had no legal rights, they were not permitted to marry. See JEAN KOH 
PETERs, REPRESENTING CIllLDREN IN CIllLD PRoTECrIVE PROCEEDINGS: EnnCAL AND PRACTICAL DIMEN· 
SIONS 243-45 (1997) (describing separate system of American family law for Blacks that "actively 
thwarted their attempts to live together in conventional family households"). 
243. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 35. 
244. See infra notes 275-77, 309 and accompanying text 
245. See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying text 
246. See infra notes 249, 271, 279-80 and accompanying text 
247. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
248. See id. at 12. 
249. See Robert A. Destro, Introduction, Symposium, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Lov-
ing v. Vrrginia After Thirty Years, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1207, 1215-17 (1998). 
250. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also Robert F. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the 
Freedom to Marry, 29 OIllO ST. LJ. 358 (1968). Given the practices and values of the time, how-
ever, Loving's moral message of respect and dignity might be categorized as an attempt to legislate 
the morality of aspiration rather than reflecting values that existed in the United States in the late 
1960s. At the time of Loving, seventeen states had laws that prohibited interracial sexual relations 
and interracial marriage. See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation 
Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1190 n.8 (1966). In 1968, the year that inter-
racial marriage became legal across the United States, a Gallup poll found that some 72 percent of 
Americans still disapproved of such marriages, even if they were prepared to tolerate them. Although 
public attitudes about interracial marriage have changed since 1967, discrimination against such 
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However, given its emphasis on autonomy and privacy, Loving has 
also been interpreted as marking the beginning of a significant retreat 
from state regulation of who may marry.251 In the thirty years following 
Loving, access to marriage has been an area to which legislators and 
family law scholars have paid very little attention.252 Recently, however, 
in a reaction to legislative and judicial consideration of proposals to le-
galize same sex marriage, moral discourse about the meaning of marriage 
has emerged as a central aspect of the legal and policy debate on the 
issue.253 
While the constitutionality of state laws denying the right for same 
sex couples to marry had been challenged from time to time in the past 
few decades,254 the wide ranging debate about the meaning of marriage 
did not begin until 1993.255 In that year, the Hawaii Supreme Court be-
came the first state court in the nation to hold that its laws banning same 
sex marriage were subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Hawaiian consti-
tution's equal protection clause.256 The court further held that the law is 
couples continues in the 1990s. See PAUL C. ROSENBLATT ET AL.. MULTIRACIAL COUPLES: BLACK AND 
WHITE VOICES 6 (1995). 
251. See WALTER O. WEYRAUCH ET AL.. CASES AND MATERIALS IN FAMILY LAw: LEGAL CON. 
CEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSIllPS 489 (1994) (interpreting Loving as, among other things, 
signaling "the increased autonomy of the parties [to the marriage] and the decline of state involve· 
ment in marriage"); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Equality and Marriage, Presentation at Law and the 
Politics of Marriage (Nov. 19-21, 1997) (arguing that Loving "sets the tone" for the Supreme 
Court's family law jurisprudence, which emphasizes autonomy and individual rights); Robert F. 
Drinan, American Laws Regulating the Formation of the Marriage Contract, 383 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POI .. & SOc. SCL 48, 49 (1969) (characterizing Loving as reflecting a "profound consensus" in the 
UniJed States that the law should say "as little as possible about who should marry whom"). 
252. In the intervening years, the Supreme Court also invalidaJed a state law precluding the is-
suance of marriage licenses to people with unpaid child support obligations. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court also struck down a state regulation prohibiting inmate marriages in 
the state's prisons. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Both decisions rested on the Loving 
Court's holding that the "right to marry" is a fundamental due process right. See id. at 95; Zablocki, 
434 U.S. at 386. 
253. Universal prohibitions against same sex marriage are an exception (along with prohibi-
tions on multiple and incestuous marriages) to modem American marriage law's avoidance of defini-
tively restricting a person's ability to marry. See GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 49-
50. Same sex prohibitions exist because they are outside the scope of marriage. See id. at 49. 
254. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). For a comprehensive list of judicial and attorney general opinions on the 
legality of same sex marriage prior to the Hawaii case, see WILUAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. 
HUNTER. SEXUALITY. GENDER. AND THE LAw 803 n.f (1997). Although the plaintiffs in many of these 
cases raised constitutional challenges, most courts failed to analyze the constitutional issue holding 
that the definition of marriage precludes same sex unions. See id. at 803·04. 
255. The debate began with a decision to deny a marriage license to two women that 
culminated in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
256. See id. at 47. The Hawaii Supreme Court granted the state's subsequent motion for c1ari-
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presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state can show that the stat-
ute's sex based classification is justified by compelling interests and is 
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the couple's rights.257 
Baehr v. Lewin set off a broad debate about the meaning of mar-
riage and commitment throughout the country. Much of the discussion at 
the federal level occurred in the context of the congressional debate of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),z58 introduced in May, 1996. 
DOMA provides a federal definition for the terms "marriage" and 
"spouse" (for purposes of federal benefits) by specifying that marriage is 
a union of a man and a woman, and that the term "spouse refers only to 
a person of the opposite sex. "259 DOMA also specifies that states are not 
required to give effect to same sex marriages under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.260 DOMA purportedly rests on Congress's power (in Art. 
IV, §1) to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause.261 
While some of the debate about the legislation focused on strictly 
legal questions about constitutional or conflict of laws issues that were 
raised by the legislation/62 much of it can be characterized as moral dis-
course focused on the law's role in promoting love and commitment and 
defming families. Consider the following exchange between Congressman 
Barney Frank and Congressman Henry Hyde during the May, 1996 de-
bate in the House of Representatives on the legislation: 
MR. FRANK: We are talking here about a desperate search for a political issue.263 
fication and advised that the state had the burden, on remand, to show that the statute furthered a 
compelling interest. See id. at 74. The trial court then ruled that the state had failed to sustain its 
burden of proof and enjoined the state from denying an application for a marriage license solely be-
cause the applicants are of the same sex. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *16 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The case has been appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court. In April 
1997, the Hawaii legislature voted to place on the November 1998 ballot a constitutional amendment 
that would restrict marriage to persons of the opposite sex. The proposed amendment recognizes lim-
ited benefits (inheritance rights, the right to sue for wrongful death, insurance and state pension ben-
efits) for gay and lesbian couples. The state filed a motion seeking to delay any decision until after 
the balloting, but the high court denied the motion, clearing the way for oral argument. 
257. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. 
258. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
259. Id. 
260. See id. 
261. See id. 
262. See, e.g., The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 104th Congo 42-48 (1996) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Jurispru-
dence, University of Chicago). 
263. ANDREW SUll.IVAN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRo AND CON 225 (1997) (quoting from the 
House debate on the Defense of Marriage Act). 
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MR. HYDE: Political! ... There is no political gain. But there is a moral issue .... 
Nobody wants to talk about it We are forced to talk about it by the courts. . . . 
Don't assume that people are doing this for political profit People don't think 
that the traditional marriage ought to be demeaned or trivialized by same-sex un-
ions. If two men want to love each other, go right ahead. If you want to solemnize 
your love affair by some ceremony, create one. But don't take marriage, which for 
centuries has been a union between man and woman, and certainly is in this coun-
try, and try to say that what you're doing is American.264 
MR. FRANK: I guess my problem is this. There are plenty of people here who have 
had marriages that have meant a great deal to them. I salute that. I don't for a min-
ute understand how it demeans, and I would ask the gentleman to explain that to 
me. The gentleman's marriage, the marriages of other members here are based on a 
deep love, a bond between two people ... How does anything I do in which I ex-
press my feelings toward another demean the powerful bond of love and emotion 
and respect of two other people?26S 
When the debate moved to the Senate, legislators on both sides in-
voked morality in their debate: 
SENATOR GRAMM: So here are the issues in very simple fashion. No. I, is there an-
ything unique about the traditional family? For every moment of recorded history, 
we have said yes. In every major religion in history ... . governments have recog-
nized the traditional family as the foundation of prosperity and happiness, and in 
democratic societies, as the foundation of freedom. Human beings have always 
given traditional marriage a special sanction . . . . Are we so wise today that we 
are ready to reject five thousand years of recorded history?266 
SENATOR ROBB: ... Mr. President, I believe it is time for those of us who are not 
homosexual to join the fight. A basic respect for human dignity-which gives us 
the strength to reject racial, gender and religious intolerance-dictates that in 
America we also eliminate discrimination against homosexuals. I believe that end-
ing this discrimination is the last frontier in the ultimate fight for civil and human 
rights .... 
Ultimately, Mr. President, immorality flows from immoral choices. But if ho-
mosexuality is an inalienable characteristic, which cannot be altered by counseling 
or Willpower, then moral objections to gay marriages do not appear to differ signif-
icantly from moral objections to interracial marriages.267 
The bill was passed by Congress in September, 1996268 and signed by 
President Clinton amidst great controversy.269 
264. [d. 
265. [d. 
266. 142 CONGo REc. S10105-06 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
267. 142 CONGo REc. S10122 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robb). 
268. See The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
269. See Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 22, 1996, at A21; Todd S. Purdum, Gay Rights Group Attack Clinton on Midnight Signing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 22; David Willman, Clinton Signs Marriage Act, Lauds GOP on 
Health Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 22. 
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Concern that a decision. to legalize same sex marriage in Hawaii 
would lead to gay and lesbian couples travelling to Hawaii to marry and 
then seeking recognition of those marriages in their home state also led 
to widespread debate on this issue on the state level. Many constitutional 
scholars contend that the "public policy exception" of the Full Faith and 
Credit c1ause270 guarantees states the right to refuse to recognize a mar-
riage sanctioned by another state.271 Despite the questionable need for 
such legislation, as of 1998, legislators in twenty-nine states have enacted 
bills to ensure nullification of same sex marriages performed in Ha-
waii.272 The debate in these states has also focused on the morality of 
same sex marriage and the meaning of commitment in marriage. These 
debates have included the traditional "vocabulary of morals"273 and have 
helped to clarify the moral underpinnings of various states' marriage 
laws. For example, an extended legislative debate on a bill to prohibit 
recognition of same sex marriages in Kentucky, included moral discourse 
on both sides.274 The legislator sponsoring the bill based much of his tes-
timony on Christian teachings, noting that "[t]raditional marriages have 
been ordained by all major religions and every major civilization."275 An-
other legislator, opposing the bill, invoked the "Golden Rule" and 
270. u.s. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (noting that 
"the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a state to apply another state's law in violation of 
its own legitimate public policy"). 
271. See Larry Kramer, Same·Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE LJ. 1965, 1971, 1975 (1997). Kramer believes the exception would per-
mit states to refuse to recognize same sex marriages, but argues that it is unconstitutional. See id. at 
1966. Some scholars have also argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require other 
states to recognize same sex marriages performed in other states. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical 
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L REv. 1, 17 n.65 (1996); see 
also Symposium, Inter jurisdictional Marriage Recognition (Part II), 32 CREIGIITON L. REv. 1045 
(1999); Sandra Cavazos, Comment, Harmful to None: Why California should Recognize Out-ol-State 
Same·Sex Marriages Under Its Current Marital Choice of Law Rule, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 133 
(1998); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 1119 (1999). 
272. According to a state-by-state survey conducted by the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force, thirty states have enacted bills banning same sex marriage since 1995. They are: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and 
Washington. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti Same Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S., 
December 1998 (last modified Dec. 1998) <http://www.ngltf.orgldownloadslmarriageI298.gif>; see 
also Philip L. Bartlett, Recent Legislation: Same Sex Marriage, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 581 (1999). 
273. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, supra note I, at 505. 
274. See, e.g., infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text 
275. Joseph Gerth, 1998 Kentucky General Assembly; Bill Opposing Gay Marriage Clears, 
COURIER-JOURNAL, March 4, 1998, at 01A (quoting Rep. Sheldon Baugh). 
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"Judeo-Christian tradition" to urge that Kentucky courts respect the 
choices of those in sister states.276 Similar debates on same sex marriage 
have occurred across the country.277 
The debate among family law scholars about same sex marriage has 
also reawakened discourse about the meaning of marriage and the law's 
role in regulating access to marriage. A significant part of the debate has 
focused on moral questions. One scholar asked "What are the costs, in 
terms of pain and suffering, to children of couples married in Hawaii? 
How does the legal status of marriage change the commitments of the 
partners to each other? How does marriage reinforce love, honor and the 
responsibility one feels for one's partner?"278 Many of these scholars, ei-
ther advocating or opposing same-sex marriage, do so on both legal279 
and moral grounds.280 Moral arguments examine the meaning of lifetime 
love and commitment in marriage and stress the value and importance of 
the institution of marriage.281 
2. Pre-Marital Procedures: Covenants and Counseling 
Until recently, family law has done little to reexamine or alter the 
longstanding formal prerequisites to marriage.282 One method states283 
276. [d. (quoting Rep. Michael Bowling). 
277. See, e.g., Washington Bans Gay Marriage, Cm. TRlB., Feb. 8, 1998, at A7. 
278. Seth F. Kreimer, Territoriality and Moral Dissensus: Thoughts on Abortion, Slavery, Gay 
Marriage and Family Values, 16 QUINNlPIAC L. REv. 161 (1997). 
279. See, e.g., Symposium, Constructing Family, Constructing Chonge: Shifting Legal Per-
spectives on Same-Sex Relationships, 7 TEMP. POL & CIV. Rrs. L. REv. 245 (1998); Claudia A. 
Lewis, Note, From This Day Fonvard: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 
YALE LJ. 1783, 1784 (1988) (arguing that marriage allows individuals to make a public, intimate 
commitment that is recognized by the larger community). 
280. See, e.g., WILUAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CMLIZED COMMITMENT 4 (1996) (arguing that advocates for same sex marriage "valor-
ize" the meaning of commitment in marriage); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse 
on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. LJ. 1871, 1877 (1997) (argu-
ing that the shift in priorities among many gays and lesbians from tolerance to acceptance requires 
strategies and may require focusing on gay couples' need for the shared goal of love and commit-
ment); Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 82 CORNELL 
L. REv. 572, 582 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMIThIENI' (1997) and examining the meaning of commit-
ment in marriage and arguing that access to legal marriage will strengthen gay people's commitment 
to each other and reinforce their family ties to the ultimate benefit not only of themselves but the 
community). 
281. See Leonard, supra note 280, at 582. 
282. Jana Singer has also characterized the changes in the regulation of premarital require-
ments as "minor" over the past two decades. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1469. 
283. Regulation of access to marriage, like most areas of family law, has traditionally been an 
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have used to regulate marriage formation are requirements that couples 
obtain a license prior to marriage and participate in a formal ceremony.284 
Every state requires parties to obtain a license before marriage.285 In or-
der to obtain a license, parties to the marriage must provide information 
that demonstrates their eligibility to marry: age, relationship, if any, be-
tween the prospective spouses and prior marriages.286 Many states also 
require a brief waiting period and some kind of medical test. 287 
A formal ceremony solemnizing the marriage is also provided for in 
all states' statutes.288 These statutes authorize various religious and civic 
officers to perform marriages, but generally do not require any particular 
form or location for the ceremony.289 Although laws regarding licensure 
and solemnization of marriage have always been the subject of secular 
state control in this country, these laws are directly traceable to the ec-
clesiastical courts and canon law of medieval Europe and England.290 
Thus, while these requirements have many secular goals-record keep-
ing, public health, prevention of fraud-they were also grounded in 
moral concerns such as preventing sexual relationships among family 
members and preserving parental authority.291 The state has an impact on 
the level of moral discourse to the extent to which it regulates marriage 
formation. 
The force -of these statutes governing access to marriage has been 
significantly eroded over the last century. State policies in favor of up-
holding marriage have led to decisions that generally validate marriages 
where there is an absence of a license or an improper license.292 Addi-
area of regulation left to each state. See Michael Grossberg, Crossing Boundaries: Nineteenth· 
Century Domestic Relations Law and the Merger of Family and Legal History, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. 
REs. J. 799, 819 (1985). Cases establishing a right to marry, however, have been interpreted as limit-
ing states' power to impose barriers to marriage. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text. 
284. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 34 (stating that license and solemnization laws exist 
throughout the country). 
285. See id. Some states have carved out exceptions to the licensing requirement. See id. at 
34-35. Additionally, the licensing and solemnization requirements do not preclude the formation of a 
marriage without a license and ceremony in the thirteen states and the District of Columbia that rec-
ognize common law marriage. See id. at 45-47 & n.11. 
286. See id. at 35. 
287. See id. at 36. 
288. See id. at 37. 
289. The only exception is West Vrrginia. See W. VA. CODE § 48-1-12c (1980). 
290. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 31; SWISHER ET AL., supra note 127, at 5. 
291. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 21-31 (describing the origins of the justifications for the 
regulation of entry into marriage as both civil and religious). 
292. See F.M. English, Annotation, Validity of Solemnized Marriage as Affected by Absence of 
License Required by Statute, 61 A.L.R. 2d 847 (1958). In some states, like New York, the statute 
provides expressly that lack of a license will not invalidate a ceremonial marriage. See N.Y. DaM. 
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tionally, although common law marriage is only recognized in twelve 
states and the District of Columbia,293 large numbers of informal mar-
riages are validated because conflict of laws rules require a state to rec-
ognize a common law marriage if valid where formed.294 
Recently, this trend toward liberalizing enforcement of pre-marital 
procedures has been slowed by the consideration and, in some cases, en-
actment of new requirements. While many states have considered the 
possibility of reinstating fault grounds as a way of reducing the number 
of divorces,295 some legislators have concluded that another method of 
encouraging commitment between married couples is to encourage 
greater reflection before marrying.296 
States have considered a variety of proposals designed to encourage 
couples to approach marriage as a lifetime commitment and enter into it 
more cautiously. The legislation that has received the most attention is 
the covenant marriage laws Louisiana enacted in June, 1997.297 This stat-
ute creates a new class of marriage, a "covenant marriage," defmed as a 
union between "one male and one female who understand and agree that 
the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship. "298 The couple must 
make the commitment to a more permanent marriage knowingly299 by 
signing a Declaration of Intent.300 This declaration cannot be executed 
until after pre-marital counseling by a religious or secular marriage coun-
selor.30) The content of the counseling must include discussion of the pur-
pose of marriage and the commitment each individual makes to the 
other.302 
Since the adoption of Louisiana's statute,303 several other states have 
considered bills that would give couples contemplating marriage a cove-
nant marriage option.304 During the 1997-98 legislative session, more than 
REI.. LAw § 25 (McKinney 1988). 
293. See CLARK, supra note 126. 
294. See ALBERT A EHRENZWE1G. A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 380 (1962). 
295. See discussion infra Part m.C.1.b. 
296. See, e.g., Legislating Marriage and Divorce, 5 STATE CAPITOLS REP. 30 (1997). 
297. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1999). The statute also focuses on divorce 
grounds, providing for an alternative to no-fault divorce. 
298. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West Supp. 1999). 
299. See id. § 9-273(A)(I). 
300. See id. § 9-272(B). 
301. See id. § 9-273(A)(2)(a). 
302. See id. 
303. As of March, 1998, 400 couples have opted for the "high-test" marriage in Louisiana. 
See Ervin Dyer, Legislature Taking Interest in Marriage, PITT. POST-GAZETIE, Mar. 27, 1998, at 4. 
304. See id. 
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a third of the other state legislatures proposed counseling requirements, 
divorce waiting periods, or abuse prevention training.305 While many of 
the legislators were very likely motivated by political rather than moral 
considerations, these proposed reforms have resulted in a meaningful de-
bate about the law's role in regulating access to marriage.306 Much of the 
debate turns on issues relating to the moral justification for such legisla-
tion.307 The debates focus attention on the nature of the marriage commit-
ment and the importance of promoting strong marriages to protect chil-
dren.30g In Connecticut, a legislator supporting a bill that would require 
engaged couples under 30 to complete ten hours of premarital counseling 
debated its importance by invoking both the costs to the state of failed 
marriages and the trauma to couples and children of such marriages.309 
Modeled on a premarital counseling program developed by the Catholic 
Church, the legislation also emphasizes the need for couples to reflect on 
the responsibilities of marriage.310 
The idea of imposing more hurdles on the front end of the marital 
commitment has also received more attention from family law scholars 
and policymakers.311 As William Galston commented in urging interven-
tions to slow the rate of divorce: 
It is stunning how much time public education spends on sex while failing to dis-
cuss marriage in any sustained manner . . . . These educational efforts should be 
reinforced by the law. In most states it is much harder to get a driver's license than 
305. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES. 1998 "COVENANT MARRIAGE" LEG. 
ISLATION (1998) [hereinafter NCSL]; see also Dyer, supra note 303, at 4. 
306. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text; see generally Jay Macke, Note, Of Cove-
nants and Conflicts-When "I Do" Means More Than It Used to, But Less Than You Thought, 59 
Omo ST. L1. 1377 (1998) (discussing the policy debates surrounding covenant marriage and no-fault 
reform); Gary H. Nichols, Note, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment, 
29 U. MEM. L. REv. 397 (1999); Rebecca E. Silberbogen, Note, Does the Dissolution of Covenant 
Marriages Mirror Common Law England's Subordination of Women?, 5 WM. & MARy J. WOMEN & 
1. 207 (1998) (comparing and contrasting covenant marriage with marriage in Tudor and Stuart peri-
ods of English history as they affect the subordination of women). 
307. Compare Lynne Marie Kohn, Covenant Marriage Endorses Lifetime Vows, VIRGINIAN-
PiLOT & THE LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 21, 1998, at B8 with Linda Valdez, Legislating Marriage An Insult 
to Human Relationships, ARIz. REFUBuC, Feb. 20, 1998, at B4. See Katherine Shaw Spaht & Ashton 
Applewhite, Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage' Be a Good Idea for America? Opposing Views, 
WASH. TIMES, Oct 6, 1997, at 24. 
308. See supra note 307 and accompanying text 
309. See Daniela Altimari & Rita A. Niro, A Marriage Proposal: Counseling Precedes a Walk 
Down the Aisle, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 17, 1997, at AI. 
310. See id. 
311. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 
1594-99 (1994) (book review) (arguing that the use of covenant may be a way to strengthen mar-
riage without reverting to traditional roles); Galston, supra note 7, at 21. 
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a marriage license. At a minimum, each state should impose a reasonable waiting 
period (at least one month, but preferably three) and require couples to show that 
they have completed a program of counseling (religious or secular) preparing them 
for marriage.312 
Hoth legislative debates and scholarly commentary have hegun to reex-
amine the institution of marriage during the 1990s. No major legislative 
reforms have yet occurred. However, the law's role in regulating who 
shall marry and what procedures should be followed before marriage has 
been explored in ways that may lead to a more coherent understanding of 
the role of marriage in ensuring commitment to children. 
B. Reinforcing Responsibilities and Commitments Within Families 
1. Family Violence 
a. Eroding the Doctrine of Family Autonomy 
One of the most deeply embedded principles in American family 
law is the principle of family autonomy, which limits the state's interven-
tion in the affairs of the intact family.313 A variety of justifications have 
been offered to support this limit on state intervention in family affairs. 
These include a reluctance to interfere with the husband's authority,314 
concern about courts' abilities to fashion and enforce appropriate reme-
dies for intrafamily disputes,315 a belief that the adversarial process will 
aggravate rather than resolve family conflicts316 and, perhaps the most en-
trenched, that families must be ensured privacy to flourish.317 Except in 
extreme cases, the principle of family autonomy has been invoked to jus-
tify courts' refusals to provide a direct remedy for f'mancially neglected 
spouses,318 to resolve a dispute between parents about their children's ed-
312. Galston, supra note 7, at 21. 
313. The right of privacy has a constitutional dimension going back to the early 20th century. 
See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
314. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAw 257 (1998); 
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLmCS 
OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 155-56 (David Kairys ed., 1990). 
315. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRiNIG, AN INvITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRiNCI· 
PLES, PROCESS AND PERsPECTIVES 172-74 (1996). 
316. See id. 
317. See id. 
318. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (denying wife's action 
to obligate husband to provide suitable maintenance and finding that "[t]he living standards of a 
family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the 
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ucation,3I9 or to alter the traditional gendered roles in marriage.320 
This doctrine has been criticized because it reinforces patriarchal 
family relationships and leaves women and children vulnerable.321 De-
spite this critique, the principle of non-interference in family life to pro-
tect the welfare of a dependent spouse is still strong today.322 However, 
the doctrine of family autonomy has eroded in the last thirty years.323 
These exceptions have resulted in increased state regulation of the intact 
family to protect vulnerable family members from abuse.324 An examina-
tion of the law's role in enforcing prenuptial agreements and punishing 
perpetrators of family violence reveals that this is an area in which both 
the language and content of the law furthers the core value of protecting 
vulnerable family members.325 
husband's attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said 
in his behalf"); Commonwealth v. George, 56 A.2d 228, 231 (pa. 1948) (denying wife's claim for 
support and stating that the statute authorizing a support order was not intended to make the court a 
"sounding board for domestic fmancial disagreements nor a board of arbitration to determine the ex-
tent to which a husband is required to recognize the budget suggested by the wife ... "). But see 
Miller v. Miller, 30 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Mich. 1948) (holding that when "there is great discrepancy 
between a husband's large income and the very small and insignificant amount he is willing to pay 
[his wife] for her maintenance and support, the court is justified in fmding that the acts of the hus-
band constitute non-support and extreme cruelty"). 
319. See Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (Ala. 1958) (refusing to enforce a prenup-
tial agreement providing that child will be raised in father's religion). 
320. See Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (B.D. Mich. 1940) (refusing to enforce an agree-
ment between husband and wife, which provided that wife would pay the husband S300 per week to 
quit his job so he would travel with her). 
321. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION. EXCLUSION AND 
AMERICAN LAW 279 (1990) ("Within a sphere cordoned off as 'private,' removed from state inter-
vention, family members remain individuals who have or who lack rights to appeal to the state ...• 
The law thus helped to shield from view the governmental refusal to see some kinds of power or 
abuse as warranting public restraint. "). 
322. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mathiasen, 268 Cal. Rptr. 895, 897 (1990) (invalidating an 
agreement between husband and wife to share equally in support expenses during their marriage). 
323. These developments are evidence that the trend Carl Schneider identified in 1994 toward 
greater non-interference by the state in the family has not taken hold. See Schneider, Marriage, 
Morals, supra note 1, at 550. 
324. See infra notes 332-46, 352-57 and accompanying text. 
325. Contracts setting forth parties' marital duties and responsibilities have recently begun to 
gain the approval of family law scholars and courts. Some early advocates of this kind of private or-
dering did so on theories based on the importance of reinforcing autonomy and individual rights in 
families. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State 
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 329-30 (1982). More recently scholars have focused on the value of 
these agreements to reinforce important marital obligations and strengthen the marital commitment. 
See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage 
Contract, 73 IND. LJ. 453, 464-65, 501-02 (1998) (advocating that couples should have options to 
establish terms of matrimony, grounds for divorce and terms for dissolution); Elizabeth S. Scott, Ra-
tional Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 42-44, 79-90 (1990) (advo-
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b. New Laws: Reducing Domestic Violence and Child Abuse 
i. Domestic Violence 
Historically, the principle of family autonomy was used to justify 
the state's non-interference in cases where one spouse or intimate partner 
physically abused another. In one of the early cases holding that the neg-
ative effects of state intervention in the family outweigh the "evils" of a 
husband's physical abuse of his wife, the court reasoned: 
The violence complained of would without question have constituted a battery if 
the subject of it had not been the defendant's wife. The question is how far that 
fact affects the case .... Our conclusion is that family government is recognized 
by law as being as complete in itself as the State government is in itself, and yet 
subordinate to it; and that we will not interfere with or attempt to control it, in 
favor of either husband or wife, unless in cases where permanent or malicious in-
jury is inflicted or threatened, or the condition of the party is intolerable. For, how-
ever great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting 
only temporary pain, they are not comparable with the evils which would result 
from raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery 
and the bed chamber.326 
In the 1870s, the women's movement and temperance activists 
called for legislation to eradicate wife abuse,327 and by the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, a husband no longer had a "right" to beat his 
wife.328 Notwithstanding these legal changes, wife abuse continued to be 
justified or ignored by the police, courts, and general public.329 This view 
prevailed until the 1970s, when a coalition of feminists, legislators, aca-
demics, and advocates brought domestic violence to the public attention 
eating the enforceability of agreements in which couples set forth marital obligations and conditions 
under which they agree marriage could be dissolved). 
326. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349, 350 (1868). 
327. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Do-
mestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1243, 1262 (1993) (citing Ellen C. Dubois & 
Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century Femi· 
nist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 31, 42 (Carole S. 
Vance ed., 1984»; Elizabeth Pleck, Wife Beating in Nineteenth-Century America, in VlcnMOLOGY 60, 
60-61 (1979). 
328. However, recent scholarship has cast doubt on the long-held view that a common law 
"rule of thumb" provided that a husband could beat his wife with a stick no bigger than his thumb. 
See Henry Ansgar Kelly, Rule of Thumb and the Folklaw of the Husband's Stick, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
341, 341-42 (1994) .. 
329. See Murphy, supra note 327, at 1262 (citing EUZABE'I1I PLECK. DoMESTIC TYRANNY: THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POUCY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PREsENT (1987». 
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once again.330 
Building on the work of feminist legal theory,33l new laws and poli-
cies aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence have been adopted 
across the country over the last twenty years. The legal approaches taken 
to protect battered women and control family violence have resulted in 
significant changes in family law.332 
New laws include statutes permitting or requiring that spousal abuse 
be considered in custody and/or visitation decisions,333 and civil protec-
tion or restraining order statutes.334 Both of these types of statutory re-
forms provide protection to both adult victims and their children. Evalu-
ating a parent's fitness by considering past acts of violence to other 
family members results in decisions that are more likely to protect chil-
dren than decisions that discount or disregard spousal abuse.335 Civil pro-
330. See generally SUSAN SCHECIITER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUG· 
GLES OF TIlE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982) (discussing the early days of the battered wo-
men's movement); Kathleen J. Tierney, The Battered Women's Movement and the Creation of the 
Wife Beating Problem, 29 Soc. PROBS. 207 (1982) (discussing the social movement to combat wife 
beating). 
331. Feminist scholars illuminated the dynamics of power and gender and have developed le-
gal theories that reflect and value women's experiences. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MAcKiNNON, FEMI· 
NISM UNMODIAED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw (1987); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND TIlE POWER 
OF LAW (1989). Feminist theory helped other scholars and practitioners to recognize that women's 
experience of violence in their homes and in their relationships is critical to an understanding of wo-
men's oppression. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the 
Issue of Separation, 90 MiCH. L. REv. I, 1-10 (1991). 
332. Changes in criminal laws including creating new criminal sanctions to fit the patterns of 
domestic violence and encouraging the enforcement of existing criminal sanctions in domestic situa-
tions have also developed in the last decade. See Bonnie J. Campbell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, A Mes-
sage from Violence Against Women Office Director, Bonnie J. Campbell, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST Wo-
MEN ACT NEWS, July 1996 (last modified July 2, 1996) <http://www.usdoj.gov/vawo/newsletter/ 
bjc796.htm>. See generally Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1528-51 (1993) (discussing new state and federal responses to domestic 
violence). 
333. See infra notes 405-14 and accompanying text. 
334. All 50 states and the District of Columbia now have some form of protection order stat-
ute. See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, C1VIt. PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLA. 
TION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 7 (1990). Since its publication, Delaware and 
Arkansas have enacted civil protection order statutes. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-101 to 9-15-302 
(Michie 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041-48 (protection from abuse proceedings); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 13, § 701(A)-71I(A) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (child protection from domestic violence act). 
Statutes typically provide for eviction of the abuser from the home, temporary child custody, and a 
prohibition against continued abuse. Some state statutes provide for monetary relief for the duration 
of the order. The duration of the order varies with each state and ranges from 60 days to 3 years. 
See FINN & COLSON, supra note 334, at 33 & Fig. 9; see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, 
Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1085-87 (1993). 
335. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 334, at 961-65. 
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tection orders can provide abused women and their children with a quick 
and easily accessible remedy that provides housing, fmancial relief, and 
an order for custody.336 While there is some controversy about the effec-
tiveness of such orders in cases involving severe violence,337 most advo-
cates and scholars agree that, under many circumstances, these statutes 
have improved the lives of women and children.338 
During the same period, Congress followed the states in legislating 
to reduce domestic violence. In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA), which, among other things, makes certain 
acts of domestic violence federal crimes,339 provides a civil rights remedy 
for victims of domestic violence,340 and provides federal funding for en-
hanced state services for victims of domestic violence.341 Along with 
mandating interstate enforcement of protective orders,342 establishing a 
National Domestic Violence Hotline,343 and providing training for state 
and federal judges,344 the Violence Against Women Act enables victims 
of gender-motivated crimes to sue their attackers in federal court for vio-
lating their civil rights.345 The legislation also begins to address the needs 
of undocumented immigrant women who are abused by their husbands.346 
ii. Child Abuse 
Historically, the government was less reluctant to interfere in the 
family to protect children. from abuse and neglect.347 The juvenile court 
336. See id. at 910-1044. 
337. See, e.g., Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction to Do ARRESTS AND RE-
STRAINING ORDERS WORK? 1, 1-5 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996). 
338. See LENORE E. WALKER. THE BATTERED WOMAN 210-12 (1979); Molly Chaudhiri & 
Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Ballered Women's Experience with Male Violence and 
Legal Process, in DoMESTIC VIOLENCE 227, 245-47 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992); 
Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Ballered Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, 4 WOMEN 
& POI .. , 13, 19-20 (Fall 1984) (concluding that protection orders are most effective in curtailing 
abuse when the level of violence is not severe); Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for 
Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 (1984). 
339. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2262 (West Supp. 1998). 
340. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995). 
341. See id. § 3796gg-hh, § 13971 (West 1995 and Supp. 1998). 
342. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (West Supp. 1998). 
343. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10416 (West 1995). 
344. See id. § 13991. 
345. See id. § 13981. 
346. See Leslye E. Orloff et aI., With No Place to Tum: Improving Legal Advocacy for Bat-
tered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 324-25 (1995). 
347. The early child welfare programs in this country were modeled on England's Elizabethan 
Poor Law, which separated the children of the poor from their families. See Act for Relief of the 
Poor,43 Eliz., ch.2 § 1 (1601 Eng.). Massachusetts, Connecticut, and VIrginia, for example, specifi-
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system in the United States was created at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury to assist the State acting as parens patriae, or as "father. "348 Efforts 
to protect children from abusive or neglectful caretakers have taken many 
forms, from the creation of large orphanages and foundling homes to the 
relocation of children from the city to the country.349 Eventually, most ju-
risdictions settled on the present day foster care system as a way to pro-
tect children whose families apparently could not care for them.350 How-
ever, juvenile courts have been the subject of criticism and calls for 
reform since they were ftrst created.351 
Recent reform efforts have emphasized a greater commitment to 
protecting children over the rights of parents. These reforms have in-
cluded development of state laws that mandate compiling records of 
child abuse352 and reporting of abuse.353 Most recently, the federal stan-
dards for governing removal of children have shifted the emphasis from 
reuniftcation with parents to permanency planning for children. In No-
vember of 1997, President Clinton signe~ into law the Adoption and Safe 
cally authorized magistrates to "bind out" or indenture children of the poor over parental objections. 
HOMER FOLKS. THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED. AND DEUNQUENT CIflLDREN 28-29, 96-97 (Arno 
Press and The New York Times 1971) (1900). Criminal laws punishing parental child abuse or neg-
lect also have a long history in this country. See generally LINDA GORDON. HEROES OF THEIR OWN 
LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988) (including an historical review of 
records of the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children from 1880-1910); see 
also A. Schwartz & H.L. Hirsh, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Survey of the Law, in CHn.D ABUSE 31 
(A. Carmi & H. Zimrin eds., 1984) (examining criminal punishment of child abuse within the last 
two centuries). Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have child abuse statutes that require 
an act of commission, an act which directly inflicts harm on the child. All but twelve states also 
have child abuse laws that punish omissions, the 'failure to protect' laws. See V. Pualani Enos, Pros-
ecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 
HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 229, 236-38 (1996). 
348. See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 
1187, 1187-88, 1192-93 (1970). 
349. See id. at 1207-12. 
350. See ANTHONY M. PLArr. THE CIflLD SAVERS: THE lNvENnON OF DEUNQUENCY 46-74, 101-
36 (1969). 
351. See id. at 152-63; Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile 
Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. I, 17-18 (1992). 
352. In 1995, investigations by child protective services (CPS) agencies in 50 states deter-
mined that over 1 million children were victims of substantiated or indicated child abuse and neglect. 
CPS agencies investigated an estimated 2 million reports alleging the maltreatment of almost 3 mil-
lion children. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS .• NAT'L em. ON CIflLD ABUSE & NEG. 
LECT. Child Maltreatment 1995: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect 
Data System ix (1997). 
353. See NATIONAL CLEARiNGHOUSE ON CIflLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS .• CIflLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTE SERIES No.1, REPoRTING LAWS: DEFINI. 
TIONS OF CIllLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996) (compiling state reporting laws). 
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Families ACt.354 States must now comply with this Act in order to receive 
federal funds.355 This statute seeks to avoid the harm that children experi-
ence from extended foster care placement.356 Under the Act, a state's re-
ceipt of federal funds is conditioned upon establishing procedures that 
make child welfare bureaucracies move more quickly to rule out parents 
as caretakers, making children available for adoption sooner.357 
Much of the language in the debates supporting both child abuse 
and domestic violence law reforms and the language of the laws them-
selves focuses on the public health and safety goals of these law reform 
efforts.358 Considerable attention is also paid, however, to the moral im-
perative underlying family violence legislation. Consider, for example, 
the following statement from the floor of Congress, which ties the issue 
of prevention of violence against women to the themes of responsibility 
and commitment to community: 
354. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, III STAT. 2115. 
355. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (West Supp. 1998). 
356. See, e.g., RICHARD GEllES, THE BOOK OF DAVIS: How PREsERVING FAMILIES CAN COST 
C1m.oREN'S LIVES (1996); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 
423-24 (1983) (discussing the harm to children as a result of "foster care drift"). In fact, there is 
much evidence that for those children who are removed, "foster care drift" continues today. A 1995 
report found that 
[o]ne in ten foster children remains in state care longer than 7.4 years. At least 40,600 
foster children have been in care for five years or longer; another 51,300 have been in care 
between three and five years. System kids, on average, live with three different families, 
though ten or more placements is not uncommon. 
Conna Craig, "What I Need is a Mom": The Welfare State Denies Homes to Thousands of Foster 
Children, 73 POL'y REv. 41, 45 (1995); see also BEYOND RHEToRIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR 
CHILDREN AND FAMlUES. FINAL REPoRT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN 288 (1991) ("In 
1986, slightly fewer than 60% of children in foster care were either reunited with their families or 
placed with a parent, relative, or other caregiver."). 
357. Hearings to determine permanent placement of children removed from parents must now 
begin no later than 12 months after a child enters foster care, a reduction from the former 18 month 
limit. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(c) (West Supp. 1998). States must also move to terminate parental 
rights when a child has been in foster care for 15 of the previous 22 months. See id. § 675(5)(e). 
The extent to which the AFSA actually fulfills its promise of providing greater protection to children 
is still an open question. See, e.g., M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Fail-
ure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637 (1999). 
358. An impatience with the slow pace at which children move through the child welfare sys-
tem encouraged legislators to develop such procedures even before the federal mandate. See, e.g., 
Act Concerning the Reporting, Investigation and Prosecution of Child Abuse and the Termination of 
Parental Rights, 1996 Conn. Pub. Acts 246 (Reg. Sess.) (new Connecticut statute providing that a 
child under the age of one year can be put up for adoption if a parent has not been in contact with 
the child for sixty days). Some states have also recently passed legislation permitting removal of a 
child at birth if a mother abuses drugs during her pregnancy. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
119, § 51A (West Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(l)(b) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 7oo1-1.3AI4.b (West Supp. 1998). 
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Much of the problem is rooted in the erosion of personal responsibility, the break-
down of families, and the deterioration of community life. Each of us can contrib-
ute to the task of renewal. That is why lawmakers' insistence on sound policies 
that protect and assist victims, law enforcers' steadfastness in punishing perpetra-
tors, advocates' commitment to providing counsel and much needed services, and 
health professionals' willingness to broaden their sphere of responsibility are so 
heartening. Together, we can undertake the varied efforts required to tum this 
threat around.359 
Representative Schroeder, in protesting a last minute attempt to reduce 
the appropriations under the bill, referred to the important role of govern-
ment in strengthening families by making the home safe from violence: 
Violence against men or violence against women in the home is wrong. Violence 
against children in the home is wrong. Instead you see everybody now moving to 
say that Government should back out of all of that and we should just again go 
back; the home is totally off limits, and you can batter children, batter spouses, do 
whatever .... but the most important thing is the home and the family, and if the 
home and the family [are] the roots of violence, if the home and the family [are] 
absolutely torn asunder, then you are never going to get off square one when it 
comes to fighting crime.360 
Scholars have also commented on the increased attention the law has 
given in the last three decades to protecting family members from 
abuse.361 There is broad consensus among politicians, scholars and 
policymakers that such developments are a healthy trend toward protect-
ing vulnerable family members.362 
2. Recognizing Commitments in Families Created Outside Marriage 
In previous sections, this Article has dealt with changes in moral 
discourse in areas where family law has traditionally focused moral at-
tention: divorce, alimony, child custody and visitation. However, limiting 
this discourse to these issues excludes many families created outside of 
marriage from the moral vision in family law.363 Recent shifts in the law 
359. 140 CONGo REe. Hl0688 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Price). 
360. 140 CONGo REc. H5180 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder). 
361. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 
2435 (1995) ("[pJublic concern about child abuse and neglect has increased in the past generation"); 
see also Garrison, supra note 76, at 1 03 (noting in general that "the last three decades have wit-
nessed a wave of new limitations on parental prerogatives" and citing the strengthening of child 
abuse laws as one example). 
362. See HERMA HILL KAy & MARTHA S. WESr. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 1192 (4th ed. 
1996) (describing developments in research, scholarship and legislation that have "transfonned the 
law into a protective tool for battered women" over the last 25 years). 
363. Increasing numbers of children now face life in a single-parent family. In 1994, 27% of 
1999] NEW LANGUAGE OF MORALITY IN FAMILY LAW 1173 
reveal a healthy trend toward increased attention to those who may be in 
most need of the law's protection, children of unmarried cohabitants. 
Historically, nonmarital cohabitation was considered deviant and 
subje~t to criminal sanctions.364 Although criminal sanctions still exist, 
prosecutions have been rare since the 1950s.365 Instead, until the 1980s, 
the law tended to ignore couples who created families outside traditional 
marriage.366 This meant little or no protection for the dependent partners 
and children of such unions, either during the relationship or at its disso-
lution. Many commentators, however, attribute the law's indifference or 
condemnation of informal families to the fact that such families have al-
ways been disproportionately headed by women367 who are poor368 and 
non-white.369 As Mary Ann Glendon describes it: 
Another large proportion of infonnal unions, especially earlier in the century, was 
composed of persons who belonged to subcultures of the poor, or to racial and eth-
nic minorities for whom the legal structures of traditional marriage and divorce 
were sometimes irrelevant and with whom the framers of such laws were rarely 
concerned-groups ignoring and ignored by traditional family law.370 
children under the age of 18 lived in a female-headed family, up from 12% in 1970. See ARLENE F. 
SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENrs. MARCH 1994, at 
viii-xii (1996). 
364. See EDWIN POWERS. CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN EARLY MAsSACHUSETIS 1620-1692: A 
DOCUMENTED HISrORY (1966). 
365. While criminal prohibitions on cohabitation and fornication still exist in some states, 
prosecutions for private, consensual acts are rare. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th 
Cir. 1986). State laws imposing criminal sanctions for sodomy still exist in about half the states. See 
Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Courts Go 
in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. U. 997, 997 
(1994). 
366. See GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 254-55. Glendon points out that 
under the traditional family law approach, the law "wavered between expressions of moral disap-
proval and covert compassionate remedies" with umnarried cohabitants, such remedies were put into 
play only in the most "hardship" cases. [d. at 255. 
367. See SALlJI'ER, supra note 363, at ix (stating that mothers are most often the custodians of 
children in single parent families with 88% of children in single parent homes living with their 
mothers); see also WORKING GROUP ON WELFARE REFoRM. FAMILY SUPPORT. AND INDEPENDENCE, U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS .• BACKGROUND PAPERS ON WELFARE REFoRM: CmLD SUPPORT EN-
FORCEMENT 3 (1994). 
368. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD. WE THE POOR PEoPLE: WORK. POVERTY 
AND WELFARE 54 (1997) (discussing the disproportionate number of female-headed households in the 
overall poverty popUlation). 
369. Among Black female-headed families, nearly 60% are below the poverty line. NATIONAL 
REsOURCE COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S ClDLDREN?: CmLD CARE POUCY FOR THE 19905, at 
27 fig. 2-9 (Cheryl D. Hayes et al. eds., 1990); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Propo-
sal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709 (1996) (tracing history of common 
law marriage and finding that its abolition hurt poor, non-white women and children the most). 
370. GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 253. 
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While the last two decades have not seen significant change in the law 
on common law marriage,371 there has been a significant movement to-
ward extending the law's protection to individuals "who have become 
dependent or suffered detriment over the course of a long relationship"372 
and to children of those unions.373 
Other commentators have observed this trend and recognized its 
moral dimension. To some extent, Carl Schneider has recognized the in-
creased moral discourse in the law of unmarried cohabitants in his sin-
gling out of contractarianism as a counter trend to the diminution of 
moral discourse in family law.374 He notes, as examples of this counter 
trend, courts' recent willingness to enforce contracts or imply contracts 
between unmarried cohabitants.375 Mary Ann Glendon, while disapprov-
ing of many recent trends, sees the increased protection for unmarried 
cohabitants, particularly the children of those unions, as appropriate: 
Traditional family law rigorously policed the boundaries of the legitimate family. It 
carefully regulated the conditions under which children born outside legal marriage 
would be permitted to acquire rights in relation to their parents, especially the all-
important right of inheritance. As for couples who had not entered into formal 
marriage, the law, for the most part, ignored them, or pretended to ignore them.376 
Over time, the focus of the law relating to children born outside marriage has ap-
propriately shifted from preoccupation with wealth and status to concern for the 
children themselves. Not only have children of unwed parents been accorded sub-
stantially equal rights to support and derived benefits, the establishment of pater-
nity (without which these rights would be meaningless) has everywhere been facili-
tated, both in law and through technological advances.377 
Despite his overall concern with strengthening marriage, Milton Re-
gan has also noted the moral imperative of protecting dependent partners 
and children of unmarried cohabitants noting that "unmarried cohabita-
tion . . . is widely accepted and raises important issues of responsibility 
in intimate relationships. Failure to respond to the claims of cohabitants 
371. See Bowman, supra note 369, at 740 (noting that ten states abolished common law mar-
riage between 1921 and 1959, and only four have recognized it since that time). 
372. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 288. 
373. See Larry L. Bumpass et al., Cohabitation and the Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. 
MAR. & FAM. 913, 919 (1991). 
374. See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note I, at 1832. 
375. See id. at 1829-30 (recognizing that the areas of family law "susceptible to contractual 
analysis" are areas in which the courts have had increased interest in moral analysis, but concluding 
that contract law's emphasis on private ordering, among other reasons, will ultimately contribute to 
the trend toward diminished moral discourse). 
376. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 253. 
377. [d. at 285. See also Krause, supra note 80, at 116-20. 
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thus could undermine the relational ethic that family law should 
reinforce. "378 
c. Family Dissolution 
1. Access to Divorce 
a. What No-Fault Divorce Really Means 
Before analyzing the moral implications of the shift to no-fault 
grounds for divorce, further clarification of the way these new laws 
changed divorce practice is helpful in understanding their impact. First, 
even prior to widespread adoption of no-fault grounds, couples had ob-
tained divorces by consent through collusion and, in some instances, per-
jured testimony.379 As courts and litigants became increasingly frustrated 
with fitting the circumstances of the breakdown of their marriage into the 
existing fault categories,380 mutually agreed upon fabricated testimony be-
came commonplace.381 Thus, the "consent divorce disguised as fault di-
vorce . . . had become a relatively common way of terminating a 
marriage. "382 
Second, the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce resulted in di-
vorce on demand-an immediate right to file for divorce without waiting 
and without the consent of the other spouse (divorce on demand) in only 
a few states.383 In most states, a divorce without the consent of the other 
spouse (unilateral divorce) cannot be granted unless the parties have been 
separated for a minimum period of time ranging from six months to three 
years.384 A few states still do not permit unilateral divorce at al}.385 Addi-
tionally, in most states there are significant procedural barriers to ob-
378. REGAN. supra note 90, at 124. 
379. See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 232. 
380. See GLENDON, supra note 78, at 76 (contrasting U.S. and European treatment of divorce 
law). 
381. See HERBERT JACOB. SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAw IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1988). 
382. GLENDON, supra note 78, at 65. 
383. See Ira Mark EHman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and 
Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. Iu... L. REv. 719, 723 (1997). 
384. See id. at 723. 
385. At least three states require mutual consent and a separation agreement before a divorce 
can be granted. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 to § 93-5-2 (1994); N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (Mc-
Kinney 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (1996). 
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taining a no-fault divorce.386 Thus, the perception that the no-fault revolu-
tion has resulted in easy access to divorce is not true. 
In enacting the first no-fault statute, California reformers never in-
tended to eliminate fault or accountability from the divorce process: 
We would underscore that this is not to say that we think immoral or reprehensible 
conduct should be overlooked. Quite the contrary, the purpose of adopting the stan-
dard we suggest would be to permit-indeed to require-the Court to inquire into 
the whole picture of the marriage. Misconduct would thus be completely relevant, 
and could be completely explored.387 
Indeed, the adoption of no-fault grounds did not eliminate the role 
of fault in the laws governing access to divorce.388 Fault continues to 
playa role in custody, property and alimony issues in many states.389 
An evaluation of the impact of no-fault divorce on the values of 
commitment and responsibility to family members must also acknowl-
edge that at least some of the goals underlying the adoption of no-fault 
divorce have been accomplished. In addition to addressing concerns 
about the integrity of the judicial system that resulted from the perjury 
and collusion in the fault era,390 no-fault divorce was intended to reduce 
the trauma of breakup on the family, particularly the children.39I Even if 
they were delayed, divorces occurred with or without the availability of 
no-fault grounds.392 The idea under no-fault was that the process of ob-
386. See Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. 
PuB. L. 123, 124 (1993). 
387. 1966 Report By the Governor's Commission on the Family cited in JUDITH AREEN. CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 342 (1992). 
388. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. Ll. 
773, 778-80 (1996) (analyzing and categorizing each state's consideration of fault in alimony and 
property decisions and finding that only twenty states can be categorized as "pure no-fault" in that 
they exclude consideration of marital misconduct from alimony and marital property decisions unless 
the misconduct has affected the property available or the fmancial need of a spouse); see also Peter 
Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 292-300 (1997). 
389. See Swisher, supra note 388, at 320 n.158. 
390. See Olive M. Stone, Moral Judgments and Material Provision in Divorce, 3 FAM. LQ. 
371, 371 (1969). 
391. See HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 181 
(1965) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
392. Furthermore, while the existence of no-fault grounds for divorce has certainly made get-
ting a divorce easier, there is some question as to what role it has played in increasing the rate of 
divorce in this country. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law Is Assailed in 
Michigan, and Debate Heats up, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al (citing conflicting studies on con-
tribution of no-fault divorce to increased divorce). Although the divorce rate accelerated after the 
adoption of no-fault, it began rising sharply in 1965, before the implementation of no-fault. See 
Cahn, supra note 1, at 250; see also Ellman & Lehr, supra note 383, at 724-32 (arguing that the law 
is a "minor player" in affecting divorce rates and citing studies to demonstrate that divorce laws had 
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taining a divorce should not further traumatize children already in emo-
tional upheaval over their parent's break-up.393 As Professor Robert Levy, 
a reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, stated in a report of the Commission endorsing no-fault di-
vorce LTl 1965: 
As debilitating as the existing hodgepodge of laws on divorce and marriage may be 
for the lives of the participants, the destructive effect upon children is incalculable. 
If the time for improvement and uniformity in this field were not at hand for the 
sake of the marriage partners, it is surely at hand for the sake of the children.394 
Although assessments of whether no-fault has achieved the goal of 
reducing the trauma of divorce for children are mixed,395 there has been a 
shift in the focus in divorce proceedings from an evaluation of the 
adults' conduct to the children's well-being. This shift is reflected in the 
many court-related programs that focus on children after divorce that 
have developed since the adoption of no-fault396 
b. Continued Debate About the Morality of Divorce in the No-
Fault Era 
The adoption of no-fault divorce did not end discourse and debate 
about the impact of divorce grounds on commitments undertaken in mar-
riage and the impact of divorce on children. To many commentators, the 
moral message conveyed by the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce 
was that couples can quickly and easily escape commitments of mar-
riage.397 While no-fault grounds have made it easier to divorce, it is not 
clear that the addition of no-fault grounds for divorce signaled a radical 
a "weak correlation, if any" to the rise in divorce rates in the 1960s and 1970s); Dirk Johnson, 
Campaign Aims to Put the "Fault" Back in Divorce: Several States Consider Efforts to Make Mar· 
riages Harder to End, MORNING NEWS TRIB., Feb. 18, 1996, at G6 (quoting Professor Larry 
Bumpass, a University of Wisconsin sociologist, as stating that no-fault divorce merely facilitates di-
vorces by speeding up "those cases that were already coming down the pipeline"). Many scholars 
and commentators argue that no-fault divorce laws were a reflection of other changes that contrib-
uted to the rise in the divorce rate more than they were a direct cause of increased divorce. See, e.g., 
Cahn, supra note I, at 250-51 (attributing the increase in divorce since the mid 19605 to a number 
of factors including unhappiness of women in patriarchal marriages and their increased participation 
in the workforce). 
393. See HANDBOOK, supra note 391, at 181. 
394. Id. 
395. Compare Wardle, supra note 107, at 99-103 (finding that termination of marriage under 
no-fault regime is still acrimonious) with JACOB, supra note 381, at 151 (discussing the movement 
leading to no fault divorce and several commentators view's on the effects of those changes). 
396. See infra notes 430-43 and accompanying text. 
397. See generally Wardle, supra note 107. 
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change in the moral discourse and vision in American divorce law.398 
Scholars,399 legislators,400 and social scientists401 continue to debate these 
issues. 
A substantial part of the moral discourse about the law's role in di-
vorce has occurred in debates about the wisdom of restoring the empha-
sis on fault in divorce. Some proposals call for the repeal of no-fault 
grounds altogether.402 One alternative proposal suggests longer waiting 
periods for divorce everywhere,403 while others would allow couples who 
are getting married to limit themselves to fault-based grounds for di-
398. This Section addresses grounds for divorce or other preconditions specifically tied 10 the 
state's grant of a divorce. In marriages involving children or property, resolution of issues of ali-
mony, child custody and support and marital property also continue 10 act as barriers to divorce. See 
GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 198-199 (discussing the traditional system's reliance 
on private agreements "as the principal mechanism for adjusting economic and child-related disputes 
upon divorce .•.. "). Traditional fault or a broader concept of marital misconduct continues to play 
a role in these decisions. 
399. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Morse, supra note 118, at 605; 
Swisher, supra note 388, at 270-76. For a response 10 arguments made against no-fault divorce. see 
Ellman & Lahr, supra note 383, at 719. 
400. See Connie Koenenn, Legislatures Move to End No·Fault Divorces, SAN ANTONIO Ex. 
PRESS-NEWS, Mar. 26, 1996 (claiming that Michigan, Idaho, Georgia, Iowa, Virginia, Washington, 
Minnesota, llIinois, and Pennsylvania are considering laws that will make marriage and divorce more 
difficult); Russ Pulliam, Real Reform for the Family, INDIANAPOUS NEWS, Feb. 14, 1996, at A8 (dis-
cussing proposals to reform the no-fault divorce laws in Indiana); see also H.B. 3751, 18th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1995) (proposing a one year waiting period and mandatory pre-divorce counseling 
for couples with children because "it is often too easy for couples to obtain a 'no-fault' divorce"). 
Several states are considering bills that would repeal no-fault divorce in certain circumstances. See, 
e.g., H.B. 1765, 143d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); H.B. 470, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(IDBiII File, Idaho 1996); S.B. 1842, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (ILBiII File, III. 
1996); H.B. 911, 1996 Reg. Sess. (KYBiII File, Ky. 1996); H.B. 1975, 79th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. 
(Minn. 1995); H.B. 2562, 180th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (pa. 1995); H.B. 1188, 1996 
Reg. Ses$. (Va. 1996); H.B. 2950, 54th Leg., 1996 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1996); H.B. 4416, 1996 Reg. 
Sess. (W. Va. 1996). Other states are considering imposing mandatory counseling or other impedi-
ments to divorce. See, e.g., H.B. 477, 19th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska 1996); S.B. 2265, 76th Gen. 
Assembly, Reg. 2d Sess. (Iowa 1996) (enacted); S.B. 367, 410th Gen. Assembly 1996 Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 1996). 
401. See, e.g., COLLEEN LEAHY JOHNSON. Ex FAMILIA: GRANDPARENTS. PARENTS. AND CtDLDREN 
ADJUST TO DIVORCE (1988); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD. THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1996); FRANK F. 
FURSTENBERG. JR. & ANDREW J. CHERUN. DIVIDED FAMIUES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CIULDREN WHEN 
PARENTS PART (1991); Paul R. Amato, Children's Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses, and 
Empirical Support, 55 J. MAR. & FAM., 23, 23-28 (1993); R.T. Gill, Family Breakdown as Family 
Policy, PuB. INT., Winter 1993, at 84. 
402. See supra note 400 and accompanying text. Among the many legislative proposals to re-
vise no-fault divorce grounds, Tennessee's proposal to completely eliminate no-fault grounds entirely 
is the most extreme. 
403. See William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PuB. INT., Summer 1996, at 22 (advo-
cating a 5 year waiting period for all divorces with children.). 
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vorce.404 A number of legal scholars have also pushed for fault to play a 
more important role in issues attendant to divorce, such as alimony and 
property distribution.405 These proposals are all grounded in the rhetoric 
of strengthening families and protecting children.406 
In response to these calls for a broadened role of fault in divorce. 
some commentators have reexamined the moral bases for no-fault, partic-
ularly in cases involving domestic violence. These commentators argue 
that no-fault divorce is necessary to protect women and children seeking 
the quickest separation possible from violent spouses.407 
While this debate has resulted in very little legislative change,408 it 
has provided an opportunity for all participants in the development of 
family law to rethink the goals, including moral goals, of marriage and 
commitment. The debate has also lead to more creative thinking about 
the law's role in strengthening families, particularly families with 
404. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
405. See Swisher, supra note 388, at 296; Morse, supra note 118, at 625. 
406. Some commentators have argued that these proposals are more pro-marriage than anti-
divorce: "I would never call this an anti-divorce movement. It's a marriage movement. The focus is 
not to punish people who have divorces. It's to tell people that there is this extremely important 
thing called marriage that needs a lot of support from education, religion, and public policy." Pia 
Nordlinger, The Anti-Divorce Revolution, WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 2, 1998, at 25 (quoting Maggie 
Gallagher describing the debate about marriage and divorce taking place "across the country, in 
statehouses and church basements and living rooms"). 
407. See, e.g., Ellman & Lohr, supra note 383; see also Frank Furstenberg & Andrew Cherlin, 
Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great Britain and the United States, 252 
SCI. 1386 (1991) (reporting research findings that demonstrate that while divorce is generally harmful 
to children, even more harmful is prolonged conflict). But see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 1.. REv. 
1241, 1247 (1991) (arguing that immigrant women who are victims of domestic violence and who 
are threatened with deportation may have difficulty meeting the current requirement that marriage be 
terminated for good cause if divorce was obtained on no-fault grounds); Martha Heller, supra note 
200, at 282 (evaluating the impact of recent movement to reinstate fault-based divorce has on do-
mestic violence and finding fault-based systems would be a further obstacle to victims' attempts to 
divorce). 
408. See NCSL, supra note 305. In one state, the effort to protect battered women and chil-
dren through more effective divorce grounds led to the addition of a new fault ground in the state's 
divorce law. Because Maryland only permitted divorce without a waiting period in cases of adultery, 
sponsors argued, on moral grounds, that battered women were entitled to the same protection as 
spouses experiencing infidelity. As Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend argued before 
the legislature, "We cannot continue to tell women ... that when their husbands sleep with someone 
else, they can file immediately for divorce, but when they beat them up or even rape them, that they 
have to stay in the marriage for another year." Jane C. Murphy, Assembly Bill to Speed Divorce Af-
ter Abuse Will Save Many Lives, Bring Needed Reform, BALT. SUN, Feb. 24, 1998, at A14. The bill 
adding abuse grounds passed in April, 1998. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 7-103(a)(7-8) (Supp. 
1998). 
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children.409 
2. Protecting Children: Changes in Custody and Visitation Law 
Modern custody law has been dominated by the "best interests of 
the child" standard.410 This ambiguous standard pennits judges broad dis-
cretion in deciding custody and visitation cases.411 This discretion has re-
sulted in inconsistent application of the standard,412 gender bias413 and ex-
pensive, lengthy custody proceedings.414 However, several developments 
over the last decade indicate that courts and legislatures are attempting to 
refme this standard and curb judicial discretion in ways that focus more 
directly on the welfare of the child. Additionally, several recent develop-
ments in custody law are intended to increase the involvement of both 
parents. Both the debate surrounding these developments and the new 
laws themselves reflect a commitment to the central moral goal of family 
409. The recent debate among social science and legal scholars about marriage and divorce 
has also encouraged new, non-partisan research efforts aimed at understanding Ihe impact of bolh 
Ihose events on children. Leaders in bolh Ihe American Bar Association and Ihe American Psycho-
logical Association approved a proposal to establish "a university-based research center to provide 
more Ihorough and objective information on marriage and divorce." Lynn Smilh, Giving Context to 
Issues '90s Families Face Values: Tired of What it Calls Politically Charged and Simplistic Solutions 
to Societal Woes, a New Group Tries a Fresh Approach, LA. TIMES, Nov_ 12, 1997, at El. 
410. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provides Ihe best summary of prevailing 
standards, states: 
§ 402. [Best Interest of Child] 
The court shall determine custody in accordance wilh Ihe best interest of Ihe child. The 
court shall consider all relevant factors including: 
(1) Ihe wishes of Ihe child's parent or parents as to his custody; 
(2) Ihe wishes of Ihe child as to his custodian; 
(3) Ihe interaction and interrelationship of Ihe child wilh his parent or parents, his sib-
lings, and any olher person who may significantly affect Ihe child's best interest; 
(4) Ihe child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and 
(5) Ihe mental and physical heallh of all individuals involved. 
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian Ihat does not affect his re-
lationship to Ihe child. 
UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aer, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998). 
411. See discussion infra at 128-139; see also Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey 
of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989) ("What is 'in Ihe best interests of child(ren)' is often a complex 
balancing of numerous competing factors, many of which are highly subjective."). 
412. See RICHARD NEELY. THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENDING A MARRIAGE 9-10 (1984). 
413. See Susan Belh Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" 
Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L REv. 845-901 (1997). 
414. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 386, at 127-30 (describing Ihe complexities of what should 
be a ralher simple divorce); NEELY, supra note 412, at 93-118. 
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law, protecting children.415 While some of these developments have re-
sulted in fewer explicit references to "moral conduct" in custody deci-
sions, overall the trend toward more child-centered custody law has 
strengthened the law's commitment to nurturing children.416 
a. Developments Encouraging Post Breakup Involvement of 
Both Parents 
i. Joint Custody 
The addition of no-fault concepts in laws in the 1970s included 
marked shifts in custody law that were intended to encourage the partici-
pation of both parents in raising children.417 One of the fIrst develop-
ments of this kind was the introduction of the concept of joint custody. 
The tITst joint custody statute was passed in 1979 in California418 and 
most states eventually followed suit, either by joint custody statutes or 
through case law.419 While the legislative history surrounding the adop-
tion of these statutes reflects a concern for parents' right to have access 
to their children,420 the primary purpose of these statutes seems to be to 
benefIt children.421 
415. See supra notes 73·85 and accompanying lext. 
416. See, e.g., Scott Coltrane & Neal Hickman, The Rhetoric of Rights and Needs: Moral Dis· 
course in the Reform of Child Custody and Child Support Laws, 39 Soc. PROBS. 400, 404 (1992) 
(discussing the role of father's groups and mother's groups in shaping the laws). 
417. See, e.g., ELLMAN ET AL., supra nole 232, at 666 (describing the joint custody trend as re-
flecting "an underlying policy of encouraging both parents to maintain their relationship with the 
child afler divorce"). 
418. See CAL. CIV. CODE 4600.5 (Deering 1984) (repealed 1981). 
419. As of 1996, 43 stales and the District of Columbia had statules that specifically authorize 
the courts to order joint custody. In some staleS, joint custody is referred to as shared custody. In the 
43 stales with joint legal custody statutes, 11 stales and the District of Columbia declare a presump-
tion in favor of joint custody, which means that courts are supposed to grant joint custody unless 
there is proof that joint custody is not in the child's best inlerest. Eight states declare a presumption 
in favor of joint custody if both parents agree to it. The remaining 24 stales with joint custody stat-
ules make joint custody an explicit option without any presumption for or against joint custody. 
Seven stales do not have joint custody statules, but courts in those stales can use their equitable 
powers to order joint custody in appropriale circumstances. Joint custody usually is considered ap-
propriale when parents appear willing to cooperale in raising their children. See Jeff Atkinson, Mod-
ern Child Custody Practice, sec. 6.01 in AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION'S FACfS ABOur CHILDREN AND 
THE LAW (1996). 
420. See Legislative History of CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080. 
421. See Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 969-70 (Md. 1986) (discussing the equitable powers 
of Maryland courts to enter joint custody orders, and observing that "the power of the court is very 
broad so that it may accomplish the paramount purpose of securing the welfare and promoting the 
best inlerest of the child"). 
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The impact of joint custody statutes on the welfare of children has 
been mixed.422 Many commentators and researchers have concluded that 
joint custody promotes the welfare of children.423 Others argue that joint 
custody should be reserved for low conflict, high resource couples.424 
However, in the years since the adoption of the fIrst statute in California, 
joint custody laws have been refmed in a variety of ways to further the 
goal of providing children with the benefIt of both parents' care. These 
changes include permitting joint custody only in cases where parents 
have agreed to such an arrangement.425 Additionally, eleven states either 
prohibit joint custody when a court fmds that there has been domestic vi-
olence or direct the courts to consider violence as a factor that weighs 
against an award of joint custody.426 These statutory provisions are con-
sistent with social science and legal scholarship, which have found that 
children living under joint custody orders in high conflict families have 
more emotional and behavioral problems than those in sole custody.427 
ii. Parenting Classes and Parenting Plans 
Another development over the last decade that has promoted in-
volvement of both parents in children's lives when parents live apart is 
the growing use of "parenting classes" and "parenting plans. "428 While 
422. See generally JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING (Jay Folberg ed., 1991) [hereinaf-
ter JOINT CUSTODY] (presenting various writings on child development relating to joint custody). 
423. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, in CIDLDREN OF DIVORCE, 
at 210, 211 (examining the effects of custody laws, among other factors, on post divorce parenting 
role for fathers and noting that the most important reason for considering father's role is "to advance 
the welfare of the child"). 
424. See, e.g., Richard Gardner, Joint Custody is not for Everyone, in JOINT CUSTODY, supra 
note 422, at 66. 
425. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-56a(b) (West 
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214(6) (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§ 722.26a(2) (West 1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125.490(1) (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 458:17(11) (1992). 
426. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 
(West 1994); Fl.A. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1994); 750 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. 5/602 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-212, 222, 224 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 458:17 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1993); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1994); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 14.021 (West 1994); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2-112 to 113 (Michie 1994). 
427. See Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Post Divorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint 
Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCIDATRY 576 (1989); see also Judith S. Waller-
stein & Janet R. Johnston, Children of Divorce: Recent Findings Regarding Long-Term Effects and 
Recent Studies of Joint and Sole Custody, 11 PEDIATRICS IN REV. 197 (1990). 
428. AFCC DIRECTORY OF PARENT EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1996) [hereinafter AFCC DIREC-
TORY] (providing brief program descriptions and contact people); see also Peter Salem et aI., Special 
Issue: Parent Education in Divorce and Separation, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION REv. No.1 (Jan. 1996) 
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the fonnat and content vary,429 the primary focus of most court-affiliated 
parent education programs is easing the family transition for children.43o 
Mental health professionals, and in some cases lawyers, team together to 
teach parents techniques to improve parental cooperation and other skills 
designed to minimize the negative impact of divorce on children.431 Early 
reports indicate a positive impact on children.432 Over 40 states now offer 
families experiencing divorce or separation educational programs to assist 
parents to better care for their children.433 Laws in at least thirteen states 
authorize courts to order divorcing parties to participate in such pro-
grams, and three states mandate that all parties to a divorce case with 
children participate in parent education.434 
Parenting plans are another feature of recent custody law that courts 
and legislatures have introduced to protect children involved in custody 
disputes by promoting the involvement of both parents in their children's 
lives.435 Parenting plans typically delineate each parent's responsibilities 
(containing essays and research reports on parent education programs throughout the country). 
429. In some jurisdictions, parents do not attend the same session; in others, they are 
expected to attend together. However, most states offer spouses the option of attending sepa· 
rately. Some programs include information on the legal process, while others focus solely on 
emotional issues. Programs operate in courthouses as well as community centers, universities, 
churches, and synagogues. 
Andrew Schepard et aI., The Push for Parent Education, 19 FAM. Aovoc., Spring 1997, at 52, 54. 
430. See, e.g., Andrew Schepard & Stephen W. Schlissel, Planning for P.EA.G.E.: The Devel· 
opment of Coun-Connected Education Programs for Divorcing and Separating Families, 23 HOF-
STRA L REv. 845, 851 (1995) (noting that parents report that participation in the planning program 
helps them to focus on the best interests of their children during the reorganization of their family 
and that they receive information and perspective that will help their children cope with the difficult 
transitions of divorce). 
431. See AFCC DIRECTORY, supra note 428. 
432. See Salem et aI., supra note 428, at 13-14. 
433. See Schepard et aI., supra note 429, at 53. 
434. See id. 
435. See Elizabeth R. Kosier, Mediation in Nebraska: An Innovative Past, a Spirited Present, 
and a Provocative Future, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 183, 195 (1997) (discussing Nebraska's Parenting 
Act, which supplements and extends legislative support for mediation in the area of domestic rela-
tions following legislative findings that joint parental decision-making is in the best interest of minor 
children experiencing divorce or separation and mandates district court distribution of information re-
garding parenting plan mediation and encourages the use of mediation for the development of a 
parenting plan); Deborah Maranville, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought 
and Action: Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment Compensation 
Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1081, 1089 (1992) (noting the Washington legisla-
ture's rejection of conventional custody/visitation terminology for proceedings involving parental ac-
cess to their children in favor of the phrase "residential time" and a procedure involving the prepa-
ration of "parenting plans"); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative 
Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REv. 687, 691 (1985) (urging that the state must promote coopera-
tive parenting through its procedures for dispute resolution, by creating an atmosphere for negotia-
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for the care of the children and decisions about education, health care, 
discipline and education.436 They also describe visitation times or, if ap-
plicable, joint physical custody. These plans also make provisions for 
resolving future disputes.437 About ten states and the District of Columbia 
currently require parties to submit proposed parenting plans prior to a 
grant of custody. Another eight states have statutes that give judges dis-
cretion to require parenting plans in custody cases.438 
While many plans written under these statutes will result in more 
private ordering child placement decisions after divorce, these statutes 
tion that encourages both parents to make concessions to ensure that the other parent is involved in 
the child's post divorce emotional and financial life). 
436. See Don R. Ash, Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: 
Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Law in Tennessee, 22 MEMPms ST. L REv. 769, 
804-05 (1997) (suggesting parenting plans should be divided into five different sections, including: 
(1) the time a child is with the parent overnight with the parent at home; (2) the actual time the par-
ent and the child spend together; (3) the portion of the time the child and the parent spend in recrea-
tion or projects together or activity time; (4) how the parents will work together to make day-tcrday 
decisions, which would include, for example, discipline, curfew, allowances, health care habits, and 
other short term activities; and (5) how the parents will make major decisions about such things as 
education, religious affiliation, critical or long-term medical care, and for older children, sports, the 
purchase of cars, and decisions about college); Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's 
Joint Custody Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CArn. U.L REV. 767, 793 
(1997) (citing Arizona's parenting plan statute as a good example of what these plans should deline-
ate: (1) each parent's rights and responsibilities for the personal care of the child and for decisions in 
areas such as education, health care, and religious training; (2) a schedule of the physical residence 
of the child, including holidays and §chool vacations; (3) a procedure by which proposed changes, 
disputes and alleged breaches may be mediated or resolved, which may include the use of concilia-
tion services or private counseling; (4) a procedure for periodic review of·the plan's terms by the 
parents; and (5) a statement that the parties understand that joint custody does not necessarily mean 
equal parenting time). 
437. See supra note 436 and accompanying text; see also Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, 
and Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Profes-
sionals, 24 MICH. J.L REF. 65, 107-08 (1990) (discussing Washington's statutory requirements that 
the parenting plan must specify terms with respect to three discrete components: a dispute resolution 
process; allocation of decision-making authority; and residential provisions for given days of the 
year, including a provision for holidays, birthdays, vacations, and other special occasions). 
438. See ALA. CODE 30-3-153 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(1) (West Supp. 1996); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996); 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/602.1 (West Supp. 
1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1996) ("At the trial on the merits, if ... 
either party seeks shared legal or physical custody, the parties, jointly or individually, shall submit 
..• a shared custody implementation plan."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(8) (West Supp. 1997) 
(U Any decree providing for joint custody shall include a specific written plan setting forth the terms 
of such custody. Such plan may be suggested by both parents acting in concert, or one parent acting 
individually, or if neither ... the plan shall be provided by the court."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
223(b)(2) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-4-9.1(F) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 109(C) 
(West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (West Supp. 1996) ("In any proceeding ... each 
party shall file and serve a proposed permanent parenting plan."). But see DEI.. CODE ANN. tit 13, 
§ 727 (1993). 
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give courts authority to require parents to focus on the care of their chil-
dren. This shifts the emphasis in divorce and custody cases from the 
adults to the children.439 Again, there is evidence that the use of parent-
ing plans has begun to accomplish the goal of minimizing the negative 
impact that parents living apart has on children.440 
b. The Child's Voice in Custody Proceedings 
Another development that has reinforced the focus on children in 
custody disputes is the trend toward increased emphasis on the "child's 
voice" in custody proceedings.441 This has been accomplished, in part, by 
greater use of appointed attorneys for children in custody cases.442 While 
appointment of counsel is still discretionary in most states,443 appellate 
courts have increasingly emphasized the need to have the child's voice 
heard in some way.444 As one court put it: 
439. See Ash, supra note 436, at 805 (noting that the advantage of a mediator in the parenting 
plan process is that he or she can help parents focus on making the children a priority, and also 
stress the importance to parents of maintaining an ongoing relationship with one another for the ben-
efit of the children); Ellis, supra note 437, at 88-89 (explaining that requiring parents in all cases to 
use a plan with specific components is intended to refocus parental consciousness on the needs of 
their children). 
440. See Lynne M. Kenney & Diana Vigil, A Lawyer's Guide to Therapeutic Interventions in 
Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARIz. ST. Ll. 629, 645 (1996) (stating that when parents are in disa-
greement over matters concerning the child, parenting plans can help them reach an agreement). But 
see Jane W. Ellis, Caught in the Middle: Protecting Children of High Conflict Divorce, 22 N.Y.U. 
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 253, 261 & n.48 (explaining that the parenting plan sometimes exacerbates 
the conflict between parents rather than lessening it). 
441. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Laoking for Rights in all the Wrong Places: Resolving Cus· 
tody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1563 (1994) (suggesting that 
under a strong version of rights, hearing a child's voice and giving her input would ameliorate the 
negative consequences of bargaining over custody and reduce animosity between the spouses who 
would need to confront the effects of their behavior on the child); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended 
Family System in the Black Community: A Child· Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. 
REv. 1649, 1671-72 (1995) (noting that commentators have attempted to refine the child-centered ap-
proach into a doctrine that would support a greater recognition of children's rights and voices in cus-
tody disputes, and advocating an approach that listens to the child's voice, includes the child's exper-
iences and values, and tames the adult "rights talk" by viewing children's needs both as children 
and as the adults they become); Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1990, 2035 (1995) (noting that in the continuing debate about the role of the child in deci-
sion making about that child's life, the question of the child's voice is a persistent theme and at the 
center of a legal controversy over the child's custody and care, the adults involved all struggle to de-
termine how much "voice" the child should possess). 
442. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: A Search 
for Definitions and Policy, 31 FAM. L.Q. 613, 628 (1998). 
443. Only one state mandates such representation in contested cases. See WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 767.045 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). 
444. See, e.g., Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394, 404-405 (1989) (remanding the case with in-
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We are most concerned that a five-year-old child has been the subject of litigation 
for over one-fourth of his life and has yet to see an end to it We are also con-
cerned that during the four days of testimony before the Master, the Master never 
spoke to the child, never heard from a truly objective witness and did not have the 
input of someone who would speak on behalf of the child. Since no other testi-
mony was offered, the hearing before the Chancellor suffered from the same defi-
ciency. This deficiency should be remedied by our direction that separate counsel 
be appointed for [the child].44s 
Advocates and scholars have encouraged this trend of requiring 
counsel for children in custody cases by identifying the benefits to chil-
dren of having representation446 and developing standards to improve the 
effectiveness of such representation.447 
c. Refining the Best Interest Standard 
i. The Nexus Requirement in Determining Parental Fitness 
The focus of moral discourse in custody cases during the fault era 
was on parents' sexual conduct. In the last decade, courts have moved 
from rules that presumptively disqualify parents who engage in 
nonmarital sexual relationships448 to a standard that requires a "nexus" or 
connection between any challenged conduct and harm to the child before 
considering such conduct relevant 449 While decisions applying the nexus 
structions that an attorney be appointed to represent the interests of the five-year-old child whose 
custody was at stake, although no one had sought the appointment of counsel for the child at the 
trial court level); see also Grist v. Grist, 946 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. Ct App. 1997) (stating that if there 
are allegations of abuse, the trial court must appoint a guardian ad litem for the child). 
445. Levitt, 79 Md. App. at 404-05. Courts have also held that children in custody disputes 
should be pennitted to dismiss an attorney and retain counsel of his or her choice. See ARsEN, supra 
note 240, at 77. 
446. See Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judicial 
Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 255, 269-70 (1991); see also Linda Elrod, Counsel for the Child in 
Custody Disputes: The Time is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 63 (1992); Emile R. Kruzick & David H. 
Zemans, In the Best Interests of the Child: Mandatory Independent Representation, 69 DENV. U.L. 
REv. 605 (1992). But see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE TIlE BEST INTERESTS OF TIlE CHILD 119 
(1979) (arguing that generally, parents should decide whether their child needs legal representation). 
447. See Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From "Best" to "Better": The Interests of Children and the 
Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. REV. 633 (1990); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & 
Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, But Who Am I?," 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1917, 
1941-42 (1996); David Peterson, Comment, Judicial Discretion Is Insufficient: Minors' Due Process 
Right to Participate with Counsel When Divorce Custody Disputes Involve Allegations of Child 
Abuse, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1995). 
448. See supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text 
449. See 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL.. CHILD CUSTODY ANO VISITATION LAW ANO PRACTICE 
§ 10. 12[2]£b], 10-212-213 (1996) ("The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian 
that does not affect his relationship to the child.") Some fault-era cases did apply a nexus standard, 
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requirement may make fewer explicit references to morality, such a re-
quirement places a greater emphasis on child welfare and less emphasis 
on punishing parents. It is that emphasis on child welfare that supports 
the moral vision in family law more directly than the punishment of sex-
ually active parents. 
One of the earliest cases marking the trend toward the harm require-
ment where a parent's sexual behavior was challenged was the New York 
case of Feldman v. Feldman.45o In Feldman, the trial court transferred 
custody of two children from the mother to the father because of the 
mother's "desire to experiment sexually."451 The appellate court reversed 
stating: 
In my opinion, amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and what we conveniently 
consider aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody . 
. . . In the instant case our sole concern is for the best interests of the children. As 
both children have resided with the mother since birth, a change of custody at this 
late date should not be made unless there is a showing that she is unfit to continue 
as the custodial parent .... 452 
Since 1975, many states have moved from a standard focused on punish-
ing the "guilty party " 453 to a standard that makes "an honest attempt to 
evaluate what would be in the best interest of the child rather than on the 
basis of subjective reactions to parental moral values. "454 
but these discussions represented the minority view at that time. See, e.g., McAnespie v. McAnespie, 
200 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. Dist Ct 1957) ("The moral unfibless of a mother must be such as has a 
direct bearing on the welfare of the child, if it is to deprive her of the custody of the child."); Rei-
land v. Reiland, 160 N.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Minn. 1968) ("The fact that the mother has been indiscrete 
or unfaithful does not necessarily disqualify her as custodian of the children. The moral unfitness of 
the mother must be such as to have a direct bearing on the welfare of the child if she is to be de-
prived of custody."). Likewise, some contemporary decisions still consider involvement in non-
marital sexual conduct as evidence of unfibless. See, e.g., Dockins v. Dockins, 475 So. 2d 571, 573 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (mother denied custody for entertaining lover in her home once while children 
were present). 
450. 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
451. [d. at 509-10. 
452. [d. at 512 (citations omitted); see also Davis v. Davis, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (Md. 1977) 
("[W]hereas the fact of adultery may be a relevant consideration in child custody awards, no pre-
sumption of unfibless on the part of the adulterous parent arises from it; rather it should be weighed 
along with all other pertinent factors, only insofar as it affects the child's welfare."). 
453. See Beck v. Beck, 120 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Neb. 1963). 
454. Nora Lauerman, Non·Marital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 CIN. L. REv. 647, 
672, 681 (1977) (noting the variety of approaches courts were taking in the 1970s in custody cases 
involving non-marital sexual conduct and finding cases that require a "clear direct impact" of harm 
to the child as a result of the sexual misconduct the "soundest"). For modem cases reflecting this 
trend see, e.g., Hanhart v. Hanhart, 501 N.W.2d 776, 778 (S.D. 1993) (awarding custody to mother 
was in child's best interests despite mother's adulterous affair, where affair had no detrimental im-
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Courts still are fairly consistent in labeling both mothers and fathers 
actively engaged in homosexual relationships as poor moral examples for 
their children.45~ However, recent custody decisions have also begun to 
require a demonstrated nexus between harm to the child and the parent's 
sexual orientation.456 These decisions signal a trend away from custody 
decisions that place primary emphasis on punishing parents for sexual ac-
tivity rather than focusing on arrangements that will best serve children. 
ii. Primary Caretaker Standard 
Another development in custody that has refined the best interests 
test is the emphasis on the primary caretaker in custody decisions.457 The 
primary caretaker can be defmed as the parent who has been most in-
volved in providing day-to-day care, such as preparing meals, purchasing 
clothes, arranging for medical care, education, and social activities, put-
ting the child to bed at night, and waking the child in the moming.458 
pact on children); Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625, 628 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that 
adulterous behavior of mother could not be used to rebut primary caretaker presumption; and grant-
ing mother custody); Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260, 262 (W. Va. 1985) (stating that acts of sexual 
misconduct by a mother may not be considered as evidence of fitness for custody unless it is injuri-
ous to the children). 
455. The majority of state courts still suggest that a parent's homosexuality is a negative fac-
tor in the best interest analysis. See Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States 1994-1995: Case 
Digests, 29 FAM. LQ. 775, 810-11 (1996). 
456. See, e.g., DeLong v. DeLong, No. 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *6, *11 (Mo. Ct. App. W. 
Dist., Jan. 20, 1998) (noting that Missouri trial courts appear to have adopted a per se rule in award-
ing custody to heterosexual parents when the other parent is homosexual, the court held that focusing 
a custody decision on a parent's sexual preference, without assessing either parents' fitness and rela-
tionship to the child, is not in the child's best interest); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36, 37 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (overturning a lower court order prohibiting a lesbian mother from visiting her son 
in the presence of her female companion). 
457. See generally Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender Presumption to a Primary Parent Pre-
sumption: Has Anything Really Changed? ... Should It?, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 75-84 (1993) (citing a 
1982 study of appellate court decisions that "found the idea of primary caretaker increasingly popu-
lar in determining custody disputes"). 
458. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). Garska has been modified by 
recent statutory changes in West Virginia that continue to instruct judges to allocate custodial respon-
sibility for children based upon past caretaking responsibilities, but do not create a presumption in 
favor of the primary caretaker. See W. VA. CODE §§ 48-11-101 to 48-11-501 (Supp. 1999). For a full 
discussion of the merits of the primary caretaker rule, see David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Sub-
stantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 527-38 (1984) (recommending 
a rule favoring the primary caretaker for children five and under); see also Richard Neely, The Pri-
mary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 
168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing for a presumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker). This rule is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the trend toward involvement of both parents after divorce. In fami-
lies where parents shared the caretaking responsibilities equally during the marriage, joint custody 
would be appropriate upon divorce. See id. at 184. One scholar has proposed a refmement of the pri-
1999] NEW LANGUAGE OF MORALITY IN FAMILY LAW 1189 
This increased emphasis on the primary caretaker has been reflected in 
cases that apply a best interest standard but place special importance on 
the primary caretaker as one of many factors to be taken into account in 
the custody decision.459 A few states have adopted a rule that presumes 
that the primary caretaker will have custody unless that parent is unfit or, 
in some cases, an older child's preference will prevail.460 Advocates of 
the primary caretaker rule have long argued that it best advances the vir-
tues of certainty and predictability while furthering the goal of producing 
decisions in the best interests of the child.461 An increasing number of 
states have incorporated this concept into their custody law.462 In apply-
ing the primary caretaker rule, decisionmakers look to past behavior 
rather than attempting to predict future behavior.463 Judges base decisions 
on the reasonable assumption that the interests of a child are best served 
by preserving the relationship that has been the primary source of nurtur-
ing and care.464 
mary caretaker standard that would take into account an expanded role for the non-custodial parent. 
Elizabeth Scott has proposed the "approximation" rule in which the decisionmaker "focuses (al-
most) exclusively on the past relationship between parents and child and seeks to approximate as 
closely as possible the predivorce pattern of parental responsibility in the custody arrangement." 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 630 
(1992). This approach is aimed at responding to two areas of concern about the child's welfare-
minimizing trauma of family breakup and maximizing involvement of both parents in child's life. 
See id. 
459. See generally Bookspan, supra note 457, at 84. 
460. See, e.g., Garslal, 278 S.E.2d at 363; see also In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
461. See Chambers, supra note 458, at 527-38; see also Neely, supra note 458, at 185-86; 
Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody 
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 241-43 (1982). But see Mary V. Becker, Maternal 
Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 154-58 (ana-
lyzing decisions under the primary caretaker standard and finding that it hurts mothers). 
462. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990) ("[T]he golden 
thread running through any best interests analysis is the importance •.• of [a child's] bond with the 
primary parent. •.. "); Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d at 1222 (affrrming custody award to mother because she 
was the primary caretaker, although both parents were fit); In re Boldt, 801 P.2d 874, 875 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1990) (affirming custody award to mother because she had been the primary caretaker); Gar-
sial, 278 S.E.2d at 364 (awarding custody to the mother, because she was clearly the primary care-
taker before the proceedings). 
463. See Neely, supra note 458, at 180-82. 
464. See Maxfield, 452 N.E.2d at 223. After its adoption in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 
713 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Legislature rejected the primary caretaker presumption and restored 
the best interest standard. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1998); see also Gary Crippen, Stumbling Be-
yond Best Interests of the Child: Re-examining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Min-
nesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 428-
29 (1990) (concluding Minnesota courts continue to place strong emphasis on the primary caretaker 
as a factor in the best interest equation). 
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Social science research emphasizing the link between the primary 
caretaker's emotional and economic well-being and the well-being of 
children46S has also begun to change the focus from parents' right to have 
access to their children to a greater emphasis on children's welfare in 
custody "relocation" cases.466 These cases involve custody modification 
requests, which are triggered when a custodial parent attempts to relocate 
and, in so doing, increases the distance between the children and the 
noncustodial parent. 467 In the past decade, an increasing number of courts 
and legislatures have placed restrictions on such moves on a variety of 
grounds, including protection of rights of noncustodial parents.468 Re-
search has demonstrated that children's interests are served by supporting 
the custodial parent even where it interferes with the non-custodial par-
ent's desire for more frequent visitation.469 This research has begun to re-
verse the trend of modifying custody when the custodial parent relo-
cates.470 Appellate courts from a wide variety of states have signalled to 
trial courts that protection of the custodial family unit should take prece-
dence over deference to the noncustodial parent's rights.471 
465. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Cus-
todial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 263-64 (1996) ("rrlhe central 
importance of the primary relationship has been convincingly demonstrated, while no similar support 
has been found for the visiting relationship."). 
466. See Cheryl S. Kamer, Relocation: What Ought to Be, 20 FAM. L.Q. 12 (1997). 
467. See id. 
468. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1983) (finding that the limited pur-
pose of a statute requiring notice to a noncustodial parent before a custodial parent makes a substan-
tial move is "to safeguard the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent"); see also In re Marriage 
of Elser, 895 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Mont. 1995) (focusing exclusively on the disruption of the father'S 
visitation that would result if the custodial mother were allowed to remove the couple's children 
from the state so that she could further her education), overruled in part by Porter v. Galameau, 911 
P.2d 1143, 1150 (Mont. 1996); Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 854-55 (NJ. 1988) (fmding that 
the purpose of the New Jersey removal statute "is to preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent 
and the child to maintain and develop their familial relationship"). 
469. See, e.g., FURSTENBERG & CHERUN. supra note 401, at 107-108; see also Valarie King, 
Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-Being: Can Dads Make a Difference?, 15 J. FAM. Is. 
SUES 78 (1994); see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psycho-
logical and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 
305, 311-14 (1996). 
470. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 401, at 107-08. 
471. See, e.g., Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 376 (Alaska 1996); In re Marriage of Bur-
gess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1996); 
Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 419-20 (Fla. 1993); Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98-99 (Ind. 
1992); Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996); Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 847 
(Miss. 1990); In re Marriage of Hogstad, 914 P.2d 584, 587 (Mont. 1996); Harder v. Harder, 524 
N.W.2d 325, 328 (Neb. 1994); Trent v. Trent, 890 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Nev. 1995); Holder v. Polanski, 
544 A.2d 852, 856 (NJ. 1988); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996); Stout v. Stout, 
560 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1997); Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828, 832 (S.D. 1996); Fortin v. 
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llZ. Recognizing the Connection Between Domestic Violence 
and Parental Fitness 
Over the last two decades, courts and legislators have begun to dis-
cover the connection between domestic violence and "best interests" of 
children in custody cases.472 Twenty years ago, judges routinely excluded 
evidence of a parent's abusive behavior toward another adult in the 
household because it was thought that such abuse was not relevant to a 
parent's fitness for custody.473 Advocates, supported by research demon-
strating the connections between domestic violence and child abuse, be-
gan petitioning state legislatures to permit or require judges to consider 
domestic violence when determining custody or visitation.474 Statutes per-
mitting judges to consider spousal abuse as relevant to fitness began ap-
pearing in the 1980s.475 In 1990, only about sixteen states had such stat-
utes.476 As of 1995, forty-four states and the District of Columbia had 
amended their custody statutes to include some provision that alerts 
judges to the danger spouse abusers pose to children.4TI These provisions 
generally either (1) permit or require courts to consider the occurrence of 
domestic violence between parents as one of several factors relevant to 
determining the best interests of the child; or (2) create a presumption 
against an award of custody to a parent who has demonstrated a pattern 
Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229, 231 (S.D. 1993); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (fenn. 1996); Lane 
v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 791 (Vt. 1992); Bohrns v. Bohrns, 424 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Wis. 1988); 
Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 1993). But see In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 
1041, 1047 (Ill. 1988); Domingues v. Johnson, 593 A.2d 1133, 1041 (Md. 1991). 
472. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 
29 FAM. L.Q. 197,225-27 (1995) [hereinafter Family Violence Project]. 
473. See Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Rec-
ommendations, 43 Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 3, 29, 34 (1992). 
474. A number of studies have reported on the harm to children who witness domestic vio-
lence. For example, one study focused on 25 children who witnessed their mothers being abused. See 
Jane H. Pfouts et. al., Deviant Behaviors of Child Victims and Bystanders in Violent Families, in Ex. 
PWRlNG TIlE RELAnoNsmp BE'IWEEN CmLD ABUSE AND DELINQUENCY 79-99 (Robert J. Hunner & 
Yvonne Elder Walker eds., 1981). Of the 25 children, 53% acted out with parents, 60% with sib-
lings, 30% with peers, 33% with teachers; 16% had appeared in juvenile court, 20% were labeled 
truant, 58% were below average or failing in school; caseworkers labeled 40% as anxious and 48% 
as depressed. See id. at 95; see also Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence 
Against Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L REv. 1109, 1111-14 (1995) (summariz-
ing studies describing both direct and indirect harm to children living in homes where mothers are 
victims of domestic violence). 
475. See Hart, supra note 473, at 29. 
476. See id.; see also Family Violence Project, supra note 472, at 199. However, the majority 
of states still do not presume that a father who abuses the mother is unfit. See id. at 208. 
477. See Family Violence Project, supra note 472, at 225-27. 
1192 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: 1111 
of violence.478 
I have argued elsewhere that contemporary custody law still reflects 
a double standard for mothers.479 The custody law reforms I have de-
scribed have not eliminated that double standard. Moreover, the overall 
effect of these statutes requires consideration of abuse to reduce the po-
tential that children will be abused by a violent parent or will suffer from 
observing the abuse of their mothers. 
The impact of these refmements to the "best interest standard" have 
not yet been evaluated, but the focus of these reforms on protecting chil-
dren over furthering parents' rights should contribute to the overall trend 
toward a more child-focused custody law. Additionally, they "fost[er] a 
substantive vision of family life" in which "the role of the father is con-
stitutive" involving shared responsibility in childraising.48o 
3. The Child Support Revolution 
During the 1980s and 1990s, another "revolution" in family law has 
been taking place that has transformed child support law.481 Both the es-
tablishment and enforcement of child support were once primarily private 
matters where parents had the ability to contract between themselves for 
appropriate awards and were primarily responsible to initiate court ac-
tions to enforce those awards.482 Family law's increasing attention in re-
cent decades on the protection of children, among other reasons, has led 
to increasing public responsibility for establishing and enforcing child 
support obligations.483 
Blackstone described the duty of parents to provide for the support 
of their children as "a principle of natural law."484 Traditionally, Ameri-
can divorce laws provided only vague guidance on postdissolution child 
support, using terms such as "suitable," "just," "reasonable," "proper," 
478. See id. 
479. See generally Murphy, supra note 213, at 693-702. 
480. REGAN. supra note 90, at 188. 
481. See WEISBERG & ApPLETON, supra note 314, at 763 (describing child suppon enforcement 
techniques as having "undergone a revolution in recent decades as a result of federal involvement"). 
482. See id. at 118. For an historical account of the development of child suppon law in this 
country from "moral duty to equitable remedy" see Garrison, supra note 76. 
483. It is interesting to note that while different moral justifications are proffered for develop-
ments in spousal and child support, the two are very closely linked. Thus, while improvements in the 
establishment and collection of child suppon reflect a moral commitment to children, they are also 
justified by a similar commitment to their caretakers, often ex-spouses. See GLENDON, TRANSFORMA. 
TION, supra note 241, at 198. 
484. BLACKSTONE, supra note 146, at 447-48. 
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"fit," "sufficient," or "necessary" to direct courts how to set an 
award.485 Later, statutes listed factors to be considered in the exercise of 
judicial discretion to determine parental child support obligations.486 
Until the 1980s, laws governing child support were primarily a mat-
ter of state law and were generally framed as broad discretionary stan-
dards.487 Courts were free to set child support at any level as long as 
there was some indication that the fmder of fact had considered the abil-
ity of the non-custodial parent to pay and the needs of the child[ren].488 
The inadequacy of most states' discretionary standards in setting ini-
tial child support awards took on critical proportions by the early 
1980's.489 Insufficient child support was a major cause of the spiraling 
poverty rate among women and children.490 When courts did award child 
support, award levels were often inadequate, thrusting many children and 
custodial parents into poverty or a seriously diminished standard of liv-
ing.491 Studies estimating the costs of raising children in intact house-
holds demonstrate the inadequacy of such amounts of child support.492 In 
addition to the inadequacy of the award itself, the traditional system of 
virtually unlimited judicial discretion in this area led to "pronounced dis-
parities in award amounts from court to court, from judge to judge, and 
485. See VERNIER, supra note 185, at 193. 
486. For example, section 309 of the Unifonn Maniage and Divorce Act allows courts to set 
an amount "reasonable or necessary," considering: 
all relevant factors including: (1) the fmancial resources of the child; (2) the fmancial re-
sources of the custodial parent; (3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had 
the maniage not been dissolved; (4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his 
educational needs; and (5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent. 
UNIF. MARluAGe AND DIVORCE Acr § 309, 9A U.L.A. 573 (1998). 
487. See HARRy D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERsPEcnve 10 (1981) 
("[T]he court's discretion regarding the amount of child support usually reign[ed] supreme."). 
488. See id. 
489. See generally Murphy, supra note IS, at 226-29. 
490. Of the 9.4 million custodial parents in 1987, 41% had no child support award. See Bu. 
REAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS. SERIES P-23, No. 
167, CHILD SUPPORT AND AuMONY: 1987, at 1 (1990). 
491. See Lucy Marsh Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study 
of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DENY. 
U. L. REv. 21, 50 (1979). In 1987, the average child support for the 3.7 million custodial parents 
who actually received payments was $2,710 per year. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 490, 
at 1-2. 
492. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Will This Divorced Woman Receive Child 
Support?, JUDGES J. 40, 42-43 (1986) (describing the project that examined the child support impli-
caitons of various custody arrangements, and finding, among other things, that the level of support 
awarded in the cases examined fell "far below the costs of rearing children estimated by 
economists"). 
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from case to case. "493 
The overall problem of inadequate awards, the lack of objective 
guidelines for establishing support obligations and the resulting inconsis-
tencies in awards prompted reaction in both Congress and the White 
House, which framed the issue in moral terms.494 In response, beginning 
in the mid 1970s Congress enacted a series of related statutes addressing 
the child support problem.495 Both the substance and rhetoric surrounding 
these changes reflected the increased emphasis on duty and commitment 
to children. Probably the most important legislation from the perspective 
of moving toward guaranteeing children support was the Family Support 
Act of 1988.496 This Act required every state to establish presumptive 
child support guidelines as a condition for continued federal funding of 
the state's welfare program.497 
A number of requirements of this statute strengthened the federal 
push for standardized child support decisions. Under this statute, each 
state had to adopt child support guidelines that presumptively established 
the appropriate child support obligation in any child support proceed-
ing.498 As a result of this federal legislation, by 1990 every state had 
adopted some type of child support formula.499 In addition to providing 
493. Sally F. Goldfarb, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Child Support Guidelines, 13 
FAM. L. REP. 3031, 3032 (1987). 
494. See HR REP. No. 98-527, at 49 (1983); see also President Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 
of National Child Support Enforcement Month, 1987 (Aug. 13, 1987) in 22 WEEKLY COMPo PREs. 
Doc. 939. ("[M]uch remains to be done to foster a nationwide conviction that child support repre-
sents not only a legal responsibility but a profound ethical obligation of parents and an urgent moral 
right of children.") While a significant factor in the initial push for federal intervention to strengthen 
child support was to reduce the federal welfare costs, the focus broadened to include a concern to 
reinforce parental duty to support children from all income groups. See Harry D. Krause, Child Sup-
port Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE 
CROSSROADS 166, 169-74 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
495. For a description of these statutes, see Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 
5 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 541, 545-48 (1998). 
496. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat 2346-48 (1988). 
497. See 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1997) (stating that an approved state plan is a condition for fed-
eral financial assistance); id. § 302.56(a) (requiring that state plans contain child support guidelines). 
498. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1994). 
499. See JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AI... NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS. CHILD SUPPORT 
GUIDELINES: A COMPENDIUM SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUiDEUNES (1990). The Income Shares 
Model, which the majority of states have adopted, employs various economic studies to identify the 
percentage of family income the child(ren) would have received if the parents lived together. The in-
come of both parents is combined to calculate the basic child support obligation. See Irwin Garfinkel 
et al., Child Support Orders: A Perspective on Reform, in THE FUTURE OF CIDLDREN, Spring 1994, at 
84, 87-88. This basic amount is then pro-rated between the parents in proportion to their respective 
incomes. See id. at 87-88. The noncustodial parent must pay his or her share as child support; the 
custodial parent presumably pays his or her share directly to the child(ren). See id. Because the eco-
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some uniformity to the method of establishing child support throughout 
the country, the Family Support Act signalled an important shift from 
child support law framed as a discretionary standard to child support 
framed as a rule or right.5°O 
The Persona! Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA),501 imposed new requirements for child support 
enforcement.5Ol This controversial503 welfare reform legislation replaced a 
federal entitlement to welfare with a block-grant system. One commenta-
tor describes the attempt to establish child support as a right guaranteed 
to children under this new legislation: "The vision for child support en-
forcement that guided much of the development of the legislation is that 
the payment of child support should be automatic and inescapable-'like 
death or taxes.' "504 Both the Family Support Act and the PRWORA stat-
ute followed much substantial debate in Congress that was often focused 
on the moral imperative of guaranteeing financial support for children.505 
Some commentators have interpreted these developments as evi-
dence of family law's increasing concern for "caring and commit-
ment"506 by parents for their children. Additionally, these laws are further 
evidence that family law is not dominated by the ideology of liberal indi-
vidualism507 to the extent that strengthening child support laws pushes 
nomic studies of intact families suggest that families spend a decreasing percentage of total income 
on children as income levels increase, the guidelines provide for noncustodial parents at higher in-
come levels to pay a declining percentage of income. See id. at 88-89. Additionally, most income 
shares formulas include cost-sharing for certain child-related expenditures such as child care and ex-
traordinary medical expenses. See id. at 89. 
500. The Act preserved limited judicial discretion by permitting judges to make a specific 
finding that application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, as de-
termined under criteria established by each state. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (b)(2) (1988). 
501. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996). 
502. See id. §§ 331-333. 
503. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, THB ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43-45. 
504. Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 
Welfare Act, 30 FAM. LQ. 519, 538 (1996). 
505. See, e.g., Welfare: Reform or Replacement? (Child Support Enforcement), Hearings on 
S.1511 Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Finance Committee, 
looth Congo 273-308 (1987) (statements of J. Byran Hehir, U.S. Catholic Conference, and Charles V. 
Bergstrom, Lutheran Council in the USA in support of the Family Support Act of 1988; both empha-
sizing the moral issues involved in the elimination of child poverty); see also President Bill Clinton, 
State of the Union Address 1996 (emphasizing the moral obligation to pass federal welfare legisla-
tion that emphasizes responsibility of both parents for children). 
506. Cahn, supra note 1, at 238 n.59; see also Galston, supra note 83 (describing increased 
efforts to enforce child support as an important part of the moral commitment to raise children well); 
Coltrane & Hickman, supra note 416, at 412-17. 
507. See Cahn, supra note 1, at 270. Interestingly, Carl Schneider predicted in 1985 that child 
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parents in the direction of responsibility and away from self-fulfillment 
and autonomy. 
Has the goal of strengthening parental obligation for support been 
realized? Research on the impact of the guidelines is mixed. Early re-
ports indicated that guidelines had improved the status of custodial par-
ents,S08 but more recent studies have focused on the increasing rate of 
child poverty despite the imposition of guidelines and other child support 
reforms of the 1980s.S09 However, most agree that fixed formulas for 
child support are a step in the right direction.slo Additionally, there are 
some signs that tougher child support enforcement laws are fmally in-
creasing collection of child support.Sl1 Promising new proposals aimed at 
assuring more generous and uniform child support awards are being de-
veloped by scholars and policymakers.Sl2 These developments and sug-
gestions for future refmements evidence the trend toward reinforcing re-
sponsibility and commitment to children. Together with the changes 
support law was moving in a direction in which the increasing public responsibility for child support 
was undermining parental responsibility for children. See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, 
at 1813. While recognizing "evidence to the contrary," he supported his claim by pointing to the 
abysmal record for child support collection that existed at that time. Id. at 1812. In the intervening 
years, both improvements in child support collection and the shift from public to private responsibil-
ity as evidenced by PRWORA indicate a strengthening of parental duty under the law. 
508. See, e.g., Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support Guidelines: Will They Make a Difference?, 
12 J. FAM. ISSUES 404, 405 (1991) (predicting that award levels would rise upon implementation of 
the guidelines); Murphy, supra note 15, at 232 ("The consensus ... is that [the] guidelines are 
working."); Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, 
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 332 (1991) (citing studies 
showing increased awards after implementation of the guidelines). 
509. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 76, at 63 (summarizing data showing that guidelines 
"have not dramatically improved the lot of children eligible for child support"). 
510. See id. at 101. 
511. See, e.g., ELAINE SORENSON & ARIEL HALPERN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUP-
PORT REcEIPT: How WELL IS CIflLD SUPPORT DOING? (Urban Institute 1999) (finding that never-
married mothers increased their rate of child support receipt from 4% in 1976 to 18% in 1997); Ann 
Marie Rotondo, Comment, Helping Families Help Themselves: Using Child Support Enforcement to 
Reform Our Welfare System, 33 CAL. w_ L. REv. 281, 282-84 (1997); see also Michael Holmes, Mil-
lions Culled in Child Support, Hous. CHRON. Sept. 10, 1996, at 20. 
512. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis 
and Recommendations §§ 3.04, 3.05B (Preliminary Draft No.7 vol. I, June, 1997) (advocating an 
Equal Living Standard Model for child support to ensure that the supported child enjoys a standard 
of living that is at least equal to lhat of the non-custodial parent); Garrison, supra note 76, at 117 
(arguing for the adoption of a "Community Model" which bases the support obligation on "family 
membership" and "mandates income sharing as the basic approach"); Murphy, supra note 213, at 
728-730 (arguing for voluntary impoverishment rules which are more generous to caretakers of 
young children); see also Harry D. Krause, Review of Part X, Child Support, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 
Soc. Sec. Am. of 1972, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, H.R. 1 (unpublished consultant's paper) 
52-53 (advocating a uniform federal formula related to the non-custodial parent's ability to pay). 
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identified in custody law that promote deeper involvement of fathers in 
child rearing, these child support reforms are a step in the direction of 
creating laws that encourage parents' fulfillment of the moral commit-
ment to support their children.513 
D. Creating Rights for Family Members: From Discretionary Standards 
to Rules 
Standards in family law for allocating family assets, deciding child 
custody and visitation, child support and alimony have traditionally been 
characterized by broad discretion.514 Over the last two decades, several 
developments in family law have signalled a shift from broad standards 
to rules.515 A brief history of the development of discretionary standards 
illuminates the ways in which such a shift holds promise for protecting 
vulnerable family members. 
Discretion in domestic law has its origins in the concept of the eq-
uity court.516 Equity courts were established to replace a system of justice 
that applied rigid rules in the courts of law with a system that permitted 
some measure of discretion.5J7 It was believed that rigidity was the mark 
of a primitive legal order.5lS Citizens thought that the law courts could no 
longer dispense justice.519 Inflexible application of rules forced the parties 
to go to the king for relief. The king appointed chancellors to provide the 
individualized justice that rigid courts of law could not; the chancellors' 
authority gradually developed into the equitable Court of Chancery.s2o 
The use of discretion continued to grow in most areas of Anglo-
513. See FURSTENBERG & CHERUN, supra note 401, at 104, 118-19. 
514. This discussion is based, in part, on Murphy, supra note 15, at 212-14, 218-19. 
515. Some commentators have analyzed changes in trends in family law over the same time 
period and interpreted the balance between rules and discretion as "moving simultaneously in both 
directions." Judith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce and Family: A Cautionary Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L. 
REv. 1367, 1376 (1993); see also Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in 
Family Law: A Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993). 
516. See, e.g., KENNETH DAVIS. DISCRETIONARY JusnCE: A PRELlMtNARY INQUIRY 18 (1969). 
517. See id. at 19. 
518. See HENRy S. MAINE. ANCIENT LAW: ITS CoNNECJ10N WID! TIlE EARLy HISTORY OF SOCI· 
ETY. AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 65-69 (5th ed. 1888); REGAN, supra note 90, at 188. 
519. See, e.g., DAVIS. supra note 516, at 19; see also JOSEPH STORY. 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQ. 
UITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 29-31 (photo reprint) (1877) (re-
viewing the British roots of the American courts of equity). 
520. However, in time, the Chancery Court developed its own rules to guide the exercise of 
discretion. See DAVIS, supra note 516, at 19. Thus, the recognition that rules should be developed to 
avoid arbitrariness and inequity has always tempered the ideal of individualized justice through the 
exercise of discretion. 
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American law.52l Given the complex issues of human behavior underlying 
child placement and other family law issues, it is not surprising that reli-
ance on the exercise of judicial discretion became particularly prevalent 
in family law. illcreasingly, discretion replaced the development of mean-
ingful standards and rules in state regulation of the family. ill contrasting 
family and property law, for example, Mary Ann Glendon has noted: 
In our legal system, property law traditionally has been and even now continues to 
be characterized by a high degree of strict law, due to what are generally thought 
to be special needs in that field for stability, predictability, and security of titles. 
Family law, on the other hand, is characterized by more discretion than any other 
field of private law. This fact is typically explained by a perceived need to tailor 
legal resolutions to the unique circumstances of each individual and family. How-
ever, when the fields of property and family law intersect, as they frequently do, 
especially when a family is dissolved by divorce or death, difficult questions arise 
concerning the proper accommodation of the interests served by rules establishing 
"bright lines" and those furthered by individualizing discretion.s22 
Commentators have offered a variety of rationales for the persistent 
hold of discretion on family law in addition to the general argument that 
individualized decisions are necessary given the complexity and diversity 
of families appearing before the COurt.523 One commentator attributes the 
rise of judicial discretion to the distinctly local nature of family law ju-
risprudence.524 Because "state domestic relations chauvinism" produced 
conflicts among state family codes, judges had to develop a "loosely ar-
ranged set of national domestic relations doctrines" to harmonize local 
law.52S These vague doctrines allowed judges to assume a "patriarchal 
stance by evaluating state legislation in terms of their perception of fam-
ily needs, community interest, and national common law priorities. "526 
Perhaps the most compelling explanation for the strong reliance on 
discretion in family law comes from feminist legal scholars.527 Mary 
521. See id. at 20. 
522. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Suc-
cession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1167-68 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also Schneider, supra 
note 195, at 2228-31 (discussing the vagueness of family law standards). 
523. See NEELY, supra note 412, at 34-38. 
524. See Grossberg, supra note 283, at 819. 
525. Id. at 819. 
526. Id. at 820. 
527. See, e.g., GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 232; Glendon, supra note 522, 
at 1176-77 (observing that judicial discretion reflects a reluctance to impose significant burdens on 
an absent father in order to force him to support his children); Schneider, supra note 195, at 2219-
26; Scott, supra note 325, at 9, 34 n.75 (arguing that reluctance to increase child support results 
from judicial ignorance of the actual costs of raising children). 
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Becker, for example, contrasts family and contract law and offers a gen-
der-based explanation for the rights versus discretion dichotomy in these 
two areas.528 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the ideal of indi-
vidualized discretionary justice played a significant role in contract law 
remedies. Juries set damages WillI few, if any~ fIxed rules; their only gui-
dance was a nebulous admonition to reach an appropriate decision in 
light of the actual injuries, needs, and abilities of the parties to the con-
tract.529 However, since that time courts and legislatures have developed 
rules that severely limit the jury's discretion.53o Becker notes that no sim-
ilar movement to curb the "virtually unbounded" discretion in the area 
of family law has occurred.53l She suggests that the greater tolerance of 
discretion in family law than in commercial cases is attributable to the 
gender of the parties seeking relief.532 
When a commercial relationship collapses, the parties seeking relief 
tend to be male. In contrast, when a family relationship collapses, it is 
primarily women who tend to need and seek remedies such as alimony, 
child custody, and support.533 Judges and legislators, who are still over-
whelmingly male,534 are more willing to fashion rules to enforce ,the bar-
gains men strike in commercial relationships, because they identify and 
empathize with the parties and place value on the transactions at issue. 
However, these decision makers neither value or understand the choices 
made by women seeking relief following the termination of a marital re-
lationship. These women are often traditional homemakers who agreed to 
defer or give up career opportunities and income potential to raise chil-
dren and provide a home for the family in exchange for rmancial and 
528. Mary Becker, Transcript of Address at 1989 American Association of Law Schools An-
nual Meeting (Jan. 6, 1989). 
529. See E. AllAN FARNSWORm, CONTRAcrs § 12.8, at 840 (1982). 
530. See, e.g., Perfecting Servo CO. V. Prod. Dev. & Sales Co., 131 S.E.2d 9, 22 (N.C. 1963) 
("Absolute certainty is not required but evidence of damages must be sufficiently specific and com-
plete to permit the jury to arrive at a reasonable conclusion.") (quoting Tillis v. Calvine Cotton 
Mills, Inc., III S.E.2d 606, 612 (N.C. 1959». 
531. Becker, supra note 528. 
532. See id. 
533. Mothers are most often the custodians of children in single parent families. The majority 
(88%) of children living in single parent homes live with their mother. See SALUTER, supra note 363, 
at ix; see also WORKING GROUP ON WELFARE REFORM, FAMILY SUPPORT. AND INDEPENDENCE, U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALm & HUMAN SERVS., BACKGROUND PAPERS ON WELFARE REFORM: CmLD SUPPORT EN. 
FORCEMENT 3 (1994) (citing a similar statistic). 
534. See CENTER FOR TIlE AMERICAN WOMEN AND Poucrncs, FACT SHEET (1999) (finding that 
22.3% of state legislators are women in 1999); WOMEN IN TIlE LAw: A LooK AT TIlE NUMBERS 31 
(American Bar Association, Dec. 1995) (finding that in 1991, 7% of federal court judges and 9% of 
state court judges were women). 
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emotional support from their husbands. In this situation the discretionary 
standards-giving primarily male judges control over women's income 
from ex-husbands-have resulted in retention by men of a disproportion-
ate share of family assets after divorce.535 Thus, Becker maintains that 
discretionary standards are used to reinforce male power and female sub-
ordination by keeping women subject to and dependent upon the judg-
ment of mostly male judges.536 
The alternative to the near total reliance on discretionary standards 
in family law is the infusion of some rules that will more effectively se-
cure the obligations family members owe one another.537 Scholars with a 
variety of perspectives have discouraged rules and individual rights in 
family law. Communitarians have argued that an emphasis on privacy 
and individual rights undermines strong families. As Michael Sandel puts 
it: "[In] a more or less ideal family situation, where relations are gov-
erned in large part by spontaneous affection ... individual rights ... are 
seldom invoked, not because injustice is rampant but because their appeal 
is preempted by a spurt of generosity. "538 
Many feminist scholars also believe that rules and rights should be 
discouraged in families. From their perspective, rules favor established 
535. See GLENDON. 'TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 232 (arguing that today's judges, in 
exercising their "virtually uncontrolled discretion," tend to protect the former husband's standard of 
living). 
536. See Becker, supra note 528; see also Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and psy-
choanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L REv. 1483, 1516, 1518 (1991) (noting 
both that the "law itself is 'male,' representing and incorporating male values" and that "judges 
have tremendous discretion in divorce cases" in this country). 
537. Of course, rules can be used to reinforce patriarchy and consolidate power and authority 
in a single family member. Prior to the adoption of equitable distribution statutes to allocate property 
after divorce, most states used a rule dividing property by title. See KRAUSE ET AL.. FAMILY LAW: 
CASES. COMMENTS. QUESTIONS 719 (1998). This method of distribution of property meant most prop-
erty went to husbands after divorce. See id. Similarly, prior to the adoption of the best interests stan-
dard for child custody decisions, a paternal presumption governed custody cases. See Polikoff, supra 
note 461, at 235-36. These rules do not work to protect vulnerable family members and the shift 
away from them generally helps custodial parents and children. 
538. MICHAEL J. SANDEL. LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 33 (1982); see also JEAN 
BETHKE ELSHTAIN. A COMMUNITARIAN PosmON ON THE FAMILY. NATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW 25-35 
(1991); Galston, supra note 83; MARy ANN GLENDON. THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 42 
(1981) (describing the "emergence of the self-determining, separate individual from the network of 
family and group ties"); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual 
Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 464-72, 496-501 
(1983) (criticizing individual rights analysis of family relationships while stressing the importance of 
traditional marital family); John Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights, 94 ETHICS 441, 
448 (1984) (examining the relationship between rights and close-knit communities and concluding 
that "thinking in terms of rights systematically denies the unity, the togetherness, the "we" that we 
are trying to create"). 
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hierarchies and do not conform with women's experiences.539 However, a 
growing number of feminists have urged a reconception of rights that can 
protect vulnerable family members and take precedence over family pri-
vacy rights when the two sets of rights confliCt.540 Susan Okin has urged 
policymakers to recognize that "however much the members of fami1ies 
care about one another and share common ends, they are still discrete 
persons with their own particular aims and hopes, which may sometimes 
conflict. [W]e must see the family as an institution in which justice is a 
crucial virtue. "541 
In analyzing the shifts between discretion and rules in the no-fault 
era, it is true that we seem to "be moving simultaneously in both direc-
tions."542 However, a close examination of the underlying changes in the 
law as a result of these shifts suggests a move towards rules when they 
are needed to secure rights for vulnerable members of families. 
Of course the movement from discretion to rules for divorce 
grounds started this trend.543 While the retention of fault grounds in most 
states has meant continued reliance on discretion in some divorce cases, 
statutes that permit unilateral or consent divorces after a waiting period 
can be classified as rules.544 Many commentators have claimed that the 
easier access to divorce has hurt women and children.545 Others argue 
539. See generally CAROL GILUGAN. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 64-105 (1982) (reporting on re-
search demonstrating that reliance on rules and rights is more common in the male experience). 
Within the more specific debate about achieving fairness for women when families divorce, other 
feminist scholars mainlain that a decisionmaking model that recognizes the complexity of relation-
ships has more promise. See Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strate-
gies, 4 Goo. J. LEGAL Ennes I, 8-12 (1990). 
540. See Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. 
FLA. L. REv. 627, 643-44 (1987) (arguing that rights belong both to the family as a group, and to 
each individual family member and when competing rights need to be accommodated, the rights of 
the weaker party should take priority over the privacy rights of the family). 
541. SUSAN M. aKIN. JuSTICE. GENDER AND TIlE FAMILY 32 (1989); see also Garrison, supra 
note 76, at 46, arguing that 
The lack of an established ethical tradition relating to child support may help to explain pol-
icy makers' failure to articulate a theoretical basis for current support guidelines, but does not 
excuse it. In a society in which law will prescribe the economic relationships of at least half 
of the children and their parents, we cannot afford to disregard issues of justice between fam-
ily members. The family as a set of affective and altruistic relationships may lie beyond the 
realm of justice, but family law most certainly does not. 
542. Younger, supra note 515, at 1376; see also Schneider, supra note 515, at 229. 
543. Application of fault-based grounds for divorce involve substantial judicial discretion. See 
supra notes 110, 114-149 and accompanying text. No-fault grounds, on the other hand, which in-
volve proof of more objective facts like the length of separation, require little or no judicial discre-
tion in their application. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text. 
544. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text. 
545. See supra note 406 and accompanying text. 
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that these no-fault grounds have achieved the goals of reducing acrimony 
and trauma to families, particularly children, experiencing divorce.546 In 
abusive marriages, the evidence is quite clear that easier access to di-
vorce protects women and children.547 
The most significant shift from discretion to rules in the no-fault era 
has been in the area of child support.548 The rules that have resulted in 
the move from a broad standard to fIxed formulae for establishing child 
support certainly need to be refmed.549 However, the new child support 
rules have secured rights for children. The debate about the rules and the 
resulting standards have also communicated the message that non-
custodial parents should take responsibility for their children, even when 
the obligation to support signfficantly inhibits personal autonomy. 
Limited acceptance of the primary caretaker rule to replace the 
broad discretionary best interests standard for child custody decisions 
represents a similar trend.550 Some have advocated the adoption of this 
rule from a perspective of fairness to mothers.55! Others argue that apply-
ing the rule will be less costly and reduce delays for litigants.552 How-
ever, most of the support for this rule, comes as a result of the research 
demonstrating that it protects children. better than the indeterminate best 
interests standard.553 
Developments in alimony law in the last decade also reveal substan-
tial support for discarding the prevailing discretionary standard and mov-
ing to a rule based approach. A number of proposals emphasize income 
sharing to equalize the post-divorce standards of living.554 The widely cir-
culated and debated555 American Law Institute Principles of the Law of 
546. See supra notes 395, 407 and accompanying text. 
547. See Furstenberg & Cherlin, supra note 407. 
548. See supra notes 481-513 and accompanying text. 
549. See id. 
550. See supra notes 458-63 and accompanying text. 
551. See Becker, supra note 461, at 175-83. But see Schneider, supra note 195, at 2215, 2216 
(discussing judicial discretion in custody cases and arguing that, despite its weaknesses, the best in-
terest standard should be retained). 
552. See Mwphy, supra note 386, at 133-34. 
553. See supra notes 457-80 and accompanying text. 
554. See Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FoRI). 
HAM L. REV. 539, 563-64, 573, 578-83, 592 (1990); Jana Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The 
Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2423 (1994); 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests at Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSS-
ROADS 159-60 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (proposing a system in which 
each spouse's interest in post-divorce income would be based on the length of marriage). 
555. See J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 801 (1997); Carl Schneider, Rethinking Alimony? Marital Decisions and Moral Dis-
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Family Dissolution (ALI principles)S56 have developed alimony formulae, 
which have compensation of a spouse for fmancial loss arising from the 
dissolution of the marriage as one of its principal goalS.SS7 The ALI prin-
ciples emphasize fairness and encourage sharing rather than need or fault. 
The goal of these principles is to return spouses to their premarital situa-
tions in short marriages and, in longer marriages to compensate fman-
cially vulnerable spouses for their marital investment. Another major 
theme of the principles is to replace the discretionary alimony system 
with a more rule-based one. 
Some rule-based formulae for property distribution and alimony 
have found their way into law.sSg Research on their impact to achieve the 
goals of fairness, equality or protection of vulnerable family members is 
yet to be done. These proposals, along with the child support and cus-
tody rules already in place, offer the promise of securing commitment 
and responsibility among family members. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Family law has undergone substantial changes since the fIrst "no 
fault" divorce statute in 1970. These changes have reduced the role of 
fault in divorce, custody, visitation and alimony. This diminished role of 
fault has reduced the emphasis in family law on sexual misconduct. Be-
cause family law jurisprudence has traditionally labelled sexual miscon-
duct issues as "moral," cases and statutes since the adoption of no-fault 
divorce have fewer explicit references to morality. This change in the 
language of family law, along with increases in both rates of divorce and 
single-parent families over the last three decades, have caused both 
policymakers and scholars to comment on the decline of morality in fam-
ily law. This Article has challenged the assumption that the decline in the 
role of fault has meant diminished emphasis on morality in either the 
language or the substance of family law. 
Two streams of contemporary thought have informed the under-
standing of the term morality. The fIrst, which has been developed by 
contemporary moral philosophers building on the classical tradition, 
course, 1991 BYU L. REv. 197 (1997); Swisher, supra note 388, at 298-300. 
556. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUI"E, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLtmON: ANALYSIS 
AND REcOMMENDATIONS. TENrATIVE DRAFT No.2 (Mar. 14, 1996) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
557. See id. 
558. See 31 MINN. REv. STAT. ANN. § 518.6111 (West Supp. 1999); MICH COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§ 722.3 (West Supp. 1998); Gregory 1.M. v. Carolyn A.M., 442 A.2d 1373, 1377 (Del. 1982); Ball 
v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Pa. 1994). 
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teaches that morality is about practicing virtues. There is much debate 
within this group of communitarian philosophers about the degree to 
which certain virtues have universal appeal; the importance of different 
virtues varies among cultures and changes over time. However, there is 
some consensus that caring for children is a core feature of most socie-
ties' moral systems. Within the context of contemporary American family 
law, there is much evidence that caring for children has become the 
moral imperative. 
The second stream of thought relates to rights and their connection 
to morality. A substantial body of commentary suggests that "rights talk" 
is hostile to the notions of care and interconnectedness that are essential 
to the family and its role in protecting children. But the concept of rights 
has been reconceived by feminists and others to emphasize protection of 
vulnerable and dependent family members, especially children. This con-
ception of rights rejects the focus on autonomy in traditional liberal 
rights discourse and is compatible with more communitarian values. 
This scholarship, which suggests a broader meaning of morality and 
rights, has revealed the substantial limitations in the view of morality 
during the fault-era. The emphasis on sexual conduct during the fault-era 
combined with broad discretionary standards, reinforced traditional gen-
der roles in family law and contributed to inadequate financial support 
for custodial parents and children. The broader concept of morality, with 
its emphasis on the virtues of care and protection of children, has pro-
vided both a new language for moral discourse and a new perspective 
from which to evaluate developments in family law over the last three 
decades. While some of these developments address issues that are more 
traditional "moral" issues, such as the meaning of commitment in mar-
riage, others address issues that are more commonly thought of as eco-
nomic or psychological issues, such as how to guarantee adequate sup-
port for children and how to evaluate parental fitness. 
Still other developments have brought family law into an area that 
the law declined to regulate during the fault era-preventing family 
abuse. Finally, the emerging shift from discretion to rules on key issues 
involving children evidences a new understanding that the concept of 
rights is not anti-family; rather, strengthening the laws that express the 
commitments family members owe to another, particularly parents to 
children, can strengthen families. All of these changes have a moral di-
mension and enhance the virtues of commitment and responsibility, p'ar-
ticularly to children. 
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Creating a family policy559 that fulfIlls what I have characterized as 
the central moral imperative of family law, protection of children, is an 
ambitious goal that is still unrealized.560 Despite the widespread rhetoric 
suggesting that this country sees our children as its greatest resource,561 
there is still an enormous gap between that rhetoric and the existence of 
policies that protect children.562 Much of the gap can be attributed to the 
large costs associated with issues like adequate health care and child 
care.563 But part of the gap can be attributed to a lack of consensus about 
how to achieve the goal of protecting children. 
A number of areas of the law have a critical role to play. Welfare 
law, labor law, social security law and tax law, all playa significant role 
in the well-being of children. However, family law still has a leading 
role to play in improving the lives of children. If the focus of family law 
is returned to punishing the sexual misconduct of married couples there 
will be little hope that this area of the law will improve the lives of chil-
dren. The developments outlined in this Artic1e--child custody and visi-
tation laws that evaluate parental fitness based on their capacity to harm 
or help their children rather than on their sexual misconduct; laws that 
provide legal protection to family members who are abused by other 
family members; child support that is predictable and more widely en-
forced-all have the potential of promoting the moral goal of protecting 
children. Future refmements of these laws are needed but should be eval-
uated from a perspective that incorporates both the concepts and the lan-
guage of this new morality in family law. 
559. Family policy can be broadly defined as "objectives concerning family well·being and 
the specific measures taken by governmental bodies to achieve them." Jacqueline B. Stanfield, Fam-
ily Policy in America: A Continuing Controversy, 50 REv. OF Soc. EcON. 420, 424 (1992) (citing 
Joan Aldous & Wilfried Dumon, Family Policy in the 198Os: Controversy and Consensus, in CON. 
TEMPORARY FAMILIES: LooKING FORWARD LooKING BACK (Alan Booth ed., 1991». 
560. As one commentator put it, despite the emphasis on children's welfare in contemporary 
family law, "[o]ur society does not embrace a child-centered morality generally." Altman, supra 
note 80, at 346. 
561. See, e.g., HILLARy RODHAM CUNTON. IT TAKES A Vll.LAGE: AND OrnER LESSONS CmL-
DREN TEACH Us 318 (1996) ("[N]othing is more important to our shared future than the well-being 
of children."). 
562. See, e.g., KIDS COUNT: STATE PROALES OF CmLD WEU.-BEING (Annie E. Casey Founda-
tion 1997) (finding that children growing up in poor communities today "face tough odds" including 
being at greater risk of being sick and having inadequate health care; of being parents before they 
complete school; of being users of easily available drugs; of being exposed to violence; and of being 
incarcerated before they are old enough to vote). 
563. See Gilbert Steiner, Looking for Family Policy---Big Tickets on Moral Judgments, in THE 
POLITICS AND PROGRAMS OF FAMILY POUCY. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MAN (J. Aldous & W. 
Dumon eds., 1980). 
